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Political ideology is defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it 
can be achieved” (Tedin, 1987, p. 65). Political parties in the United States embrace a set of 
political ideologies that could be translated into a firm’s ideology by the individuals within the 
corporation who subscribe to the ideology. Hence, a political ideology could potentially 
influence the firm’s decision-making and the firm’s policies. Using political contributions to 
political parties by individuals within a firm as the proxy for a firm’s political ideology, this 
study analyses the relationship between political ideologies and audit fees. This study is drawn 
by the concept of the self-categorisation theory where individuals categorise themselves and 
act as a group. Therefore, an individual’s ideology could become a shared ideology within a 
group/corporation. 
The main research question that this study attempts to answer is the following: Do firms’ 
political ideologies influence audit fees? To answer this research question, this thesis 
hypothesises that political ideologies do affect firms’ policies, affect auditors’ judgement on 
business risks and, ultimately, affect audit fees. Specifically, this study hypothesises that 
Republican- (Democrat-) leaning firms are associated with lower (higher) audit fees. This study 
also hypothesises that financial report quality could be a possible channel through which 
political ideology influences the audit fee. 
This study has several motivations. First, although prior literature has suggested that political 
ideology could influence firm outcomes and policies, no prior study has examined the 
relationship between political ideology and audit fees. Second, political ideologies could 
influence firms’ financial outcomes and potentially affect an auditor’s judgement on risks. It is 
important to analyse how political ideology plays a role in determining an auditor’s perception. 




documented that investors choose to invest their funds in firms that subscribe to a preferred 
political ideology. Political ideology also influences investment decisions, such as investments 
in mergers and acquisitions and in corporate social responsibility. Thus, the study on political 
ideology could have significant implications for the capital market. Finally, the fourth 
motivation is to examine how the divergence of the political ideologies in the U.S. could have 
implications for businesses. A recent survey shows the Republicans and the Democrats have 
diverged from each other in terms of their ideologies and views towards public policies. It is 
interesting to examine this divergence in ideologies and its impact on businesses.   
This study uses the aggregate political contributions to political parties made by employees of 
a firm as the measure of the political orientation of a firm. The sample consists of listed firms 
included in the Compustat database from the year 2000 to 2016. They are two main hypotheses 
in this study. First, I hypothesise that Republican- (Democrat-) leaning firms are associated 
with lower (higher) audit fees. Second, I synthesise that Republican-leaning firms are 
associated with lower audit quality because these firms provide higher quality financial reports.  
The results from using 14,112 firm-year observations indicate that Republican-leaning firms 
are associated with lower audit fees, suggesting that Republican-leaning firms are more 
conservative and take less risk. Conversely, firms that are leaning towards the Democrats are 
significantly associated with higher audit fees, signalling that Democrat-leaning firms could 
have a higher level of risk tolerance. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, 
I analyse financial reporting quality to provide possible explanations of the relationship 
between political ideologies and audit fees. I examine whether or not there are differences in 
financial reporting quality between Republican and Democrat-leaning firms. I use 
conservatism and discretionary accrual scores as the proxies for financial report quality. I find 
that Republican-leaning firms are positively associated with accounting conservatism 




This finding signifies that Republican-leaning firms are more conservative than their 
Democrat-leaning counterparts. Additionally, using both the Jones and the Modified Jones 
models, I find that Republican-leaning firms are associated with less earnings management. 
The results suggest that financial reporting quality could be the possible explanation for the 
manner in which political ideologies affect audit fees. The endogeneity tests conducted by 
using the Heckman selection method, a propensity score matching process and difference-in-
differences for the audit fee analyses are consistent with the main analyses. 
Furthermore, the additional tests reveal that Republican-leaning firms are associated with a 
higher negative value of discretionary accruals. These findings imply that Republican firms are 
associated with an income-decreasing earnings management, also signalling a higher degree of 
conservatism and, hence, lower audit fees. Indicated by higher audit report lag, the additional 
tests also suggest that auditors spend more time and place more audit efforts to conduct the 
audits of Democrat-leaning firms. After controlling for lobbying activities, conservatism 
scores, discretionary accruals, corporate governance variables and political indicators, the 
results for the relationship between political ideology and audit fees still remain qualitatively 
unchanged.  
This study fills the gap in the literature by providing the evidence that political ideology could 
influence audit fees. This thesis contributes to the growing accounting and finance literature 
that suggests that cultures, values, and political ideologies could affect a firm’s decision-
making and policies. This thesis also contributes to the literature by providing evidence that 





Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Corporate involvement in politics is an essential part of a business strategy and a firm’s 
involvement in the realm of politics can be observed through corporate political activity (CPA). 
Corporate political activities are defined as the proactive actions of firms to favourably 
influence public policy (Baysinger, 1984; Ozer, 2010). Government policies are critical sources 
of uncertainty and have control over critical resources that determine the firms’ 
competitiveness (Hillman & Hitt, 1999, p. 825-826). Moreover, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
argue that the political sector could influence wealth transfers between various groups and that 
corporations, in particular, are vulnerable to these wealth redistributions (p.115). The uncertain 
nature of business also increases the firm’s dependency on policymakers (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980) since there is significant interdependence between the firm’s competitiveness and 
government policy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Murtha & Lenway, 1994). Businesses consider 
political strategies because the decisions made by the regulators and policymakers could 
consequently affect businesses (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Shaffer, 1995). Thus, corporations 
tend to retain their competitiveness by engaging in political activities that arguably should 
allow firms to receive preferential treatment by the government (Faccio, 2006; Hillman & Hitt, 
1999; Khwaja & Mian, 2005).  
The government plays an important role in businesses, as its actions affect firm 
competitiveness and in turn firm performance. The major and substantial sources of uncertainty 
for firms are government policies that shape the firms’ competitive environment (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999). Thus, there is substantial interdependence between the firm’s competitiveness and 
government policies. Hillman and Hitt (1999) further explain that hundreds of policies are 
issued each year and that these new policies increase the uncertainty for firms because the 




Therefore, engaging in political activity could be the firm’s attempt to influence the 
government to produce policies that are favourable to the firm. For instance, the government 
can influence entry and exit barriers, market size through government purchases, import 
policies, taxes, and other cost structures including employment and pollution costs (Goldman, 
Rocholl, & So, 2009; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
CPAs are still debatable topics in the U.S. and important to study further, especially 
after a notable event such as the Supreme Court decision on Citizens United in 2010 that relaxed 
the constraints on the firms’ spending on CPAs (Chen, Parsley, & Yang, 2015).12 The 
importance of CPAs has been established by prior research, and CPAs have been defined as 
proactive actions to influence policymakers, although Snyder (1992) states that “despite years 
of research by political scientists and economists, the extent to which money actually buys 
political influence on a regular basis remains a mystery” (p. 15). Firms extend their efforts and 
strategy to influence public policy decisions and remain competitive because public policy has 
significant impacts on the firms’ performance (Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 2014). Specifically, 
firms engage in CPA as a tool to shape policies in a way favourable to the firm (Baysinger, 
1984; Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Corporations even 
employ separate but overlapping political strategies/activities to influence public policies 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). 
Prior research in accounting and finance have focused on three main forms of CPA: 
political connections (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2012; Boubakri et al., 2012; Chaney, Faccio, 
& Parsley, 2011; Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2009; Gul, 2006; Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 
                                                          
 
1 See https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/02/how-citizens-united-changed-campaign-finance/ for the details 
of the case and for information on the increase in the firms’ spending on CPAs. 
2 However, individual investors might not necessarily perceive the case to reflect big business’s objectives and 




2014), corporate lobbying (Blau, Brough, & Thomas, 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Igan, Mishra, & 
Tressel, 2011; Kim, 2008; Kong, Radhakrishnan, & Tsang, 2017; Yu & Yu, 2011) and the 
political contributions or Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions (Akey, 2015; 
Brown, Drake, & Wellman, 2015; Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Heflin & Wallace, 
2015; Jiang, Kumar, & Law, 2016; Ovtchinnikov & Pantaleoni, 2012) as proxies for the firm’s 
involvement in politics.3 These three main forms of CPA are the common strategies for firms 
to maintain and foster relationships with politicians (Houston et al., 2014), and firms can even 
employ more than one of these strategies to savour incremental benefits (Brown et al., 2015).  
In this study, there are two main motivations for further examining CPAs. The first 
motivation is based on the past scholars’ studies that have documented contradicting outcomes 
of CPAs. A considerable number of studies have focused on the economic benefits of engaging 
in CPAs (e.g., Akey, 2015; Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2012; Brown, Drake, & Wellman, 
2015; Chen, Parsley, & Yang, 2015; Ovtchinnikov & Pantaleoni, 2012; Unsal, Hassan, & 
Zirek, 2016). The benefits of engaging in CPAs include obtaining government contracts 
(Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 2013; Dicko, 2016), lowering tax rates (Brown et al., 2015; Kim 
& Zhang, 2016), generating abnormal stock returns (Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; 
Kim, 2008), lowering the interest rates charged by lenders (Houston et al., 2014) and achieving 
better firm performance (Chen et al., 2015; Ovtchinnikov & Pantaleoni, 2012).  
Although scholars have provided some evidence that CPAs could benefit businesses, 
prior literature has also proposed that CPAs also come with risks. Ozer & Alakent (2012) argue 
that the uncertain nature of CPA causes shareholders to face greater information asymmetries. 
They also argue that shareholders often question and are concerned about these types of 
                                                          
 
3 Akey (2015) suggests that these three prominent forms of CPA are substitutes for and correlated to one another, 
although PACs could also be seen as complementary to lobbying because PACs provide firms access to politicians 




activities that create a “divergence of interests in corporate political strategy between managers 
and owners” (p. 2). Werner and Coleman (2015) also argue that “Within the realm of CPA, 
scholars argue that managers introduce agency costs not only by using more firm funds than 
are optimal in the political process but by using these funds to pursue public policies that benefit 
management (p. 128).” Further, managers also have the discretion to be involved in riskier 
CPA choices as well as pursuing personal benefits (Boubakri et al., 2013; Ozer & Alakent, 
2012). Thus, this evidence suggests that CPA could increase agency costs because managers 
might not be acting in the best interests of the owners. Prior studies also provide some evidence 
that politically active firms are also associated with poorer accruals’ quality and higher audit 
fees (Chaney, Faccio, & Parsley, 2011; Gul, 2006; Heflin & Wallace, 2015), are perceived as 
risky by lenders (Bliss & Gul, 2012) and that the lobbying by financial institutions/firms 
resulted in more risky lending during the financial crisis (Igan et al., 2011). Given the risky 
nature of CPA and potential asymmetric information, it is important to examine how auditor 
perceives the riskiness of political activities. I use audit fee as the proxy of auditors’ risk 
perception as suggested by prior research (e.g. Bell, Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001). 
The second motivation to more deeply examine CPA is because corporations in the 
United States spend billions of dollars on CPAs to obtain potential economic benefits. The 
amount and frequency of corporate lobbying and PAC contributions increased significantly, 
especially after the Citizens United case shock (Coates IV, 2012). Given the risks attributed to 
CPAs, spending a huge amount of money on politics might not be in the best interest of 
shareholders. An interesting example would be Enron, which incorporated lobbying into its 
business strategy. Enron spent $5 million on lobbying during the period from 1997 to 2002 (Yu 
& Yu, 2011). The amount of dollars spent by businesses on CPAs also doubled from 1998 to 
2008. In 1998, U.S. firms expensed $1.45 billion for lobbying, and the figure increased to $3.30 




lobbying, and the top 20 PAC contributors in 2015 and 2016 spent over $50 million 
(OpenSecrets, 2016). Based on Kong et al. (2017) study’s sample, the number of firms that 
reported incurred expenses for lobbying increased from 4% in 2001 to 10% in 2012. Similar to 
corporate expenditures for lobbying, the top 10 largest political contributions made by 
individuals have been increasing, reaching $155.78 Million in the 2015–2016 election cycle 
alone (Federal Election Commission, 2016). Firms establishing political connections also show 
a similar increasing trend. Houston et al. (2014) provide an example of a USA Today study 
revealing that 39% of companies have politically connected directors and that the percentage 
increased to 55% in 2000. In their study, Houston et al. (2014) also document that 43% of the 
total firms in their sample had established political connections. Among academics, 
policymakers and the media, the increasing trend in political connections, the increase in 
spending and the large amount outlaid for CPAs have attracted much attention, especially 
regarding the antecedents, outcomes and effectiveness of CPA. 
 













This study extends the CPA literature further by considering the political ideologies as 
one of the factors that affect the firms’ involvement in CPAs and that could influence the firms’ 
financial outcomes. Political ideology is defined by Erikson and Tedin, (2015) as a “set of 
beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (p. 64). Political ideology 
is important to examine with respect to the economy and the business environment. Hankla 
(2006) argues that “by far the most frequent explanation for relative government involvement 
in economic affairs is political ideology” (p. 1). Prior literature has documented that political 
contribution is used to indicate an individual’s / manager’s political ideology that could be 
translated into the firms’ political ideology (Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Wu, 2016; Hutton, Jiang, 
& Kumar, 2015), although “individuals have a variety of motivations when making political 
contributions, including ideological, partisan, access-driven, or identity-based” (Ovtchinnikov 
& Pantaleoni, (2012), p. 371). Hutton et al. (2015) argue that a firm’s / manager’s political 
ideology often indicates the core values of a political party. In other words, by contributing to 
the party, a firm also subscribes to the party’s core values and ideologies. By an active 
involvement in political activities, managers or employees could also promote their political 
ideologies (Mathur, Singh, Thompson, & Nejadmalayeri, 2013). Furthermore, although a 
company does not have political preferences per se, Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2012) 
argue that companies have economic agendas and interests in various legislative actions, 
regulatory decisions and other political outcomes. Therefore, companies make political 
contributions to influence the political process that could improve a firm’s economic 
performance.  
In this thesis, I examine whether as the proxy for political ideologies, political 
contributions are associated with audit fees. Specifically, this study investigates the 
relationship between political ideologies and audit fees. Thus, this research attempts to answer 




studies have placed more attention on political ideology, which can be considered as one of the 
interesting characteristics of a firm that could influence financial outcomes. Therefore, this 
study also aims to analyse if political ideology as one of the cultural attributes of a firm could 
play an important role in determining a firm’s policies.  
The following factors motivate this study on political ideology. First, although political 
activities/political contributions have attracted the attention of interest groups such as investors 
and regulators4, no prior published study has investigated the relationship between political 
ideologies and audit pricing. While prior studies on audit fees have examined a considerable 
wide range of corporate political activity variables, such as political connections (Bliss & Gul, 
2012, 2012; Gul, 2006; Wahab, Zain, & Kieran, 2011) and political contributions (Heflin & 
Wallace, 2015), there has been little evidence provided regarding the impact of firm-level 
political ideology on audit pricing. Since prior literature has documented that political ideology 
could also influence financial outcomes (e.g., Elnahas & Kim, 2017; Francis et al., 2016; 
Hutton et al., 2014; Unsal et al., 2016), it is interesting to examine whether political ideology 
could influence the auditors’ perceptions of audit risks. This study on political ideology could 
shed some light on why companies engage in political activities since the literature has not 
provided a clear answer on why companies engage in political activities and the empirical 
results are inconsistent (Brasher & Lowery, 2006). 5 
Second, a strand of literature has provided evidence that political orientation could 
affect the firms’ decisions and corporate policies (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 
2015; Francis et al., 2016; Hutton et al., 2014). The possible explanation for the relationship 
                                                          
 
4 See Appendix 3 for media coverage on political activities that have attracted the investors’ and the regulators’ 
attention. 
5 Brasher and Lowery (2006) refer to the lobbying activities and question the motivation of companies that engage 




between political ideology and firm policies is the alignment of the manager’s political 
ideology with the firm’s goals and objectives (Unsal et al., 2016). Research has suggested that 
there are differences in firm policies and outcomes when a firm or management team subscribes 
to a political ideology. McClosky (1964) designates the Republicans as the conservatives and 
the Democrats as the liberals. It would be interesting to study the impacts of these different 
ideologies on the firm’s policies and financial outcomes. Prior literature suggests that political 
orientation affects firm performance and output. For example, Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2013) 
document that a more politically diverse corporate board is associated with higher firm 
performance and lower agency costs. They also suggest that more diverse political orientation 
within the board might improve effectiveness, which leads to higher performance. Hutton, 
Jiang, & Kumar (2014) provide another example where political ideology could have an impact 
on firm policies. Particularly, they document that Republican managers exhibit more 
conservative behaviour by making less risky investments, spending less for research and 
development (R&D), and by lowering capital expenditures and the level of corporate debt. 
Unsal et al. (2016) find a less conservative approach by CEOs for corporate decisions on 
lobbying activities, as they find Republican-leaning CEOs spend more on corporate lobbying, 
lobby the greatest number of bills and issues and employ the greatest number of lobbyists. 
Recent studies on tax sheltering also suggest that political ideology could also affect a firm’s 
tax-sheltering behaviour. Francis et al. (2016) find that compared to their Democratic 
counterparts, Republican CEOs are more likely to engage in tax sheltering. They argue that 
political beliefs influence a CEO’s tax-sheltering decisions regarding tax policies.  
Taken together, these studies advocate that political preference has an impact on 
corporate policies and performance. As Heflin and Wallace (2015) point out, political 
contributions influence auditor decisions and ultimately, affect audit fees. A concurrent study 




and audit pricing. However, the study is at the top executive level and not firm-level. Thus, the 
impact of political ideology and political orientation towards audit risk judgement could be 
interesting to examine further at the firm- and director-level which will be examined deeper in 
this study, as it affects different corporate decisions and their outcomes. 
Third, the motivation to study corporate political ideology is driven by research in the 
capital market. Hong and Kostovetsky's (2012) study reveals Democratic investors are more 
willing to invest funds in companies with better KLD index scores than are Republican 
investors, indicating that these companies are deemed to be more responsible corporate 
citizens. They argue that a large group of investors (Democrats) care about corporate social 
responsibility and that infusing money into socially responsible companies might have an 
impact on the cost of capital, improvements in community programmes, the employees’ 
welfare, and on environmental and other corporate social responsibility factors (Hong & 
Kostovetsky, 2012). The sample used in Hong and Kostovetsky's (2012) study consists of 
professional groups of funds managers, who could exert a significant impact on asset pricing 
as the movement towards socially responsible mutual funds grows. Furthermore, Elnahas and 
Kim (2017) document that Republican CEOs are less likely to engage in merger and acquisition 
activities, signalling more conservative investment decisions. This finding supports the notion 
that the Republican ideology takes a more conservative approach on investment decisions, as 
suggested by (Hutton et al., 2014). Both Elnahas and Kim (2017) and Hong and Kostovetsky 
(2012) suggest that political ideology could play an important role in determining investment 
choice. Therefore, the study of political values and ideologies might have significant 
implications for the capital market and investment decisions. 
Fourth, the ability to study the role of political ideology in the U.S. is useful for theory 
testing since there are two parties in the U.S. with divergent political ideologies that arguably 




Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012; Hutton et al., 2014, 2015). In addition, the two political parties 
have extreme views for example, those regarding tax policies6 that provide a better setting for 
testing the political ideology theory. A study by Christensen et al. ( 2015) confirms that there 
are differences in the corporate decision, particularly on tax avoidance between top executives 
who lean to the Republican party and those who lean to the Democrats. Even more important 
is the fact that corporations are vulnerable to these wealth redistributions (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978). Bipartisan or distinct ideologies in American history date back to the early 
19th century when both Democrats and Whigs were divided along pro- and anti-abolition lines, 
which facilitated the creation of bipartisan alliances. After the civil war, the conservative white 
Southerners blamed Abraham Lincoln’s Republican administration of laying waste to their 
homeland. Therefore, many conservative Southerners moved to the Democratic Party, making 
the political ideologies of the two groups overlap. However, in the 1960s, the Democrats placed 
more emphasis on racial equality, and over generations, this emphasis has managed to shift 
Southerners back to the Republican Party, and the divergence in ideologies has grown even 
larger. The recent Pew Research Centre survey shows that the gap between the Democrats and 
the Republicans in terms of ideology is growing wider as well in other government policies, 
such as racial discrimination and immigration. For example, since 1994, the partisan gap 
between the Republicans and the Democrats in positions across political values has increased 
over the years. This statistic shows the importance of examining how these political ideologies 
could play a significant role in business. The evidence in this thesis could also be applicable in 
other countries, such as the U.K. with its Conservative and Labour party and Australia with its 
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Liberal and Labour party, where there are dominant parties with distinct ideologies that could 
arguably have impacts on the economy.  
 
Figure 2. The Bipartisan Gap over the years and based on a Survey conducted by the Pew 
Research Center.7 
 
This study tests two hypotheses: (1) Compared to Republican-leaning firms, Democrat-
leaning firms are associated with higher audit fees. (2) Republican-leaning firms are associated 
with higher financial reporting quality. The first hypothesis predicts the relationship between a 
firm’s political ideology and audit fees, while the second hypothesis provides a channel on how 
political ideology influences an auditor’s judgement on business risks that ultimately influence 
audit fees. Specifically, the second hypothesis predicts that compared to their Democrat-
                                                          
 





leaning counterparts, Republican-leaning firms are associated with a higher degree of 
conservatism and with reporting less discretionary accruals. The tests for hypothesis 2 also 
provide corroborating evidence of how political ideology could influence audit fees. 
This study uses the firm-aggregate individual contributions of a firm’s employees as 
the proxy of a firm’s political ideology. Previous studies have used PAC contributions (Akey, 
2015; Cooper et al., 2010; Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Keim 
& Baysinger, 1988) or higher-level employees’ contributions (e.g., Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 
2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017; Francis et al., 2016; Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012) as the measure 
for political activity. Akey (2015) states that “(a PAC) can solicit contributions from the 
members of the firm and donate them as the PAC sees fit” (p. 3194). Some political agendas 
of certain employees might not be aligned with the objective of the PAC and thus might not be 
captured in the PAC. However, firm-aggregate individual contributions of all employees are 
interesting to examine because higher-level employees (white-collar employees) and lower-
level employees (blue-collar employees) could have different views and purposes when they 
make political donations (Dutt & Mitra, 2005; Hibbs, Rivers, & Vasilatos, 1982; Hibbs & 
Vasilatos, 1982). Therefore, the firm-aggregate individual contributions of employees could 
capture the different political agendas of all employees within a firm. 
Although prior studies have used higher-level employees’ contributions as the proxy 
for the firm’s political ideology (e.g., Francis et al., 2016; Hutton et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2013; 
Unsal et al., 2016), the higher-level employees’ contribution itself would not be truly 
representative of the whole company’s political agenda. Thus, the aggregate all-employee 
contributions might be a more appropriate proxy for the firm’s political ideology as a whole. 
Although Akey (2015) also suggests that individual contributions may reflect the individual’s 
own personal political agenda and biases, based on the self-categorisation theory where 




individual contributions could depict the whole organisation’s political ideology objectives. 
Nevertheless, this study also tests the relationship between political ideology and audit fees by 
using both the PAC and the higher-level employees’ contributions as alternative proxies for 
the firms’ political ideologies.8 
To measure the political inclination of a firm, the main experimental variables are the 
corporate political ideology (CPID), as it has been used in several prior studies (Francis et al., 
2016; Hutton et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2013; Unsal et al., 2016), and the firms’ total contributions 
to Republicans (LOGREP) and to Democrats (LOGDEM). Political contributions to 
Republicans and Democrats are used to reflect an individual political preference rather than 
merely to establish political connections with politicians or to facilitate an appointment of a 
politician favoured by the firm (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, & Snyder, 2003). By using the 
political donations of all employees, including managers and lower level employees, the results 
of this study show that there are differences in audit fees for firms embracing different political 
ideologies. 
Using a supply-side explanation9 for audit fees, this study finds that there are 
differences in audit fees based on the different political ideologies of firms. Specifically, using 
14,112 observations from the year 2000 to 2016, the main test shows that Democrat-leaning 
firms are associated with higher audit fees, while Republican-leaning firms are associated with 
lower audit fees. Higher audit fees imply that compared to Republican-leaning firms, 
Democrat-leaning firms are considered more risky because auditors might not be able to 
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the auditor (Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006, p. 146). Auditors provide a differentiated audit service quality and 
audit fees depending on a client’s attributes (e.g. client size, client risk, client complexity, etc.), auditor attributes 




discover the Democrat-leaning firms’ material misstatements. Using the smaller samples of 
executives and directors, I obtain consistent results. Furthermore, this study also finds similar 
results when using PAC contributions as the sample. To test the party and presidential 
incumbency effect, I divide the sample into two periods: President Bush’s (Republican era) 
period and President Obama’s (Democratic era) period. Both tests suggest that Democrat-
leaning firms are paying higher audit fees, consistent with the main results.  
To provide an examination of the influence of political ideology on audit fees, I 
hypothesise whether there is a differential financial reporting quality between Republican- and 
Democrat-leaning firms. I use conservatism and discretionary accruals as the proxies for 
financial reporting quality. Conservatism is chosen as the proxy of financial reporting quality, 
as conservatism affects the quality of the accounting numbers reported in the balance sheet and 
income statement (Penman & Zhang, 2002). Arguably, higher conservatism should increase 
the financial reporting quality. Less conservative accounting numbers could also increase an 
auditor’s inherent risks (Gul, Srinidhi, & Shieh, 2002). Linking conservatism and Republican 
ideology, prior literature in psychology finds that right-wing ideology is associated with 
conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Muller, 2001; Wilson, 1973; 
Wilson & Patterson, 1968). Hence, I expect Republican-leaning firms are associated with a 
higher degree of conservatism than their Democrats counterparts are. Using a conservatism 
score (the C_SCORE), following Khan and Watts (2009), I find that Republican leaning-firms 
are positively associated with conservatism. The positive association indicates that Republican-
leaning firms are more conservative, consistent with past literature, which finds that 
Republican ideology is more conservative (Hutton et al., 2014, 2015). In addition, I also test 
conservatism by using Hutton et al.'s (2014) novel proxies, such as capital expenditures, stock 
return volatility (SDRET), R&D expenditures and return on assets (ROA). The results show 




fewer debts, spend less on R&D and are more likely to invest in less risky projects. These 
findings support the assumption that Republican firms are more conservative than their 
Democrat counterparts.  
I also test whether discretionary accruals can be a channel in which political ideology 
could affect audit fees. Discretionary accruals are often used as a proxy for earnings 
management. As management could opportunistically manage the firm’s earnings, a higher 
level of discretionary accruals might be an indication of lower financial reporting quality. 
Research has found that discretionary accruals are associated with material misstatement (e.g., 
Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011). Auditors are concerned with material misstatements, and 
failing to detect a misstatement could have an impact on the auditors’ reputation. Thus, auditors 
place more audit efforts in situations where a high degree of discretionary accruals exists. Since 
the Republican ideology is considered a conservative one, I expect a Republican ideology to 
be associated with a lower degree of discretionary accruals. Using Jones (1991) and the 
modified Jones model developed by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), I find Republican-
leaning firms are associated with lower discretionary accruals, signalling that these firms 
provide better-quality financial information. Higher-quality financial information can lower an 
auditor’s detection risks and may reduce audit fees. The corroborating evidence of a lower 
amount of discretionary accruals and more conservatism support the argument that Republican-
leaning firms are associated with lower audit fees because auditors are less likely to discover 
Type II errors and material misstatements. 
I conduct endogeneity tests to alleviate some of the omitted variables’ concerns from 
the analysis. Theses endogeneity tests include the Heckman selection bias tests, propensity 
score matching, and difference-in-differences analyses. The results from the Heckman 
selection bias test and the propensity score matching tests reveal that compared to their 




with the results of the main test. Using a difference-in-differences method, I find that after the 
2008 election year, the firms that shifted their ideology from an extreme Republican one to a 
less extreme Republican ideology paid higher audit fees. I also perform endogeneity tests for 
the conservatism analysis as well as the discretionary accruals. 
I perform several additional analyses to further explain the relationship between 
political ideologies and audit fees. The additional analyses in this study support the premise 
that distinct political ideology preferences have an impact on auditor perceptions. First, I test 
whether political contributions affect the audit fee. Consistent with the agency theory, I find 
that political contributions are associated with higher audit fees. Second, Republican firms are 
related to a higher negative value of discretionary accruals. I find Republican firms are 
associated with higher negative discretionary accruals, signalling that Republican firms are 
more conservative than their Democratic counterparts.  
Third, Democrat-leaning firms are significantly correlated with audit report lags, and 
Republicans firms have a significant negative relationship with an audit report lag. This finding 
suggests that auditors place more effort to conduct the audit for Democrat-leaning firms. 
Fourth, in the multivariate analysis, I control for several factors that could affect the audit fee. 
These controls include discretionary accruals, the C_SCORE, the corporate governance 
variables and other political activities factors, such as lobbying and political indicators. This 
study documents that the results qualitatively remain unchanged after controlling for these 
variables. Finally, I remove extreme Democrats and extreme Republicans from the main 
sample, as there are some concerns that firms contribute to both parties to obtain benefits from 
both parties and from the potential future incumbency. The results remain unchanged after 




The analyses in this study contribute in two ways to the developing topics in accounting 
and finance studies on how a firm’s political ideology might influence a firm’s financial 
outputs. First, to my knowledge, no prior study has focused on the relationship between 
political ideology and audit fees. Therefore, this study sheds some lights on how political 
ideology might have an impact on audit fees. Ultimately, this study will fill the gap in the 
literature by empirically analysing how political ideology could affect audit pricing. This study 
finds that compared to their Republican counterparts, firms that are leaning towards the 
Democrats are paying significantly higher audit fees. Using the Corporate Political Ideology 
(CPID) as the measure of political inclination, this study finds that Democrat-leaning firms are 
positively associated with audit fees. The results are consistent with the premise that the 
Republican ideology is more conservative than the Democratic ideology and that auditors thus 
perceive these firms to be less risky and vice versa.  
Second, this study also contributes to the emerging accounting and finance literature on 
the importance of political ideology as one of the significant firm attributes that might affect 
audit fees. Previous research has focused on another cultural aspect of a firm, such as 
religiosity, and how it affects financial outputs, namely, the auditor’s going-concern opinions 
(Omer, Sharp, & Wang, 2016), risk-taking behaviours (Shu, Sulaeman, & Yeung, 2012) and 
firm policies (Hilary & Hui, 2009). The level of a firm’s religiosity cannot be measured 
directly, as the measure of religiosity is area-based and firms situated in an area possibly might 
not subscribe to the religiosity beliefs in the local area. Unlike religiosity, political 
contributions that ultimately reflect political ideology provide a more direct measure of the 
political values that a firm embraces (Hutton et al., 2015).  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. First, the background and 
framework of this study will be presented in Chapter 2. Second, the related studies are 




hypotheses is drawn from the evidence from prior studies in Chapter 4. Fourth, the 
methodology including the data collection and empirical models are presented in Chapter 5. 
Fifth, the results and discussions are presented in Chapter 6, followed by additional analyses 





Chapter 2. Background of the Study 
 
This chapter provides the background of this study. Specifically, the sections in this 
chapter describe political contributions in the U.S., political ideology and the self-
categorisation theory. The first section provides background on how political contributions 
work in the U.S. together with the mechanism of political contributions in the U.S. The last 
part of this chapter presents the self-categorisation theory as a background theory for this study. 
2.1. Theory of the Firm and Agency Theory - Background Summary 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) extend the property rights literature to the theory of the 
firm. The property rights theory posits that the specifications of rights are generally effected 
through contracting and through the individuals in an organisation, including the managers, 
and will depend upon the nature of these contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These contracts 
emerge as a response to the separation between ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) use the term agency relationship to explain the relationship between the principal and 
the agent.10 An agency relationship is defined “as a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling 
(1976), p. 308). This relationship comes with risks because if both parties are utility 
maximisers, it is reasonable to believe that managers would not always act in the best interest 
of the principal, which raises the incentives for managers to conduct opportunistic behaviour 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fama (1980) explains a firm as a set of contracts between 
management and risk bearers. Fama (1980) describes management as “…a type of labour but 
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with a special role-coordinating the activities of inputs and carrying out the contracts agreed 
among inputs, all of which can be characterised as "decision-making”” (p. 290) and explains 
that risk bearers are set by the contract to accept the uncertain and possibly negative differences 
between total revenues and costs at the end of each production period, assuming a firm rents 
all factors of productions at the beginning of a period and receives payoffs at the end of the 
period. 
 The opportunistic behaviour by managers in the accounting and finance context refers 
to the accounting choice in which managers desire to maximise their benefits at the expense of 
those of others (Henderson, Peirson, & Herbohn, 2010). For instance, managers could choose 
to manipulate accounting numbers to increase income because their compensation is tied to the 
firm’s profit. This behaviour might not necessarily be in the best interest of the shareholders 
but certainly could maximise the managers’ benefits. Another example could be the decision 
to reinvest earnings versus paying larger dividends. Managers may prefer to retain cash for 
future expansion (empire building), whereas shareholders prefer dividends to increase their 
wealth (Henderson et al., 2010). These situations could increase the divergence between the 
shareholders’ and the managers’ interests. The principal has the incentive to limit the 
opportunistic behaviours by the managers by incurring costs, and these costs are also known 
as agency costs. Agency costs consist of “the costs incurred to reduce opportunistic behaviour, 
plus the costs of those forms of opportunistic behaviour that it is not economic to eliminate” 
(Henderson et al., 2010, p. 121). The principal could mitigate the divergence between their 
interests and the managers’ interests by enacting appropriate compensation schemes (and 
bonding costs) or by incurring monitoring costs to alleviate the opportunistic behaviour by 
managers. Jensen & Meckling (1976) encapsulate agency costs as the sum of (1) the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual 




 Managers have the incentive to engage in some forms of opportunistic behaviour, as 
managers often possess more accounting and other information (Lambert, 2001). Thus, agency 
problems could arise because (1) the principal and the agent have different goals and (2) the 
principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved favourably (Eisenhardt, 1989). Based on 
this idea, information asymmetry exists between the principal and the agent because the 
principal does not possess complete information to monitor the agent’s behaviour. If the 
principal has complete information for the management of behaviour and all information is 
available publicly, information symmetry prevails (Harrison & Harrell, 1993, p. 636). 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Darrough and Stoughton (1986) posits that there are two major 
informational aspects of the agency problem: the moral hazard (hidden actions) and adverse 
selection (hidden information). The moral hazard occurs when the agent exerts less effort to 
reduce agency problems. Holmstrom (1979) argues that “the source of this moral hazard or 
incentive problem is an asymmetry of information among individuals that results because 
individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted” (p. 74). For instance, the agent is 
aware that he or she is behaving unfavourably and yet does not make the principal aware of his 
or her behaviour. 
Moreover, moral hazard arises when “the action undertaken by the agent is 
unobservable and has a differential value to the agent compared to the principal” (Darrough & 
Stoughton, 1986, p. 501). Moral hazard can come in many forms notably because of low effort 
from the firms to oversee management behaviours and could be manifested in the form of 
inefficient investments (Tirole, 2010). There are several ways to reduce moral hazard. 
Holmstrom (1979) argue that moral hazard can be completely monitored by imposing contracts 
that penalise dysfunctional behaviour and that thus promote optimal risk sharing. However, 
this form of moral hazard prevention is impractical as a full observation of actions is impossible 




to provide performance-based compensation to managers to align the managers’ interests with 
those of the shareholders (Bernardo, Cai, & Luo, 2001; Gayle & Miller, 2009; Hall & Liebman, 
1998; Tirole, 2010). For example, Bernardo et al. (2001) suggest that another possible way to 
monitor moral hazard problems is through external monitoring, such as monitoring by 
debtholders (Tirole, 2010). Research finds that moral hazard occurs when management exploits 
bank bailouts and consequently takes more risks (Dam & Koetter, 2012). Thus, debtholders 
might be able to monitor management risk-taking behaviour through higher scrutiny and might 
consequently be able to reduce potential moral hazards. Finally, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests 
that one way to discover undesirable management behaviour is by investing more in a better 
information/budgeting system and reporting processes and empowering the board of directors 
and additional layers of management to increase monitoring activities. 
The second aspect of the agency problem is adverse selection. Adverse selection arises 
when the agent has more information than does the principal (Darrough & Stoughton, 1986). 
Thus, adverse selection is closely related to the information asymmetry problem. Adverse 
selection refers to the misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, 
adverse selection occurs because the principal could not verify the agent’s ability during the 
hiring process or while the agent was working. Harrison and Harrell (1993) suggest that the 
agents act to maximise their self-interests when they possess private information that is not 
available to their principal. They find that managers could pursue unprofitable projects in 
exchange for personal benefits. This finding might be irrational for the principal, but it is 
rational for managers who are pursuing self-interests. Thus, such conditions create inefficiency 
because the agent might not always opt for the best long-term contracts (Dionne & Doherty, 
1994; Fudenberg, Holmstrom, & Milgrom, 1990). The adverse selection goes beyond the 
relationship between agent and principal and also extends to the relationship between investors 




assets and increase their offering price in the case of the share offering. This situation later 
could raise a negative reaction to the stock price when investors discover that the assets are 
overvalued (Tirole, 2010). Managers in initial public offerings situation may offer a stock at a 
lower price to attract uninformed investors, as the underpricing acts as a premium to keep them 
in the market (Michaely & Shaw, 1994; Tirole, 2010). Michaely and Shaw (1994) conjecture 
that when the information possessed by the outside investors is less heterogeneous (less adverse 
selection), there will be less underpricing. 
The contracting nature of a firm goes beyond the relationship between the principal and 
the agent, as these contracts also involve other stakeholders such as creditors. Creditors have 
concerns regarding the resources they lend to a firm and how the agents in the firm manage 
these resources. Although some studies suggest that debt could potentially reduce moral hazard 
(e.g., Diamond, 1984, 1991; Krishnaswami, Spindt, & Subramaniam, 1999) because debt 
contracts could add more layers of monitoring, without informing the lender, managers could 
also redistribute resources to owners and other managers (Henderson et al., 2010). In some 
extreme cases, using the borrowed money, managers could pay high dividends to owners and 
pay high compensation amounts to themselves, which is a situation that is not favourable for 
lenders. Thus, this behaviour raises agency problems through the managers’ engagement in 
opportunistic behaviour. This contractual relation can be extended further to include suppliers 
and customers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
One way to reduce the agency problem is to increase monitoring. Monitoring costs 
include employing an external auditor to monitor the managers’ misbehaviour and reduce 
potential conflicts of interest between owners and managers as well as shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Because managers are not always 
acting in the best interest of the principals, the principals suffer from agency costs, which arise 




monitoring mechanism to monitor management behaviour. Fama (1980) argues that a firm is 
disciplined by competition from other firms, which could be an efficient mechanism to monitor 
the performance of individuals within a firm (p. 290). In addition, Fama (1980) also argues that 
individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and 
opportunities provided by the market for their services both within and outside of the firm 
(p.290). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that “the principal can limit divergences from his 
interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs 
designed to limit the aberrant activities, of the agent” (p. 308). This incentives scheme could 
reduce the previously mentioned agency problems, such as moral hazard.  
One of the most prominent forms of monitoring is through an independent audit 
function (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1983). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983) argue that “an audit by someone independent of the manager reduces the incentive 
problems that arise when the firm manager does not own all the residual claims on the firm” 
(p. 613). Historically, even in the earliest forms of corporations, managers have been audited 
by independent parties, although the entity conducting the audit was not designated as an 
“auditor” per se (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983).11 Auditing can also seem to be an effective and 
the less costly method to reduce agency problem, as (DeAngelo, 1981) states, “In at least some 
cases, the provision of audited financial statements is the least-cost contractual response to 
owner-manager and intra-owner conflicts of interest, i.e., agency costs” (p. 185). Furthermore, 
the audit is one of the important monitoring mechanisms that could increase the value of the 
firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Thus, auditing is important as 
an effective monitoring instrument to reduce agency costs and promote firm value. The role of 
                                                          
 




auditing to reduce the agency problem is later discussed in more detail in the following 
subsections.  
2.2. Auditing Roles and the Agency Problem 
 
Although research has found various auditing roles, Hay, Knechel, and Willekens 
(2014) summarise six important roles of auditing: (1) the information role, (2) the agency role, 
(3) the insurance role, (4) the organisational control role, (5) the confirmation role and (6) the 
risk management role.12 These auditing roles are important in providing an economic 
explanation for auditing. The brief explanation of each auditing role is presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
First, auditing could function in an information role. Managers possess better 
information than do owners and outsiders because the managers are directly involved in the 
day-to-day business activities. Thus, this creates an imbalance of knowledge about the business 
between managers and stakeholders. This disproportion in information is called information 
asymmetry (Hay et al., 2014; Wallace, 2004). The main platform for managers to communicate 
about a business is through financial statements. However, managers can opportunistically 
manipulate financial statements, and, thus, the financial statement might not be credible. 
Hence, auditing could assure the validity of the financial statement and increase the credibility 
of the financial information. This role becomes even more crucial for potential future investors, 
as an audited financial report would provide them with more assurance of the financial 
information (Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991). Thus, auditing provides an assurance of the 
information provided in the financial statement. The employing of a higher-quality auditor 
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could also provide a signalling role. By appointing a higher-quality auditor, managers signal to 
investors that the financial information they provide is credible and of a higher quality. 
Second, auditing can function in an agency or a monitoring role. Agency theory 
suggests that auditing could be used as a monitoring function and reduce moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Shareholders and 
other stakeholders may realise that managers act in their personal interests and that they could 
report misleading information (Hay et al., 2014). Therefore, stakeholders have the incentive to 
monitor the managers’ behaviour by employing an external auditor. Managers could also 
employ an external auditor as a monitoring function on behalf of the shareholders as a form of 
corporate governance (Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993). Since agency problems expand to 
outside stakeholders such as creditors, for a firm, auditing could potentially increase its access 
to more favourable debt, perhaps facilitating its ability to receive lower interest rates. 
Third, auditing could play an insurance role or a key role in what is known as the ‘deep 
pocket’ hypothesis. Auditors could face litigation risks and reputation risks if they provide 
inappropriate audit work (Wallace, 2004). The insurance role arises when auditors have the 
incentive to provide high-quality audits because they face litigation risks in the case of audit 
failures. Investors prefer larger audit firms, as these firms should be able to honour their legal 
claims. From the auditor’s point of view, there is an incentive to provide a higher-quality audit 
to maintain their reputation, as their clients might choose other auditors if the current auditor’s 
reputation deteriorates (Skinner & Srinivasan, 2012; Willenborg, 1999). From the creditors’ 
perspective, as creditors are aware of these risks, they therefore consider auditing as a 
mechanism to provide insurance in case the firm fails to pay back its debt. If a firm fails to 
repay debts provided by the external funding providers, creditors could sue the party involved, 
including the directors and management team. However, those parties might not have the 




having ‘deep pockets’ and possessing more resources to provide insurance for the losses (Hay 
et al., 2014). Hence, auditing acts as insurance for future undesirable behaviour or misleading 
reporting (Hay et al., 2014). 
Fourth, an audit can play as an organisational control role, especially for small, family 
and less complex businesses. In small businesses, owners and managers are often directly 
involved in the daily operation and in some cases, the owners are also the managers of the 
organisation. However, these small businesses can become more complex as the business 
grows over time. Increased complexity in businesses also requires more layers of management 
and promotes a higher hierarchy in management. This increase in complexity makes control 
more difficult, which increases the moral hazard and opportunistic behaviour (Hay et al., 2014). 
Auditing research also supports this hypothesis by showing evidence that owners seek auditing 
as a compensatory control system for organisational loss of control in hierarchical 
organisations (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). The owners of private businesses are willing to invest in 
external auditing to compensate for the organisational loss of control because of the growing 
business complexity and hierarchies (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). Abdel-Khalik (1993) also finds that 
audit fees are significantly associated with the number of layers of hierarchy and firm size. 
Fifth, auditing can be employed as a confirmation function. Ball, Jayaraman, and 
Shivakumar (2012) posit that for communicating with investors, audited financial reporting 
and the voluntary disclosure of the private information of the managers are complementary 
mechanisms, not substitutes (p. 163). They further argue “the basic idea is that commitment to 
independent verification of financial outcomes allows managers to credibly disclose private 
information that is costly for investors or auditors to verify directly” (Ball et al., (2012), p. 
136). Hay et al. (2014) also argue that the confirmation hypothesis posits that “it is still 
necessary for announcements to be independently verified at a later stage” (p. 4). Firms that 




investors associate higher audit fees with more frequent, timely, specific, accurate and 
informative financial reports. 
 Finally, auditing can play a risk management role. This is particularly important for 
organisations whose stakeholders are subject to high risks (Hay et al., 2014). Businesses adopt 
risk management mechanisms by employing internal auditors, audit committees and 
independent directors. These mechanisms also increase management risk and business 
complexity because of the interactions between these elements. Audit committee members and 
independent directors themselves are often the stakeholders of the company and have the 
impetus to minimise risks. Hay et al. (2014) argue that “because individual decisions about 
control processes and procedures may shift benefits and costs across groups of stakeholders, 
the net investment in auditing may increase when multiple stakeholders become involved in 
corporate governance decisions. Each stakeholder benefits from a greater level of control, 
while being able to shift a share of the costs to the other stakeholders” (p. 4). This notion is 
supported by Knechel and Willekens (2006) who find that higher audit fees are associated with 
whether or not a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of financial 
risk management, and whether it has a higher proportion of independent directors. 
2.3. Agency Problem, Auditing Quality, and Corporate Political Activities 
 
2.3.1. The Demand for Higher Audit Quality 
The quality of audit services is defined as the “market-assessed joint probability that a 
given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system and (b) report 
the breach” (DeAngelo (1981), p. 186). There are two prominent elements of audit quality: the 
auditor’s competence and the auditor’s independence. The auditor’s competence refers to the 
probability that the auditor will discover a breach in the accounting system, given the audit 




conditional probability of reporting a discovered breach (DeAngelo, 1981). The demand for 
different levels of quality in an audit is determined by the level of agency problems (DeAngelo, 
1981). Because they have higher agency costs, public firms have more incentive than do 
privately held clients to demand a higher quality audit, including a requirement for more 
monitoring. In Chapter 3, I present a brief history of auditing and based on Watts and 
Zimmerman (1983) paper, a more detailed rationale for auditing in the existence of an agency 
relationship. 
In recent years, following corporate scandals involving auditors and because of the 
higher complexity of businesses, there have been continuing demands for better quality audits 
and greater transparency. In their audit quality forum report, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) (2005) suggests, “The principal-agent conflict 
depicted in agency theory, where principals lack reasons to trust their agents because of 
information asymmetries and differing motives, is critical to understanding the development of 
the audit over the centuries as well as its usefulness and purpose. However, in today’s economy 
where companies’ audited financial information is widely available in the public domain, other 
factors are at work, and different interests come into play (p. 5).” These factors are the 
complicating factors, such as the role of auditors as agents, the auditing role in promoting more 
confidence in the capital market, auditing as a tool to protect public interests, and unconscious 
biases that could still influence the demand for audits (Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England & Wales, 2005). Given that research has suggested that political activities could cause 
greater agency problems, the auditing role is necessary to improve accountability and provide 
assurance that the principal’s interests are aligned with those of the agents. Therefore, auditing 
has a significant role in mitigating agency conflicts raised from the agents’ involvement in 




2.3.2. Corporate Political Activities, Agency problems and the Demand for Audit 
Regarding political activities, a corporate political strategy could raise an agency 
problem between owners and managers (Ozer & Alakent, 2012). Political donations made by 
firms can be considered as a type of perquisites consumption which is often not transparent nor 
visible to shareholders (Aggarwal et al., 2012). This involvement in politics, in turn, could 
widen the agency problem and information asymmetry between owners and managers and 
might not necessarily be aligned with the shareholders’ interests (Coates IV, 2012; Ozer & 
Alakent, 2012): this agency problem could lower the returns for the firm (Aggarwal et al., 
2012). For example, Aggarwal et al. (2012) find that firms engaging in political donations are 
associated with the existence of a free cash flow problem (agency problem proxy) and with 
lower returns. Similarly, revealing results inconsistent with the notion that political activity 
serves shareholders’ interests, Coates IV (2012) finds that political activity is negatively 
associated with measures of shareholders power, positively associated with agency costs, and 
negatively associated with shareholder value. Ozer and Alakent (2012) find that institutional 
ownership reduces the propensity of firm involvements in the relational approach of political 
activity. This evidence amplifies the idea that corporate political activities can cause agency 
problems.  
 Ozer and Alakent (2012) also argue that “shareholders will face information 
asymmetries when assessing the effectiveness of their portfolio firms’ political activities and 
that executives of such firms may engage in riskier and short-term strategic choices as well as 
focus on personal managerial benefits” (p. 2). The agency problem surrounding corporate 
political activities is aggravated by the absence of disclosure laws for firms engaging in 
political activities. According to Bebchuk and Jackson (2010), the currently existing law 
governs political activities the similar way it governs ordinary business decisions, which 




not required to report their political activities to shareholders (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2010; Ozer 
& Alakent, 2012). In recent years, shareholders have also demanded that public companies 
increase transparency regarding their political activities such as political contributions and 
lobbying (Ozer & Alakent, 2012). There is anecdotal evidence that at the 2006 annual meeting, 
JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s shareholders demanded that the company disclose how and why the 
company uses its money to engage in political action (Tambe, 2006). Therefore, these strands 
of evidence suggest that there is a possible divergence of interest between managers and owners 
regarding the political activities’ approach. 
Given the lack of transparency and the divergence of management and shareholders’ 
interests, political activities have raised concerns for investors. According to Mathur et al. 
(2013), there are two reasons that political activities might be a concern to investors. First, 
investors are concerned that performance-linked compensation could incentivize managers to 
become involved in politics as a business strategy to boost the company’s short-term 
performance. Using this strategy, managers could earn their compensation payoff at the cost of 
long-term value creation for shareholders, increased information asymmetry, and increased 
agency costs. Second, managers could engage in political activities to foster their political 
agendas, such as building political connections and promoting their political preference. Thus, 
managers could incur political activities’ costs in a wasteful manner without the assurance of 
obtaining value gains (Mathur et al., 2013). These two motivations are dependent on factors 
such as the composition and orientation of top management (Ozer, 2010) and management 
entrenchment in the firm (Mathur et al., 2013). 
An independent audit then becomes an essential monitoring function to reduce agency 
problems. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) argue that “an audit by someone independent of the 




residual claims on the firm” (p. 613).13 Firms with higher agency costs are expected to employ 
higher-quality audit services, and more costly auditors are expected to help mitigate agency 
costs (Gul & Tsui, 1998). The demand for auditing and quality-differentiated auditing are 
viewed as more efficient solutions to costly agency problems (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
Historically, dating back to the early development of corporations, independent auditors have 
been employed to mitigate agency problems (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Since auditing is 
essential for monitoring, the fee paid to auditors (audit fee) is an important part of monitoring 
costs. An auditor has a duty to inspect accounts and provide assurance that the managers’ 
behaviour is aligned with the shareholder’s interests. Thus, especially when agency problems 
are more severe, auditors will place more effort and time to inspect accounts (Nikkinen & 
Sahlström, 2004). The independent audit function is even more important in higher agency 
conflict situations involving a firm with a high free cash flow and lower management 
ownership. Jensen (1986) theorises that managers have the motivation to engage in value-
destroying activities when high free cash flow and low-growth opportunities exist. The 
existence of a free cash flow can influence the audit effort and the audit fees. Prior studies have 
suggested that free cash flow is associated with higher audit fees (Griffin, Lont, & Sun, 2010; 
Gul & Tsui, 1998). To alleviate the agency costs caused by free cash flows, firms could issue 
debt to increase the monitoring function through debt monitoring (Jensen, 1986). Thus, Gul 
and Tsui (1998 find that higher debt reduces the relationship between free cash flow and audit 
fees. Research studies have also found that management ownership reduces audit fees, as 
managers’ interests are more aligned with the owners’ interests (Nikkinen & Sahlström, 2004). 
Since corporate political activities are associated with higher agency problems and 
agency problems raise the demand for independent audits, the demand for an external audit is 
                                                          
 




even more pronounced for firms engaging in corporate political activities. Shareholders could 
demand a higher-quality audit to mitigate agency problems. Therefore, independent audits are 
important as a mechanism to reduce the manager’s opportunistic behaviours and from engaging 
in political activities to pursue personal benefits. 
 
Figure 3. The relationship between political activities, agency problems and the demand for higher-
quality audits 
 
2.4. Institutional Background – Political Contribution in the United States 
 
This section provides a brief background of the overall political contributions’ 
mechanism in the U.S., as political contributions are the political activities on which this study 
focusses to measure political ideology. The history of corporate political contributions in the 
U.S. dates back to the early 1900s when corporations were restricted by the Tillman Act (1907) 
from making political contributions in federal elections (Prabhat, 2012). The subsequent laws 
and regulations allowed corporations and interest groups to make limited political contribution 
to federal candidates in the 1970s and the early 1990s. Fast forwarding to 2010, the Citizens 









the corporations’ monetary resources could be spent as independent expenditures with no 
restriction. Until today, this issue on how much a corporation should spend for political 
activities is still a vast debate because there are some concerns among shareholders of public 
companies on how public companies should direct corporate funds for political activities. 
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) defines a political contribution as anything of 
value that is given, loaned or advanced to influence a federal election.14 Therefore, the term 
contribution is not only affixed to monetary contribution but also to contributions in the form 
of goods, services and loans. In terms of disclosure requirements, the campaign finance law 
requires all candidates committees, party committees and PACs to disclose their donors’ 
detailed information (including name, occupation, employer, addresses of the donor, etc.) to 
the FEC. Until 2002, corporations could make a direct political contribution to federal 
candidates; known as soft money contributions, these contributions, which were unregulated 
and unlimited, were not publicly disclosed until the 1991–1992 election cycle and were 
eventually banned by the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reforms Act in 2002. Political parties 
could use these funds for party-building activities and do not have to use the funds to support 
federal candidates (Prabhat, 2012).  
The amount of soft money from organisations alone increased significantly from $60 
million in 1992 to over $297 million in 2002.15 Although Federal election laws permits 
Congress to regulate independent political contributions made by organisations and unions for 
campaigns, congressional regulation of political contributions is still a public debate 
(OpenSecrets, 2018). Following the 2002 federal election, corporations were not allowed to 
make direct political contributions to candidates. The restriction came along after the 
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Republican National Committee argued that advertisements on television often mentioned the 
federal candidates’ names (Prabhat, 2012). After the FEC recognised the validity of this 
argument, political parties carefully advertised their campaign, while still finding ‘loopholes’ 
enabling them to support specific federal candidates. 
Corporations, however, can indirectly contribute to candidates by establishing Political 
Action Committees (PACs). Corporations can still indirectly manage their resources to 
financially fund campaigns through a separated segregated funds committee (SSF), which is 
also known as a PAC. The SSF works as a solicitor to solicit donation funds from individuals 
within a corporation. The SSF then distributes the funds to federal candidates, other PACs or 
political party committees. Additionally, the SSF funds can be used for political advertisements 
where the advertisement could support preferred candidates or attack the opposing candidates. 
Moreover, political committees could support or oppose a candidate by making independent 
expenditures. These independent contributions, as defined by the FEC, are not included as 
contributions and are not subject to contribution limits. Because of the unlimited amount that 
an entity can spend on independent expenditures, it is also known as a super-PAC. Furthermore, 
the FEC also defines an independent expenditure as expenditure for a communication that (1) 
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate and (2) 
is not coordinated with a candidate, candidate’s committee, a party committee or their agents. 
Up until the time of the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case’s ruling, 
corporations, trade association and unions could not make direct contributions for independent 
expenditures. Following the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission court decision, 
corporations, trade association and unions could directly support independent expenditures by 




The initiative to establish a campaign finance system was motivated by the Watergate 
scandal, where President Richard Nixon allegedly received and took corporate donations in 
exchange for political favour in 1972. The laws incorporate public financing systems that also 
mandate donor disclosure and contribution limits. However, in 2010, with the case of Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, the contribution limits were lifted as an expression of 
free speech. The federal court ruling also lifted the limit on the contribution amount a super-
PAC could raise from individuals, corporations and labour unions. Super-PACs can raise an 
unlimited amount of money for advertisements and other efforts to support a candidate or for 
efforts against undesirable candidates, although these super-PACs cannot contribute directly 
or organise their spending with a candidate. Furthermore, there are also organisations known 
as 501(c)(4)s, which do work to benefit the community and spend money to influence 
elections. Furthermore, to maintain the competitive nature of the national parties, in 2014, 
Congress lifted the maximum donations by the parties’ campaign committees to $801,600 from 
$100,000 each year.  
In February 2017, the FEC released a press release on the increase in contributions 
limits for the 2017–2018 election cycle. 16 The increase in contributions limits follows the 
annual inflation rate. For example, the limit on the individuals’ contributions to candidates was 
set at $2,000 per election by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA); it is 
adjusted at the start of each new election cycle. During the current, two-year election cycle, the 
limit for contributions by individuals to federal candidates for the United States Senate and the 
U.S. House of Representatives remains at $2,700 per election. The same increase also applies 
to contributions by individuals and non-multicandidate PACs. For contributions by individuals 
to national party committees, the limit is $33,900 per year; for contributions from 
                                                          
 




multicandidate PACs to additional national party committee accounts, the limit is $101,700 per 
year. The new limits are effective from 1 January 2017. Other contributions limits are 




This study adopts the self-categorisation theory as the rationale for this research. This 
theory is important for explaining why the political contributions of all individuals within a 
company are used as the proxy for political ideology. The following section describes the self-
categorisation theory as well as the rationale of using self-categorisation in this study. 
The self-categorisation theory is the development of the social identity theory, which 
examines how people’s social identity constructs intergroup relations (Haslam & Reicher, 
2015). The self-categorisation theory was developed as a response to the limited explanations 
that social identity theory offered about how individuals categorise themselves and how self-
categorisation alters one’s behaviour and psychology, et cetera. Thus, John Charles Turner and 
his colleagues tried to answer these questions by developing the self-categorisation theory in 
the 1980s (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The theory helps psychologists 
and social science to understand how an individual’s mind is structured by social group 
memberships and how this structuring develops collective organisational actions (Haslam & 
Reicher, 2015). 
The self-categorisation theory is “a set of related assumptions and hypotheses about the 
functioning of the social self-concept (the concept of self-based on a comparison with other 
people and relevant social interaction)”, and it emphasises “how individuals are able to act as 
                                                          
 




a group at all” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42). Further, the theory suggests that group behaviours 
follow an act of stereotyping and that self-categorisation plays a role in social perception and 
behaviour when a group of individuals categorise themselves in a particular group (Haslam & 
Reicher, 2015). This is because the self-categorisation theory focuses on social influence and 
actively strives to reach agreement on certain issues, not merely on the issue of shared identity 
(Haslam & Reicher, 2015). Furthermore, Haslam and Reicher (2015) state that “it is precisely 
through individuals’ identification of, and conformity to, norms that are perceived to be shared 
with others in a particular context that their potentially idiosyncratic views become socially 
organised and consensual. In other words, it is through this process that individual views are 
coordinated and transformed into shared values, beliefs, and behaviours” (p.457). Haslam and 
Reicher (2015) state that self-categorisation could also explain collective political actions and 
social changes (p. 458), which could also relate to the subscription of political ideologies. 
Based on the theory stated above, the self-categorisation theory could explain an 
individual’s behaviours towards their political preference. If an individual is more inclined and 
adheres to a certain political party’s perspective, he or she is more likely to contribute to the 
party and categorise himself or herself as an adherent to that party. For example, an individual 
would support and contribute to a Democrat if he or she believes that his or her beliefs and 
values are reciprocal with a Democrat’s values. Arguably, this individual could be labelled as 
a Democrat. Furthermore, once an individual has categorised himself or herself as a subscriber 
to a political ideology, he or she could influence other groups of people to embrace similar 
beliefs and values. Ultimately, the subscribed beliefs and values become shared values and the 
ideology of the group or the organisation. In a firm, the employees’ shared values could 
conceivably become the firm’s values and ideology that could influence decision-making and 




North (1994), who suggest the importance of social groups and the role of collectives in 
embracing a particular ideology.  
As one’s political ideology often indicates the core values of a political party (Hutton 
et al., 2015), by contributing to a political party, he or she could arguably also subscribe to the 
party’s core values and ideologies and identify or categorise himself or herself as the supporter 
of that party. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse an individual’s political contributions 
because based on the self-categorisation theory, an individual’s values and beliefs could 
become group or shared values; in the employees case, an individual’s values could arguably 
become a shared organisation or firm value. This idea is supported by Rokeach (1968) who 
defines ideology in an organisation as “beliefs and attitudes—religious, political and 
philosophical in nature—that are more or less institutionalized or shared with others, deriving 
from external authority” (p.123-124).18 The employees’ political ideology is a prominent 
concern, and the inclusion of the lower-level employees’ contributions (not only those of 
higher-level employees or management) is important because different-level employees could 
have different agenda: higher-level employees (white-collar groups) may be concerned about 
firm performance, efficiency and inflation, whereas lower-level employees (blue-collar group) 
may be more concerned about unemployment (Dutt & Mitra, 2005; Hibbs et al., 1982; Hibbs 
& Vasilatos, 1982). By using the individual employees’ political contribution, this study 
captures the personal interest aspect of engaging in political activities, as political activities can 
be seen as a means to promote a political ideology (Mathur et al., 2013). Overall, the inclusion 
of all employees’ political contributions enables this study to hypothesise the relationships 
between a firm’s political ideology and the various firm financial outcomes. 
                                                          
 




2.6. Summary  
This chapter provides the background of this study. I started with the agency theory and 
the theory of the firm. I included the description of the agency relationship as well as the 
monitoring mechanism that could reduce agency problems. Then, I presented auditing roles in 
the subsequent section. The auditing roles include the following: (1) the information role, (2) 
the agency role, (3) the insurance role, (4) the organisational control role, (5) the confirmation 
role and (6) the risk management role. I then provided the background for higher-quality audit 
services, followed by a discussion of the agency problem surrounding corporate political 
activities and how auditing could reduce this problem. I presented the institutional background 
of political activities in the U.S., specifically examining the political contributions mechanism 










This chapter reviews and discusses prior literature on political economy, political 
activities and audit fee. The papers presented in this chapter are the selected prominent papers 
in the field, given the extensive research has been done in the area of political activities and 
audit fee from accounting, finance, management and even political literature. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections; political economy and audit fee. The first main section 
discusses the overview of political economy and political activities. In the political activities 
section, I provide more detailed past studies on political activities, including prior literature on 
political connections, corporate lobbying and political contributions. In the political 
connections section, I discuss the benefits as well as the downside of engaging political 
connections, along with the accounting and finance studies on political connections. 
Subsequently, the prior studies on corporate lobbying and political contributions will be 
presented. Accounting and finance studies on political ideology utilise political contributions 
as the proxy for one’s political ideology. Thus, studies on political ideology will be presented 
as a subsection of political contribution study.  
The second main section of this chapter deals with audit fees literature. I start the 
discussion on audit fee literature by giving a brief overview of auditing research, background 
and why audit is necessary to corporations. After that, I will present relevant auditing and audit 
fee research to this study. The review on audit fee literature include the theories and 
determinants of audit fee. Given the vast existing audit fee literature, I provide studies that are 
related and relevant to this study on political ideologies and audit fees. 
 





Research in management and politics fields have vindicated the importance of 
business entanglements in politics. Keim and Baysinger (1988) document that firm 
involvements in politics have increased significantly in the 1960s. Corporations tend to engage 
more diversified political strategies because of some factors such as the increase in regulations 
and policies changes which could increase business’ competitive pressure since the government 
acts as a policy maker and regulate businesses (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). As Hillman and Hitt 
(1999) state that, “The overall objective of political behaviour is to produce public policy 
outcomes that are favourable to the firm’s continued economic survival and success” (p. 826).19 
Because of this reason, they also state that “To the extent that individual firms are able to 
influence the nature and extent of public policy, corporate political behaviour may be viewed 
as strategic” (p. 826). Consequently, public policies could influence firms and have been major 
sources uncertainty. For example, government has the capacity to influence the market through 
government purchases, alter entry and exit barriers, influence business practices in regards to 
employments or pollution and affect businesses’ bargaining power with the suppliers or the 
customers (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
In the same time, regulators should gain some benefits in the form of information and 
campaign contributions from interest groups (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2006). Firm 
performance is highly affected by government policies on the competitive environment and the 
regulations could affect how the corporations conduct businesses (Shaffer, 1995). Therefore, 
businesses’ dependency on government is significant for firms to remain competitive because 
these firms should have arguably preferential treatment from the regulators (Faccio, 2006; 
Gordon & Hafer, 2005; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Murtha & Lenway, 
1994). Moreover, significant uncertainty also comes along with political and regulatory 
                                                          
 




environment which increase the policy-makers dependency of the corporations (Aplin & 
Hegarty, 1980). Thus, firms set a specialised strategy to influence policymaking to counter 
uncertainty in political and regulatory settings (Baysinger, Keim, & Zeithaml, 1985). 
Corporations could savour the benefits of having connections with politicians if firms marginal 
costs if lower than its marginal benefits (Faccio, 2006). 
Early management literature focuses on the efficacy of political activities for firms 
(Aplin & Hegarty, 1980; Keim & Baysinger, 1988; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Rehbein & 
Schuler, 1999). As the literature on political economy research progresses, researchers place 
more attention on the antecedents and motivations of firms engaging in political activities. 
Evidence from previous studies has revealed several motivations why firms engage CPA which 
include firm size (Bhuyan, 2000; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Schuler, Rehbein, & 
Cramer, 2002), government dependency (Hart, 2001; Schuler et al., 2002), foreign Ownership 
(Hansen & Mitchell, 2000), firm age (Hart, 2001), managerial political orientation (Burris, 
2001; Ozer, 2010), industry concentration (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hillman, Keim, & 
Schuler, 2004; Kim, 2008), and industry diversification (Bhuyan, 2000). Larger firms are more 
likely to engage CPA (Bhuyan, 2000; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Kim, 2008). The 
larger the firm size, the more likely firms to receive assistance from the politicians when those 
firms form PAC contributions (Hart, 2001). Larger firms are more likely to draw government’s 
attention that affects a firm’s value (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000). In addition, larger firms possess 
more resources which enable large firms to allocate those resources for CPA (Bhuyan, 2000). 
 Firm dependency on the government, particularly on government contracts, influences 
firm decision on CPA. Political contributions provide incentives for politicians to grant 
government contracts to those contributing firms (Hart, 2001). In addition, firms which depend 
heavily on government purchases are more likely to engage CPA to retain close relations with 




suggests that government contracts positively influence firm decisions on CPAs (Hart, 2001; 
Schuler et al., 2002).  Foreign ownership has a negative relationship with political contributions 
(Hansen & Mitchell, 2000). Foreign firms are less likely to engage CPA because these firms 
might concern about the perception of interfering another country’s politics (Hansen & 
Mitchell, 2000). The age of corporations influences firm engagement in politics. Younger firms 
are less likely to form political contributions because the top managers are less familiar with 
the policymakers and have not established large networks. Thus, firm age positively associated 
with CPA.  
Past literature suggests that senior managers are more likely to involve in CPA (Ozer, 
2010). She argues that senior managers tend to perceive that the political environment might 
have an impact on their business over time and because of this reason, they allocate resources 
on CPAs. Industry concentration influence the likelihood of CPA. Studies have found that 
higher industry concentration positively correlated with higher engagement in CPA (Bhuyan, 
2000; Grier et al., 1994; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Kim, 2008; Schuler et al., 2002). Bhuyan 
(2000) argues that the few numbers of corporations in the industry make it easier to arrange 
political contributions or lobbying. They also provide evidence that Industry diversification 
also affects the likelihood of CPA. Using the U.S. food industry, Bhuyan (2000) draws 
evidence that the higher industrial diversification, the lower corporate involvements in politics. 
The argument is that the more product lines a firm has, the tougher for the firms to organise 
political activities. 
Recent accounting and finance literature draws more attention to business 
involvements on political activities and its relationship with accounting and finance outputs. 
Although management scholars have established numerous variations of corporate political 
activities (e.g. Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Shaffer, 1995), three most 




corporate lobbying and political contributions. Research also reports strong relationship 
between these political strategies, particularly lobbying and campaign contributions.  
3.2.1. Political Connections 
 
The first and prominent form of political activity is through political connections. 
Faccio (2006) defined that a firm is politically connected if the firm’s large shareholders or top 
executives is either a member of parliament, a minister or head of state or having a close 
relationship with a top official (p. 370). Research has suggested that political connections can 
be a form of corruption (Faccio, 2006, 2010) and the impact of political connection can be 
mixed. Political ties could alter strategic decisions and long-run performance (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Faccio (2006) argues that the value of political 
connections can take various forms that include preferential treatment by the government, 
lighter taxation, more likely to receive government contracts, more relaxed regulatory scrutiny 
and stricter regulatory oversight of the company’s rivals (p. 369). However, there are risks 
accompany political connections, especially if the government could not provide support to 
politically connected firms (Fisman, 2001). 
Companies incorporate building political connections to obtain economic benefits. 
There are two sides of a coin regarding the impact of political connections. In other words, 
despite the benefits of engaging political activities, building political connections also comes 
with costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) establish the downside of political connections as 
summarised by Faccio, (2006) that politicians themselves would extract at least some of the 
rents generated by connections, and corporations could increase its value only if marginal 
benefits of the connections exceed their marginal costs (p. 369). Political connections could 
also be a form of corruption as lenders could also seeking rents from politically connected firms 




value-creating strategy as Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) states, “…the performance of 
closely connected firms might vary dramatically over time depending on the political fortunes 
of their backers, suggesting that connection based strategies could be particularly risky” (p. 
412).  
3.2.1.1. Studies on Political Connections 
 
This section summarises prior studies on political connections. Studies have 
documented that political connections could impact firms’ economic outputs and consequences 
as documented by previous studies. Earlier research finds that the political connections might 
also be associated with lower firm performance in politically unstable and financial downturn 
settings. For example, Fisman (2001) examine the magnitude and value of political connections 
using politically connected firms in Indonesia. The Indonesia setting is appealing because, 
during Soeharto's era, Indonesia was arguably associated with an authoritarian system where 
Soeharto was the dictator of the nation. Soeharto also had been the leader of the country for 
three decades and thus firm economic dependency was high for politically connected firms. 
The definition of political connection is if a firm through their top officials is connected to the 
Soeharto or Soeharto’s family members. The study hypothesises that politically connected 
firms should perform more poorly during the series of episodes when President Soeharto’s 
health was in jeopardy. Fisman documents that Indonesian politically connected firms suffer 
lower returns when there is a rumour about President Soeharto’s health. The results in Fisman’s 
study are consistent with the argument that politically connected firms are highly dependent on 
the government and these connected firms perform poorly when they expect the government is 
facing a downturn. In addition, the results support the notion that political connections come 




Following Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003) conduct similar analysis using 
Malaysian data where the political and economic environments are similar, especially during 
the 1998 financial crisis. In particular, they are able to examine the effect of political 
connections more explicitly when the government introduced capital control to help firms 
(politically connected) to bounce back from the financial crisis. They present some motivations 
for using Malaysian data. First, the Malaysian government imposed capital control in 
September 1998 which arguably favourable for politically connected firms. Because of this 
imposition of capital control, Johnson and Mitton could analyse the effect of cronyism for firms 
that are connected to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim. Second, the political connections are not based on unobservable characteristics of the 
firms, but it is early friendship with Mohamad and Anwar in their career in politics. Third, 
Malaysian stock market remained liquid despite the financial crisis. Malaysian markets are 
relatively aware of politically connected firms and expected that capital control could have a 
positive impact on the capital market for politically connected firms. Finally, compared to 
Fisman’s (2001) study, Malaysia was arguably more democratic than Indonesian political 
system in 1998, making it possible to analyse the variation on firms connected to the winning 
or losing politicians. The results on Johnson and Mitton (2003) support that capital control was 
used as one of the tools to cover cronyism in Malaysia. They find in the early stage of the 
financial crisis, politically connected firms had worse stock returns compared to nonconnected 
firms and they perform better compared than nonconnected firms after the introduction of 
capital control. They also document politically connected firms received greater access to debt, 
indicated by the debt-to-asset ratio. The results remain unchanged after controlling for firm 
characteristics and “Bumiputera effect” as being more likely to receive government support.  
Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell (2006) conduct a multi-country analysis from 1997 to 




that politically connected firms are likely to bail out. These politically connected firms across 
the sample are more likely to be bailed out when the home country receives monetary assistance 
from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. In addition, they find that the bailed-out 
firms are associated with lower financial performance than their non-connected counterparts. 
This evidence shows that politically connected firms are more likely to receive financial 
assistance when they are financial distress situation. The findings also confirm that firms that 
involve in political activities, particularly political connection, receive preferential treatments 
by the government.  
Using Malaysian audit settings, Gul (2006) investigates whether auditors place more 
audit effort for politically connected firms during the Asian financial crisis because of the risk 
of financial misstatement. He also examines whether politically connected firms receive 
assistance from the government in the form of capital control to rebound from the financial 
crisis, resulting in the possible reduction of financial misstatement. Gul (2006) defines a firm 
as a politically connected if the firm’s officers or major shareholders have close relationship 
with the top government officials. Using a final sample of 740 firm-year observations from 
1996 to 1988, the research suggests that politically connected firms are associated with higher 
risk of financial misstatements because they lose government assistance in the form of 
subsidies. Thus, he finds that politically connected firms are correlated with higher audit fees 
than non-politically connected firms during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, he finds that 
politically connected firms are associated with lower audit fees after the capital control 
introduction, signalling that politically connected firms have less incentive to misstate financial 
statement. This is in turn reduce the auditor’s assessed risks and consequently, reduced audit 
effort and audit fees. In addition, Gul (2006) controls for ethnicity, an alternative measure of 
audit fee and earnings management, and the main results remain unchanged. Another study by 




connected firms in Malaysia are paying higher audit fees because auditors perceive these firms 
as riskier. Furthermore, they also find that firms that better corporate governance demands a 
higher audit quality which leads to higher audit fees. The findings also support the notion that 
politically connected might not necessarily demand higher quality audit even firms engage 
corporate governance because they might receive certain preferential treatment by the 
government.  
On the other hand, political connections also come with several economic benefits. For 
instance, firms report better stock performance when they develop relationships with 
politicians. For example, Goldman et al. (2009) use the year 2000 election to analyse whether 
politically connected boards affect firm value. They use hand-collected data from EDGAR 
database to gather the information on S&P500 firms board member’s prior employment 
background. That way, they can determine whether or not a board member was affiliated to 
any particular party. A board member is claimed to be politically connected if he or she held 
position as a senator, member of House of Representatives, or member of the administration 
or the director of federal agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency. They determine 
whether a board is affiliated to the Republicans (Democrats) if at least one board member was 
affiliated with the Republicans (Democrats) and not such member is affiliated with the 
Democrats (Republicans). The results show that Republican (Democrat) portfolio is associated 
with positive (negative) and significant cumulative abnormal returns upon the 2000 election. 
However, the negative cumulative abnormal return of Democrat portfolio is only for value-
weighted average, signalling that the effect is more pronounced for large firms. Furthermore, 
they find that abnormal stock returns increase following the announcement of politically 
connected board nominations. The results are robust after controlling for industry, firm 
characteristics and board’s expertise. Overall, the study suggests that political connection does 




Faccio (2010) analyses further the differences between politically connected firms and 
nonconnected firms in 47 countries. Specifically, she examines whether or not political 
connections could benefits firms and whether political connections is a form of corruption. She 
finds that although a fair amount of research has established that political connections are a 
form of corruption, firms still benefit from political connections. The results in her study find 
that firms that establish political connections are associated with higher leverage, lower tax 
expenses and stronger market power, despite they also associated with lower return on assets 
and market to book ratio. The differences are stronger with firms that establish stronger 
political connections through high ranking politicians-top firms’ official's relationship. She 
also finds that the differences are also higher for firm operating in more corrupt countries. This 
finding complements (Faccio, 2006) that suggest political connections could be a form of 
corruption. 
Using similar definition of political connections developed by Faccio (2006) and using 
multiple countries sample, Chaney, Faccio and Parsley (2011) analyse financial reporting 
quality by politically connected firms. They argue that politically connected firms have fewer 
incentives to provide higher quality earning because regulators would impose weaker scrutiny 
to these connected firms. Knowing that they might avoid penalties from the government, 
politically connected firms could spend less time to report their financial statement items 
accurately. Consequently, politically connected firms could report lower quality accruals. They 
use the performance adjusted accruals quality based on Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew's 
(2003) study, specifically the difference between total accruals and expected performance 
adjusted accruals for 5-year and 10-year window period. The sample used in the study consists 
of more than 4500 firms from 19 countries from 1996 to 2005. The results indicate that political 
connections are a prominent factor in determining financial report quality besides country-level 




firms with political ties are associated with poorer earnings quality. They also test whether the 
relationship between political connections and accruals quality is ex-ante or ex-post. They find 
that political connections are associated with accruals quality ex-post, and they do not find 
significant relationship between prior accruals quality and current period political connections. 
In addition, they test whether accruals quality is associated with the cost of debt. They find that 
poor accruals quality is associated with higher cost of debt for non-politically connected firms 
only. This finding implies that politically connected firms are less likely to deal with negative 
consequences from reporting poorer quality disclosures. 
Firm political connections might also affect external stakeholders. Using a multi-
country study, Boubakri et al. (2012) find that politically connected firms incurred lower cost 
of raising capital They argue that shareholders view firms with political ties with politicians to 
be more valuable. Moreover, another study using developed countries sample finds that firms 
that establish political ties are correlated with higher financial profitability and higher level of 
debt (Boubakri et al., 2012). The evidence shows that political connections provide better 
access to debt and improve performance. Following the argument of politically connected 
institutions possess greater access to debt, Boubakri et al. (2013) argue that politically 
connected firms are taking more risk. Thus, institutions that have stronger connections with the 
politicians they are tend to invest in riskier investments by allowing more short-term projects 
which benefitting the managers because managers investment horizon is relatively shorter 
(Boubakri et al., 2013). Utilising similar multi-country sample, Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar 
(2014) analyse auditor choice of companies with political ties. The results in their study provide 
some evidence that politically connected public firms choose to be audited by Big 4 auditors. 
The reason why politically connected firm choose Big 4 audit firms is because agency problem, 
which investors demand higher audit quality and greater transparency. These results are more 




institutions are worse. In addition, they also find that connected firms audited by Big 4 auditor 
are associated with lower earnings management, greater transparency and lower cost of equity. 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2013) analyse whether board political connections are 
associated with firm’s propensity to receive government procurement contracts. The study 
proposes that besides to monitor and to provide advisory to the company, board members could 
utilise their political connections to benefit the firm. They hypothesise that firms with a 
connected board member(s) receive more government procurement contracts and vice versa. 
To perform the analysis, they use the sample of S&P500 companies from 1990 to 2004 with 
the year 2004 as their main focus because there was a change in the composition of the House 
and Senate from the Democrats to the Republicans. Furthermore, the midterm election is 
chosen because of the consideration that officials in the legislative branch are in the best 
position to influence and direct procurement contracts. The results show that politically 
connected board members allow firms to attain government procurement contract following 
the 1994 general election. In particular, firms with politically connected board to the winning 
party after the election are associated with an increase in procurement contracts which could 
indicate that these firms somehow attain favourable treatment by the government through 
procurement contracts. In average dollar term they find firms connected to the winning party 
experience $476 million increase and firms connected to the losing experience $234 million in 
average for procurement contracts. These results remain robust after controlling for industry, 
trajectory firm characteristics and geographical characteristics. In addition, they also find that 
firms experience larger increase in contracts with board member that more recently political 
appointment than less recent appointment. 
A handful of research has also considered the effects of political connections on bank 
loans. Research has established that politically connected firms as being risky (Bliss & Gul, 




further the effect of political connections on how lenders perceive these politically connected 
firms. Bliss and Gul (2012) use Malaysia as an emerging economy to investigate the impact of 
political connections on cost of bank loans. They argue that since audit market in Malaysia 
perceives politically connection as risky, lenders should perceive these firms as risky and 
charge higher cost of debt. In the sample of top 500 Malaysian public companies from 2001 to 
2004, they find that politically connected firms are paying higher cost of bank loans compared 
to their non-connected counterparts which is consistent with the notion that politically 
connected firms are more risky. In addition, they also find that politically connected firms are 
associated with higher leverage, more likely to report loss, more likely to have negative equity 
and have more likelihood being audited by big audit firms. Similarly, Houston et al. (2014) 
analyse whether or not political connections are associated with costs of bank loans in the U.S. 
They use the S&P 500 from the year 2003 to 2008 as the sample. The study suggests two 
possible channels where political connection could influence the cost of bank loans. The first 
channel is the Borrower Channel whereby banks acknowledge that political connections could 
improve profitability, which in turn affect loan terms and credit risks (i.e. banks expect credit 
risks to be lower). The second channel is Bank Channel whereby bankers are more likely to 
provide favourable loan terms because the bankers themselves could potentially gain access 
and receive favours from politicians through politically connected firms. They argue that in the 
developing countries where the government intervene banks activities, Bank Channel is more 
applicable. 
On the other hand, in the U.S. where it possess relatively more sophisticated financial 
systems, stronger litigation regime, free press and banks are mostly privately owned, Borrower 
Channel is more likely to be the case because it is more difficult for politicians to influence 
banks activities. They find that firms with politically connected boards associated with lower 




ties.20 Furthermore, they document negative relationship between measures of accounting 
transparency (income smoothing, total accruals and discretionary accruals) and cost of bank 
loans. However, the effects are significantly reduced if the firm is politically connected. In 
addition, the also test the effect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on cost of loans and they 
indicate that politically connected companies have lower borrowing loans than non-connected 
companies. To establish the channel of how political connection could affect cost of borrowing, 
they test the possibility of Borrower Channel and Bank Channel. They control for procurement 
industries and companies operated in industries that are subject to foreign competition, as these 
industries arguably rely more on the government. Moreover, they also test the firm historical 
performance, default risk and creditworthiness. The results show that loans costs are 
significantly lower for procurement industries and industries that subject to foreign 
competition. They also find that politically connected firms are less likely to realise an increase 
in overall risk. For the Bank Channel argument, they find no evidence to support the notion as 
there is no significant difference on how bankers and bondholders value political connection 
and banks which already established political connection value borrowers’ political 
connections to gain access to politicians. Thus, their study supports the Borrower Channel 
theory. 
Recent studies demonstrate that lobbying and political donations could be ways to 
establish political connections (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Heflin & Wallace, 2015; 
Kim & Zhang, 2016). For example, Heflin and Wallace(2015) analyse whether political 
connections through political donations also affect auditor as well as the audit outcomes. They 
report that corporate political contributions influence auditor decisions that political 
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contributing firms have lower accruals quality, fewer restatements, less likely to receive going 
concern opinion and fewer material weaknesses. In addition, they find that auditors tend to 
maintain the politically connected clients and they earn higher audit fees. Kim and Zhang 
(2016) argue that firm could build political relationships through corporate lobbying and 
political contributions. They utilise both corporate lobbying and PAC contributions as 
measures for political connections. Moreover, they find that politically connected firms are 
more likely to engage in tax avoidance behaviour. This finding is in line with the notion that 
politically connected firms yield economic benefits.  
3.2.2. Corporate Lobbying 
 
In terms of the aggregate dollar value, lobbying expenditures are much larger than PAC 
contributions (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2015; Kim, 2008; Milyo, Primo, & 
Groseclose, 2000) and in terms of the entities, lobbying entities are larger than the number of 
active PACs (Brasher & Lowery, 2006). PAC contributions mostly come from individuals 
(although some also come from corporations), while lobbying is mostly corporate expenses 
(Chen et al., 2015). Some of the most politically active firms could spend more than 20 times 
the amount of maximum amount PAC contributions per candidate per election (Milyo et al., 
2000). In line with political contributions, lobbying could be one of the tools for a firm to 
influence policymakers to produce a set of policies that are preferable for the firm (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999). Lobbying activities signal the aggregate firms’ political activities to pursue 
favourable policies. Furthermore, in the political cost hypothesis (Watts, 1977) argues that 
firms that engage in lobbying activities are under public scrutiny and most likely to adopt 
accounting conservatism. 
Corporate lobbying may be used as a business strategy to improve firm performance 




industries compared to less strictly regulated firms. In highly regulated and concentrated 
industries, firms tend to engage more lobbying because the industry’s stakes are higher 
depending on government actions (Kim, 2008). Using panel data from 1998 to 2004, Kim 
(2008) report that firms with declining sales and high paid CEOs engage more lobbying than 
campaign contributions to gain political favours. They also test other antecedents of CPAs such 
as government purchases, sales and number of business segments which are positively 
associated with lobbying. His study also finds that lobbying firms are associated with higher 
equity returns. Chen et al. (2015) analyse the impact of corporate lobbying on firm financial 
performance. They find that lobbying expenditures are positively associated with financial 
performance measured by income before extraordinary items (IBEI), net income and cash flow 
from operations. In addition, S. Chen et al. (2015) also find that the more intensive lobbying 
firms gain higher market returns compared to non-lobbying firms. The results support the 
argument that lobbying activities could improve a firm’s financial performance.  
Similar to political contributions, companies might also establish political connections 
through lobbying. Lobbying firms are associated with higher tax sheltering. Kim and Zhang 
(2016) find that lobbying firms are more tax aggressive than to non-lobbying firms. It is argued 
that political connections mitigate the political costs arises from the tax aggressiveness (Kim 
& Zhang, 2016). In line with the argument that more politically active firms are taking more 
risks, Igan et al. (2011) report that lobbying financial firms provide more risky lending than 
less lobbying firms in a financial crisis setting. Specifically, lenders who are engaged in a 
riskier lending lobby and lobby more intensively on laws and regulations related to mortgage 
and securitization. Moreover, Igan et al. (2011) propose that political influence financial 
industry might contribute to the financial crisis by allowing riskier loans.  Thus, their study 
proposes that monitoring bodies should consider the importance of lobbying activities as it 




Thomas (2013) examine the association between banks’ lobbying expenditures and the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Blau et al. (2013) obtain evidence that in 2008, 
lobbied banks have a higher likelihood to receive TARP and a greater amount of TARP. Firms 
that receive TARP also spend up to four times higher on lobbying than firms which do not 
receive TARP. 
Mathur and Singh (2011) analyse whether lobbying activities create value for the firm. 
Using 5,452 US firm-year observations, they find that lobbying firms create more market value 
added (MVA) compared to their non-lobbying counterparts.  The results remain unchanged 
after splitting the sample into small and large firms. Moreover, they find corporate governance 
and managerial entrenchment are associated with lower lobbying intensity. Total assets are also 
positively associated with lobbying expenditures, signalling larger firms tend to lobby more 
and firm’s size could be an antecedent of corporate lobbying. Another study also analyses 
managers’ entrenchment and its correlation with lobbying activities. Mathur, Singh, 
Thompson, and Nejadmalayeri (2013) find that entrenched managers are associated with higher 
involvement in lobbying activities. However, consistent with the previous research by Mathur 
and Singh (2011) they also suggest the more entrenched managers are, the more risk averse 
and will limit corporate’s risk exposure to lobbying exposure risks. Furthermore, they argue 
that managerial entrenchment is associated with lower lobbying intensity proxied by lobbying 
expenses and the number of lobbyists hired. Finally, Mathur et al. (2013) find that lobbying 
intensity positively correlated with firm performance, suggesting that lobbying is not agency 
driven.  
On the other hand, some studies provide evidence that lobbying engagements are 
motivated by agency conflicts. Agency conflicts and fraudulent activities may also arise from 
lobbying activities. Yu and Yu (2011) document that fraudulent firms are more likely to engage 




expenses compared to non-fraudulent firms and spend 28% more during the fraudulent periods. 
In addition, Yu and Yu (2011) find that lobbying firms have a significantly lower fraud 
detection rate which can be translated to 117 days longer to evade detection compared to firms 
that do not involve in lobbying activities. The detection delays allow managers to allocate 
resources for self-interests such as sell more of their shares during the fraudulent periods.   
Chen et al. (2015) analyse how corporate lobbying could shape favourable policies for 
lobbying firms and consequently, improve lobbying firms performance. The motivations study 
lobbying instead of other political strategies is because they argue that lobbying is the more 
direct strategy to influence government to issue favourable policies. The study attempts to 
provide a causal effect on whether or not lobbying activities could affect financial performance. 
Using lobbying and non-lobbying firms sample from the year 1998, they find lobbying 
activities improve firms performance. Specifically, lobbying is positively associated with 
income before extraordinary items, net income and cash flow from operation (although they 
find inconsistent results with cash flow from operation). They also establish a causal 
relationship between lobbying and firm performance. They find that lobbying affects and 
improve firm performance measured by income before extraordinary items and net income. In 
addition, they find that firms performance increases after the Citizens United case decision was 
released. The Citizens United case decision allows more relaxed constraints regarding the 
amount of money an entity can spend on political activities. 
Unsal et al. (2016) examine whether or not CEOs’ political ideology impacts the 
engagement in lobbying activities. They also analyse how lobbying activities could influence 
firm performance. Their findings suggest that Republican managers spend more on lobbying, 
lobby a large number of bills and employ large number lobbyists. They also find that the costs 
of engaging lobbying activities outweigh the benefits for Republican CEOs. The results are 




abnormal returns following lobbying activities. Furthermore, they find that lobbying CEOs 
earn more compensation, in terms of total compensation, salary and cash. Compared to non-
lobbying, CEOs of Lobbying firms are also more busy (indicating weaker governance) and 
they are associated with higher firm ownership. Unsal et al. (2016) argue that if lobbying fails 
to create firm value, only the managers who are benefited from such lobbying activities. 
Overall, the results propose that the lobbying influences firm performance across distinct 
managerial political orientations.  
The more recent study by Kong, Radhakrishnan and Tsang (2017) analyses whether 
public scrutiny influence lobbying-financial reporting quality relationship. Using firms annual 
lobbying expenses as the proxy for lobbying intensity from 2001 to 2012, they find that 
lobbying firms are more conservative using C_SCORE method are the proxy for accounting 
conservatism as developed by Khan and Watts (2009). This results indicate that lobbying firms 
are producing higher quality financial report. Using the propensity score matching process to 
isolate the different characteristics of lobbying and non-lobbying firms, they find that more 
visible lobbying firms are indicating greater accounting conservatism compared to less visible 
lobbying firms. Furthermore, using visibility measures (firm size, the number of analysts 
following the firm, the age of the firm, the number of foreign stock exchanges the firm is cross-
listed in and the level of firm media coverage) as proxies for public scrutiny, they find the 
relationship between lobbying and conservatism is more pronounced when firms are under 
public scrutiny. The study shows that lobbying firms are more conservative when the public 
attention is relatively high and less conservative when public scrutiny is relatively lower which 





3.2.3. Political Contributions  
 
Political contributions are important tools to develop business strategies as firms 
might savour economic benefits from PAC contributions activity. Through political 
contributions, corporations have the discretion to support candidates that presumably will 
support their business objectives (Milyo et al., 2000). Thus, the basic premise of political 
contributions is that political contributions could act as an investment strategy by firms as they 
expect returns to their investments. As Snyder (1990) summarises, “Economist and political 
scientist often model political campaign contributions are one side of an exchange. Their 
models proceed from the assumption that there is an important class of contributors who view 
their political contributions as a kind of investment, expecting some benefit in return for their 
money (p. 1195).  Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012) also support the notion of political 
contribution can be an exchange relationship by stating, “We rely on previous literature and 
assume that political contributions matter because politicians care about reelection and need 
campaign financing to win. Thus, politicians are willing to trade favourable decisions for 
political contributions” (p. 370). In the U.S., political contributions have become more 
frequently used as a better means to gain access to politicians (Kroszner & Stratmann, 1998). 
On top of that, firms and politicians exchange favours through political contributions where 
politicians receive fund for campaigns and in return, politicians could repay firms by providing 
favours (Claessens et al., 2008; Correia, 2014). Although political contributions might have 
little impact on voting outcomes (see Ansolabehere et al., 2003), political contributions coming 
from special interest groups are associated with the probability of a legislator winning an 
election (Snyder, 1990). Firms that make political contributions through PAC supports might 
establish initial connections with the candidates and politicians and research has found that 
political contributions influence firm policies and financial outcomes such as firm performance 




enforcement (Correia, 2014), preferential tax treatment (Brown et al., 2015; Francis et al., 
2016; Kim & Zhang, 2016).  
Claessens et al. (2008) study campaign contribution and its impact towards debt 
financing using Brazilian firms as the sample. Specifically, the article examines whether 
political connections through political contributions affect firms’ decision on access to finance. 
They argue that political contributions help politicians to fund their campaigns and establish 
access to politicians to repay the contributions by providing favourable policies. The study uses 
Brazillian data for three main reasons. First, Brazil is well-known for the revolting relations 
between politicians and businesses. Second, political connections in Brazil seems to be an 
important business strategy because of lack institutional development and significant 
distortions. Brazil is one of the countries with the highest interest rate in the world, low degree 
of financial intermediation and two of the largest commercial banks are government-owned 
banks, making political connections essential for a business to access finance. Third, the data 
availability is important for this study because Brazil is one of the few countries that impose 
registered campaign contributions at the candidate level. The results of the study show that 
political contributions are associated with higher cumulative abnormal returns around the 1998 
and 2002 Election Day. Moreover, they also find that political contributions are associated with 
higher leverage. Higher leverage implies that firms receive favour from politicians in the form 
of greater access to debt financing to debt, similar to Boubakri et al.'s (2012) study which 
emphasises the notion that politically connected firms obtain greater access to debt. These two 
main findings are more pronounced for contributions to the winning deputies (than deputies) 
and they find no significant relationship between political contributions to the losing deputies 
and neither abnormal returns nor leverage. To test whether or not political contribution 
improves the quality of investments, they find that political contributions are associated with 




political connections could be a rent-seeking behaviour which costs 0.2% of gross domestic 
product a year (Claessens et al., 2008).  
At the firm level contribution, Cooper et al. (2010) investigate the association between 
corporate political contributions and stock returns. They employ several measures as proxies 
for political connectedness to analyse whether or not political connections influence abnormal 
returns. The proxies to measure political connections include the lagged number of supported 
candidates, the strength of the political relationship (the length of the relationship), the ability 
of the candidates to help the firm (based on whether or not the firm is in the same state as the 
candidates), and the power of the candidates (candidates’ ranking in the committee). They find 
political contributions, measured by the number of candidates the firm supports during the 
political campaign are correlated with high future abnormal returns and future earnings. 
Moreover, the results are robust when using an alternative measure of connectedness. They 
document a strong association with the candidates’ ability to help contributing firms. The 
results are more prominent for candidates who hold a position in the same state as where the 
firm is located. In addition, the results show that the effect of contributions is stronger for firms 
which more gravitate towards House candidates and the Democrat Party, even though 
Republican candidates receive higher amount of dollar contribution. Overall the findings of the 
study emphasise the benefits of engaging political activities, particularly, establishing political 
connections through political contributions.  
Individual political contributions also influence firm performance, especially for those 
firms located in congressional districts. Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012) study whether 
individuals would make political contributions to pursue economic benefits and improve firm 
performance. The methodology used in the study is motivated by anecdotal evidence of 
political contributions made by Microsoft and Microsoft’ congressional district (CD) during 




to identify CD in which individuals are economically dependent on the nearby firms.21 They 
argue that “If individuals derive their economic livelihood from nearby firms and, therefore, 
make political contributions on behalf of these firms and if politicians do exchange policy 
favours for contributions, we expect a positive relationship between political contributions 
from economically dependent CDs to economically relevant politicians and firm performance” 
(p.369). They find that significant positive relationship between political contributions from 
economically dependent CDs to economically relevant CDs and future firm performance 
measure by industry-adjusted ROA change and Industry media ROA. The results indicate that 
future performance changes are associated with changes in frequency and the amount of 
political contribution made from economically dependent to economically relevant. 
Furthermore, they find that the positive association between political contributions to the 
economically relevant and firm performance are more pronounced with financially distressed 
firms and(or) if the contributions are made close to re(election) cycle. In addition, they also 
test whether economically dependent individuals redirect their political contributions to other 
CD in the case of mergers. They find that economically dependent individuals redirect their 
political contributions to the relevant bidder firms and on the other hand, there is a significant 
decline in political contributions from parent and subsidiary CDs to parent and subsidiary 
economically relevant politicians from before to after the spinoff. Thus, the results suggest that 
economically dependent individuals strategically redirect their political contributions to 
politicians that supposed to provide more benefits as a result of mergers or spinoffs. Overall, 
the study suggests that not only firms that view political connections as an important business 
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strategy, but individuals are also dependent to the politicians if their economic livelihood is 
dependent to the politicians and make political contributions accordingly. 
Prior literature has shown that political contributions are associated with favourable 
treatment to the firms. Correia (2014) analyses whether or not political contributions have an 
impact on SEC enforcement costs in the form of prosecutions and penalties if being prosecuted. 
She uses PAC contributions from 1980 to 2006 as a proxy for political connectedness. The 
study argues that firms expect exchange relationship with politicians, whereby firms expect to 
receive political and regulatory favours and in return, politicians receive political support in 
the form of money or votes (Stigler, 1971). She finds that politically connected firms by 
contributing to the politicians are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement action and if 
prosecuted, they face lower penalties. Specifically, firms that engage in long term PAC 
contributions and lobbying are associated with lower likelihood of receiving enforcement. 
However, this finding is conditional on whether or not the enforcement has being filed, as she 
finds no relationship between lobbying expenses and penalties at the end of enforcement. The 
study also finds that employing lobbyists who are formerly linked to SEC and direct lobbying 
to the SEC are more effective than other lobbying expenditure to reduce enforcement costs.  
Using PAC contributions made by U.S. firms, Akey (2015) analyse the impact of 
political connections to abnormal equity returns. Based on the sample from 1997 to 2010, he 
finds that abnormal returns are higher postelection for firms that contribute to the winning 
candidates than firms that contribute to the losing candidates on the election days. In other 
words, the market reacts positively if a firm is connected to the winning politicians and 
negatively if the firm is connected to the losing candidates, especially for special elections. The 
market reacts more strongly to indirect connections through leadership PACs because senior 
party politicians could have stronger influence on the party decisions than firms. Furthermore, 




committees matter the most to the firms as they committee assignments to these sectors are 
most valuable. Akey (2015) also provide the evidence that political connection establishments 
influence future sales, as future sales increase if a firm is connected to the winning politicians 
and vice versa. Finally, he argues that political contributions are only one of the strategy to 
engage political activities as other more direct actions such as employing former politicians 
and engage in corporate lobbying appears to be substitutes political contributions. 
Prior studies have analysed the relationship between political contributions and tax 
sheltering behaviour or tax aggressiveness. These studies have documented that firms that 
contribute more to a political party are associated with higher level of tax sheltering (Brown et 
al., 2015; Francis et al., 2016; Kim & Zhang, 2016). With the recent increase in the 
contributions to tax-writing members. Recent taxation studies focus on the relationship 
between corporate political contributions and corporate tax-specific decisions because firms 
perceive CPA to be economically beneficial. According to  Brown et al. (2015), “From 2000 
to 2008, PAC contributions rose 60 percent generally, while PAC contributions to tax-writing 
members of Congress rose 80 percent” (p.70). In their study, Brown et al. (2015) examine the 
effect of corporate PAC to tax policymakers and tax decisions. The setting of the study allows 
me to determine the economic value of PAC supports because it analyses the benefits of tax-
specific PAC supports and tax-specific outcomes. Using the relational approach methodology 
following Cooper et al. (2010) from the year 1994, the study finds that firms that engage more 
relational approach to political activities (Relational Candidate and Relational Strength) have 
lower future cash and GAAP ETRs and less volatile future cash ETR. Furthermore, they find 
that the more intense the political contributions made by firms through PAC, the lower the 
future cash ETR. The study also tests whether other political activities such as lobbying on tax-
related issues could be a complementary strategy for firms to obtain economic benefits. They 




negative. The result suggests that the PAC contributions could be a part of the relational 
approach to CPA that might lead to future economic benefits (Brown et al., 2015).  
 Kim and Zhang (2016) analyse whether political connections through political 
contributions affect companies’ behaviour on tax. They test political connections through 
several channels such as management political ties, lobbying activities and political 
contributions. The proxy for political contributions is a dummy variable whereby a firm 
observation is assigned the value of 1 if the company registered a political action committee 
(PAC) in the year, and 0 otherwise. They find that companies that engage in campaign 
contribution are more tax aggressive. They argue that these firms could afford to engage in 
more aggressive tax behaviour because they have lower detection risks, they are better 
informed regarding tax regulations and policies, lower transparency requirements from the 
capital market, lower political costs of aggressive tax planning and tax aggressiveness depicts 
risk-taking opportunity for politically connected firms (Kim & Zhang, 2016). The study also 
indicates that the strength of political connections is associated with tax aggressiveness. The 
measures for political strength is based on political contributions which include the number of 
candidates a firm supports, the length of firm-candidate relationship, the ability of the 
candidates, total lobbying expenditures and the number of politically connected individuals 
within the firm. 
A recent working paper by Heflin and Wallace (2015) study the relationship between 
political contributions and the auditor-client relationship. They argue that political 
contributions by firms could influence auditors’ decisions and consequently audit outcomes. 
The study uses three measures of political contributions, total PAC contributions, the number 
of candidates a firm supports, and whether or a firm makes a PAC contribution in a year. They 
find that political contributions are associated with poorer accruals. However, they also find 




weaknesses. This evidence suggests that although accruals quality is poorer, politically 
connected firms are able to influence audit outcomes, shown by less restatement and less 
reported material weaknesses. Furthermore, they test whether auditors are taking more risks by 
allowing poorer accruals by examining audit fees and auditor tenure. They find that 
contributing firms are associated with higher audit fees and non-audit fees. This result is 
consistent with the argument that to compensate for higher risks, auditor charge higher fees to 
the politically connected clients. In addition, they also find that politically connected clients 
are associated with longer auditor tenure, suggesting the existence of auditor-client economic 
bonding. Overall, the study suggests that auditors are more likely to take on more risk on well-
connected clients in change for higher fees. 
3.2.3.1. Political Ideology 
 
Political contributions can also be utilised as a proxy for political ideology because it 
often reflects one’s political values and ideology (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Hutton et al., 2014, 
2015). Accounting, finance and management research on political ideology has found that 
political ideology could determine corporate decision and consequently could affect financial 
outcomes. For instance, recent accounting and finance literature exhibits that personal political 
preferences have a significant impact on individual and professional investors’ investment 
decisions, and analyst forecast (Bonaparte, Kumar, & Page, 2017; Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012; 
Jiang et al., 2016). From the professional investing perspective, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) 
find that Democrats mutual funds managers (Democrats donor) value “responsible” firms more 
than “irresponsible” firms (which include, tobacco, guns and defence, natural resources firms 
and companies with low KLD index scores). The results are robust with hedge funds managers. 




groups of funds managers which could influence significant impact on asset pricing as the 
movement of socially responsible mutual funds grow.  
Kim et al. (2013) examine whether board’s diversity in terms of the members’ political 
ideology influence firm performance. The results of the study suggest that more politically 
diverse management teams are associated with better firm performance and lower agency costs. 
In addition, Firms that have more diverse boards in terms of their political preferences also 
exhibit lower agency costs indicated by lower free cash flows (Kim et al., 2013). Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) use aggregate executive’s contribution as a proxy for firm political 
orientation to analyse its relationship with corporate social responsibility (CSR). The findings 
indicate that Democratic leaning firms are more socially responsible using the KLD index. 
Overall, Democrats oriented firms spend $20 million more and $80 million more for S&P 500 
firms on CSR than their Republican counterparts. The higher spending for Democrats leaning 
firms are more pronounced for a firm based in Democrats oriented states. Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) also report that CSR activities engaged by firms are associated with lower 
returns and profitability measured by ROA. This result suggests that CSR activities come at 
the expense of firm value and profitability (Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014). 
Managers’ political orientation could influence firms’ decisions and policies. 
Managerial characteristics and political orientations affect firms’ decisions on CPA. Hutton et 
al. (2014) argue that managers that lean to the Republican Party are more conservative and 
hence likely to develop more conservative corporate policies. Specifically, those firms are 
associated with lower corporate debt, lower capital and lower research and development 
expenditures and invest in less risky projects, but higher profitability. Following the 9/11 
attacks and Lehman Brothers collapse, they also find that Republican CEOs are more 
conservative, indicated by lower capital expenditures of tangible assets. The results in Hutton 




perspective, Democrats are more risk accepting than Republicans. In the litigation perspective, 
Hutton et al. (2015) argue that firms that subscribe to Democratic ideology are less likely to be 
subject to environmental, labour and civil-right related litigation. Republican cultures, on the 
other hand, are less likely to be embroiled in security fraud and intellectual property rights 
violations. The argument for these findings is that Democratic ideology is more concern about 
equality, labour rights and environmental concerns, whereas Republican values emphasise 
more on self-reliance, property rights, market discipline and limited government involvements 
in business (Hutton et al., 2015). 
Political preferences also affect financial analysts’ forecasts. For instance, prior 
research by Jiang, Kumar, and Law (2016) analyse whether analysts’ political preferences as 
one of the personal traits affect their forecasting behaviour and stock prices. They argue that 
political preferences could be an unobservable personal trait that could influence economic 
decisions. In particular, they argue that analyst that more align to the Republican Party are more 
likely to adopt a conservative approach towards information processing. Conservatism used in 
their study is distinct with other accounting definition of accounting conservatism.22 Whereas 
in their study the definition of analyst conservatism “reflects cautious updating following the 
arrival of information signals regardless of the direction of the news (p.39). In the tests, the 
study uses 100% analyst donation to the Republican as the measure of politically conservative 
measure. They find that conservative analysts are 3% more likely to issue small changes 
recommendation in the forecast and 1.5% less likely to issue bold forecasts. In other words, 
Republican analysts are likely to issue modest revisions in earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations. The higher quality research produced by the analysts is rewarded by their 
employers, institutional investors and media. Particularly, they find that conservative analysts 
                                                          
 




are more likely to produce accurate earnings forecasts and issue more updates and more likely 
to receive Institutional Investor all-star analyst, covered by media and obtain promotion. 
Regarding market reactions, the market reacts less positively when the conservative analysts 
produce positive forecasts revisions and the market reacts less negatively when the 
conservative analysts produce negative forecasts revisions. 
Francis et al. (2016) find that the manager’s political ideology could influence tax 
sheltering decisions. The sample comprises of CEOs in 1992 to 2007 period. They utilise three 
measures of tax sheltering which include permanent tax sheltering (DTAX), discretionary 
portion of tax planning (DD_TA) and extreme tax sheltering case (SHELTER). The results 
show that partisan CEOs both the Republicans and Democrats engage in tax sheltering 
(permanent, discretionary and more aggressive), consistent with political connections 
conjecture. Specifically, they find that Republican CEOs engage more tax sheltering even 
controlling for managerial compensations and corporate governance. On the other hand, 
Democratic CEOs are associated with higher tax sheltering behaviours when they have high 
sock-based incentives. This finding suggests that tax sheltering decisions are not only driven 
by political ideology but more importantly by economic incentives.  Francis et al. (2016) 
suggest that “political preference is a necessary but not sufficient determinant for tax sheltering, 
especially when CEOs’ (such as Democratic) political beliefs are not aligned with tax 
sheltering” (p. 39). A more recent study by Unsal et al. (2016) also uses political contribution 
as the proxy for manager’s political ideology by which managers that proportionately 
contribute more to Republican are perceived leaning more towards the Republicans and vice 
versa. Using the CEOs sample from the year 2000 to 2012, they analyse corporate lobbying 
outcomes vary by CEO’s political orientation. They find that Republican leaning managers 
spend more on lobbying activities, lobby the greatest number of bills and employ more 




employs a more conservative approach by avoiding less risky corporate decisions. The results 
also suggest that Republican CEOs regard lobbying activity as an important corporate strategy 
that necessary to be incorporated. Moreover, they find that lobbying CEOs are associated with 
higher compensations compared to non-lobbying counterparts. Republican CEOs also have the 
lowest abnormal returns, lower Tobin’s Q, lower buy-and-hold returns compared to their non-
Republican counterparts. The results of the study also exhibit that Republican CEOs are 
associated with higher free cash flow, signalling agency problems and rent seeking behaviour 
Unsal et al. (2016). They argue that Republican CEOs tend to waste free cash flow on a less 
beneficial project to the firm, whereas non-Republican CEOs incline to maximise lobbying 
expenditures on value-creation projects.   
Following Hutton et al. (2014 & 2015), Elnahas and Kim (2017) find that political 
ideologies influence CEOs investment decisions, particularly on merger and acquisitions 
decisions using 1,007 public firms and 2,100 CEOs sample between 1993-2006. They find that 
Republican leaning CEOs are less likely to engage mergers and acquisitions activities. 
Moreover, in conducting mergers and acquisitions, Republican CEOs prefer more conservative 
cash method to settle the payment. Cash method allows quicker settlement, reduce bid rejection 
and reduce the uncertainty of deal summation. Republican CEOs also engage more in within-
industry merger and acquisitions. The possible explanation for this finding is that Republican 
CEOs tend to be more conservative and they tend to avoid loss from the unfamiliar business 
environment. In addition, the study also documents that Republican CEOs are associated with 
higher long-term performance compared to their Democrats counterparts. Republican CEOs 
outperform non-Republican CEOs by 20.73%, consistent with the notion that Republican 
CEOs are associated with better performance (Hutton et al., 2014). The results of their study 
remain robust after controlling for management overconfidence and whether or not Republican 




to use earnouts to acquire targets in high-tech and service industries to reduce the higher degree 





3.3. Audit Fees Literature 
3.3.1. Introduction  
This section discusses and summarise the audit fee literature. I begin this section with 
the brief development of auditing practice from Watts and Zimmerman (1983) and Jensen and 
Meckling's (1976) article. The discussions incorporate agency theory and agency conflicts 
surrounding businesses between principal and agent that leads to the need for independent 
auditors. Subsequently, I present the audit pricing theory according to Simunic (1980) and the 
audit risk model. Finally, I provide a review of relevant audit fee studies to exhibit the important 
determinants of audit fee and the development of audit fee literature. 
3.3.2. The Need for Auditing and the Early Development of Auditing Practice 
 
Auditing is important as one of the monitoring activities in the theory if the firm. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) hypothesise that an audit is a monitoring form to reduce agency conflict 
between owner and manager. In the article, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state: “In practice, it 
is usually possible by expending resources to alter the opportunity the owner-manager has for 
capturing non-pecuniary benefits. These methods include auditing, formal control systems, 
budget restrictions, and the establishment of incentive compensation systems which serve to 
more closely identify the manager’s interests with those of the outside equity holders, etc” (p. 
323). Watts and Zimmerman (1983) further assert: “An audit by someone independent of the 
manager reduces the incentive problems that arise when the firm manager does not own all the 
residual claims on the firm” (p. 613). Opportunistic behaviour by contracting parties arises 
because firms are sets of contracts among factors of production and different sets of contractual 
arrangements (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The different contractual arrangements provide an 
incentive for the contracting parties to act opportunistically. This opportunistic behaviour 
reduces the total product of the firm and consequently, reduce the value of the firm (Watts & 




to provide a contract to restrict opportunistic behaviour. Jensen and Meckling (1976) then 
conjecture that auditing should play its role to enforce this contract. More importantly, auditors 
should be able to discover and report breaches of contracts (opportunistic behaviour) where the 
auditor’s independence comes into place. Therefore, auditors should be able to serve as a 
monitoring tool to discover and report breaches of contract between owner and manager.  
Early corporations such as the English merchant guilds had adopted auditing since the 
early development of business corporation in the twelfth and thirteenth century. Members of 
the guild form “cartels” to monopolise the trade and to reduce transaction costs. Moreover, 
members of the guild gathered resources and these resources are administered by officers 
(managers) of the guild. Between the members of the guild and the officers, contractual 
arrangements are drawn to restrict the contracting parties behaviour because the officers 
conduct the trading on behalf of the members. Thus, agency conflicts between the owner 
(members of the guild) and manager (the officer) existed.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) document that these companies and guilds of merchants 
are audited annually by committees of members. One of the most important roles of the audit 
was to examine expenditures and not merely count assets or cash on hand. In other words, the 
audit of the guilds’ task is to inspect for unauthorised expenditures. Because of its duty, 
auditing played an important role to monitor managers’ contract and prevent breaches of 
contracts. Furthermore, although being an auditor might not be necessarily a full-time career, 
these auditors were still responsible for monitoring managerial tasks and breaches of contracts. 
Therefore, auditing had already been an important monitoring tool, even during the early-
corporations era. 
From the early development of corporations, auditors are expected to perform their duty 




responsible for completing the audit on time although they are not a full-time auditor. Auditors 
are heavily fined when they do not complete the audit appositely. Moreover, auditors have the 
incentives to be independent because of reputation risk, similar to modern auditors. Auditors 
who are also members of the guilds could also lose their guild membership and the share of the 
guild’s profit if they show lack of performance and independence. 
In its development, corporations undertake similar audit practice as the early English 
merchant guilds between thirteenth to nineteenth centuries. The notable difference is the size 
of the committee or the auditors because of the corporations’ more complex trades and large 
scope of trade. Regarding the auditing practice that survived over centuries, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1983) state that: “The hypothesis advanced here is that committees of auditors 
survived because they were an efficient method of monitoring contracts between managers and 
those supplying capital. However, auditing practice was not constant over time; it changed as 
the business corporations changed” (p.626). In the U.K., the auditing process was conducted 
by the shareholders and directors until the introduction of the Companies Act 1844 which 
required directors to keep accounts and required those accounts to be audited by persons other 
than the directors. Since 1845, corporations were likely to employ experts to assist auditors 
because the 1845 Companies Act permitted auditors to employ outside experts at companies 
expenses. A large number of new securities increase the tendency for new corporations to 
reduce agency costs by 1881. Gradually, existed companies started to replace shareholders with 
professional auditors to conduct the audit. In the U.S., the change to professional auditors 
occurred later than in the U.K. In 1933, the Securities Act 1933 required that corporations 
subject to the act have audits by independent or certified public accountants, although in the 





The demand for professional firms to conduct audits can be explained by two reasons. 
First, the demand for audits. The increasing demand for audits was in line with the increase in 
the complexity of the accounts and the increasing number of companies registered. The 
complexity of the accounts encourage specialisation in auditing and thus increase the demand 
for audit by professional auditors. Second, the introduction of a low-cost mechanism for 
accrediting auditors. This low-cost mechanism for accrediting auditors allowed more people to 
become a professional accountants/auditors. These professional accountants later were 
employed and the demand for professional auditors increased as the cost for professional 
accrediting auditors decreased. 
3.3.3. Audit Fee Theory 
 
The auditing and accounting scholars have focused on audit pricing research 
extensively in the past decades. Simunic (1980) is one of the earliest studies that propose a 
model to measure auditors decision making in terms of determining the level of audit fee 
charged to the client, based on auditee’s risks and market competition among auditors. The 
early audit fee literature focus on the Big-N and the non-Big-N dichotomy of audit fees and 
how Big-N auditors differ in terms of audit fee with their non-Big-N counterparts. Early 
literature suggests that audit fees are higher for Big N auditors because several factors that 
include Big N auditors have more resources, higher reputation risks at stake and thus provide 
more thorough and higher quality audit. As it progresses, audit fee literature focuses on the 
other determinants of audit fees such as client’s business risks, corporate governance, litigation 
risks and competitions among audit firms.  
In his early work in audit fee, Simunic (1980) provide an audit pricing model based on 
auditor’s risk judgement of the client. Generally, audit fees represent the total cost for the 




by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Thus, the cross-sectional 
differences in audit fees represent the quantity of audit conducted or the audit pricing 
discrepancies. Since an audit is an economic good, clients could determine the amount of audit 
they desire, according to the marginal costs and benefits. The potential benefits of audits 
according to Simunic's (1980) paper focuses on the assurance on client’s financial statement’s 
credibility and free from material misstatement and therefore, reduce client’s potential liability 
by providing less credible financial statement to the users. Thus, an auditor’s minimum fee for 
a different level of audit quantity will be equal to incremental expected total costs. The model 
for audit cost function is formulated as follow;   
E(c) = cq + E(d | a,q) E(θ) 
Where, 
E(c)  : the expected incremental total cost of audit (total audit fee). 
c  : the per-unit cost of external audit resources to the auditor, including all 
opportunity costs an therefore a provision for a normal profit. 
q  : the quantity utilised by the auditor in performing the audit examination. 
a  : the quantity of resources utilised directly by the auditee in operating the 
internal accounting system. 
E(d | a,q) : the expected potential losses that are attributed to the financial statement given 
a and q. 
E(θ)  : the expected likelihood of potential future losses bounded by the auditor. 
 Following Simunic (1980), Pratt and Stice (1994) summarise the steps that an auditor 
would take to determine the cost of an audit and even whether or not to take the client in a 




the auditor will perform the following three steps pricing procedures. First, the auditor assesses 
the amount of and likelihood of being held responsible for possible future losses, which is 
denoted as E(d)E(θ). Second, auditor invests in auditing, q, to the point where the marginal 
reduction in as E(d)E(θ) from an additional unit of auditing is equal to the marginal cost of that 
unit of auditing. Third, the auditor determines a client fee, E(c), that covers the cost of the 
investment in auditing, including a normal profit, cq, and the expected value of possible future 
losses, E(d)E(θ). Therefore, the determination of audit fee embroils the auditor judgement of 
potential future losses (E(d)E(θ)) and based on that, an auditor decides the quantity of audit (q) 
and total fees (E(c)). An auditor values the audit engagement to the extent where auditor could 
reduce the risk exposure to potential future losses. If the auditor is unable to charge a fee 
sufficient to cover the total expected costs (E(c)), the auditor might choose not to pursue the 
audit engagement (Pratt & Stice, 1994, p. 642). 
 Furthermore, Simunic (1980) also conduct a survey to determine the observable cost 
determinants of audit fee. He tested the hypothesis about the determinants of the audit fee 
components of total observable costs were tested by obtaining the least squares’ estimates of 
the coefficients of the variables in the following linear regression function; 
𝐹𝐸𝐸
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑉 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑉 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐽 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅 + 𝜇 
Where FEE is amount of current year’s external audit fee; ASSETS is the total assets at year-
end; SUBS is the number of consolidated subsidiaries; DIVERS is the number of two-digit SIC 
industries in which auditee operates, less one; FORGN is foreign assets divided by total assets 
at year-end; RECV is the accounts, loans, and notes receivable divided by total assets at the 
year-end; INV is the inventories over total assets at year-end; PROFIT is the net income over 




three fiscal years; SUBJ is an indicator variable which equals to if auditee is subject to qualified 
audit opinion; TIME is the auditor tenure with the auditee; AUDITOR is an indicator variable 
which equals to 1 if auditor is a Big Eight audit firm and; µ is the standard error. These factors 
affect the quantity and auditor’s risk judgment towards a client and based on these factors, 
auditor determines audit pricing for the client. 
3.3.4. Audit Risks 
 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) defines audit risk as 
“risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or her opinion on 
financial statements that are materially misstated”.23 Auditors’ job is to report material 
misstatement in financial reporting and provide reasonable assurance to the financial report’s 
users. Thus, audit risk is the risk of auditor fail to report this misreporting. Furthermore, 
auditors are also bound by the risk of injury and litigation from their profession in addition to 
the audit risks, as AICPA AU section 312.02 Footnote 2 states “In addition to audit risk, the 
auditor is also exposed to loss of or injury to his or her professional practice from litigation, 
adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with financial statements audited and 
reported on. This exposure is present even though the auditor has performed the audit in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and has reported appropriately on those 
financial statements. Even if an auditor assesses this exposure as low, the auditor does not 
perform less extensive audit procedures than otherwise is appropriate under generally accepted 
auditing standards”. The definition of audit risks also does not include that an auditor might 
erroneously conclude that the financial statements are materially misstated (AICPA, AU 
312.02 Footnote 3). 
                                                          
 




The three major components of the accepted audit risks (AAR) include inherent risk 
(IR), control risk (CR) and detection risk (DR). The accepted audit risk R (AAR) is defined as 
the probability that auditors are willing to accept that they will render unqualified opinions on 
materially misstated financial statements” (Houston, Peters, & Pratt (1999), p. 284). Inherent 
risk (IR) is defined as the probability that an account balance or class of transactions contains 
a material misstatement before considering the effectiveness of the internal control system 
(Houston, Peters, & Pratt (1999), p. 284). Control risk (CR) is “the probability that a material 
misstatement is not prevented or detected on a timely basis by the internal control system” 
(Houston et al. (1999), p. 284). Detection risk (DR) is “the probability that a material error that 
does occur and is not detected or corrected by the system of internal accounting control is not 
detected by the audit procedures performed” (Brumfield, Elliott, & Jacobson (1983), p. 62). 
Materiality is essential in determining the AAR and also influence the judgment of the financial 
report users.24 All components of audit risks are dependent on the level of materiality as it also 
stipulates the level of assurance an auditor provides. The accepted audit risk model is 
formulated as follows;  
AAR = IR × CR × DR 
where AAR is the accepted audit risk; IR is the inherent risk; CR is the control risk and; DR is 
the detection risk. 
Brumfield et al. (1983) summarises the elements of business risk that include (1) 
litigation (2) sanctions imposed by public or private regulatory bodies (e.g. the SEC, AICPA 
or other professional bodies), and (3) Impaired professional reputation, which can occur as a 
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result of litigation, sanctions, or adverse publicity.  Auditors also need to assess client’s 
business risk as a whole since business risk are closely related with client’s audit risk. An 
auditor could reduce audit risks based on the level of business risk by conducting more audit 
efforts. Thus, when business risk is high, auditors are expected to place more audit effort to 
reduce audit risks. However, Brumfield et al. (1983) argue that “the major conclusion from 
preceding arguments is that a perceived high level of business risk may be recognised as a 
factor that could lead an auditor to do more audit work to satisfy GAAS, but under no 
circumstances should an assessment of low business risk lead to an auditor to do less work than 
that suggested by the GAAS minimum” (p. 68) 
3.3.5. Audit Fee Studies 
 
3.3.5.1.Overview of Audit Fee Studies 
 
A vast literature on audit fee studies has been documented by accounting scholars. 
Given the accounting and auditing literature has comprehensively studied the topic on audit 
fee, I select some prominent studies in audit fee that are related this study. In the later section, 
I also present some studies on audit fee about political activities/economy research that are 
closely related to this study.  
One of the early audit fees studies by Simunic (1980) analyses the price competitiveness 
between Big Eight and non-Big Eight auditors. Because the data on audit fees are not publicly 
available at least before the 2000s, Simunic (1980) develops a demand-based positive model 
to determine audit fees. The data gathered using the survey to auditees on audit fees related 
information. In his study, Simunic, (1980) identifies several factors that might influence audit 
pricing such as auditee size, the complexity of the audit and the risk sharing between the auditor 
and the clients. Simunic (1980) documents overall lower audit fees for Big Eight audit firms 




firms in Simunic’s sample charge higher fees. The higher fees might be correlated to higher 
audit fees because auditor place more effort in conducting the audit and higher fees also 
satisfies the monopolistic argument which Big Eight auditors could form a “cartel” that enables 
them to charge higher fees (Palmrose, 1986). 
Agency theory suggests that managers have the incentives to employ high-quality 
auditors to monitor contracts, and because of that, managers would employ high reputation and 
high-quality auditor. Francis (1984) is one of the earliest studies that find Big 8 auditors are 
correlated with higher audit prices in the Australian audit market. Francis (1984) also states 
that the auditor size-audit fees relationship depends on the competition in the market, audit 
product differentiation, and potential scale economies to large accounting firms. The 
relationship between auditor size, audit quality and audit pricing can be seen in studies where 
researchers analyse the relationship between audit quality and litigations risks. Auditors 
perceive litigations risk as a serious problem as litigation could damage the auditor’s reputation 
severely. Palmrose (1988) finds that large audit firms have less litigation occurrence than the 
smaller audit firms. Specifically, she finds that the Big 8 audit firms have less litigation 
occurrence than the Non-Big eight firms. This implies that the Big 8 audit firms provide higher 
quality of audit services compared to the non-Big eight audit firms and thus satisfies the 
quality-differentiations according to audit firm sizes (Palmrose, 1988). Another literature 
argues that Big 4 auditors treat their clients more conservatively in the countries which have a 
strict legal system (Francis & Wang, 2004). This might be because the investors have greater 
power to prosecute the auditors if the auditor fails to perform high quality audits. Moreover, 
Francis and Wang (2004) find that discretionary accruals in countries with greater investor 
protection and regulatory system are smaller. Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg (2008) 
provide further evidence that auditors tend to avert themselves from opportunistic manager 




offerings. They find that abnormal accruals are smaller during pre-IPO engagement compared 
to post-IPO. They also find that audit fees are higher during the IPO engagement audits than 
post-IPO. The audit quality and audit fees are higher in a higher litigation regime or in other 
words, auditors conduct more audit efforts and provide higher quality audits to minimise 
litigation risks. 
Auditors might be able to reduce misstatement risk by conducting more audit effort 
which consequently increases audit quality and audit fees (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; 
Seetharaman, Gul, & Lynn, 2002). More audit effort will presumably lower the possibility of 
future litigations (Seetharaman et al., 2002). Auditors could also pass this risks to the client 
through audit fees. However, because auditor might not be able to conduct a full audit of a 
client and only able to provide reasonable assurance, auditors can still be sued, even when the 
auditor complies with the auditing standards. Thus, auditors will still charge premium fees not 
merely because of the increase of audit effort and litigation risks, but also to deal with the 
“residual risks” to cover for future litigation losses (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Seetharaman et 
al., 2002; Simunic & Stein, 1996). 
Although Palmrose (1986) does not find the association between audit fees and industry 
specialisation, further research regarding the auditor specialisation with more data available 
leads to the association between the auditor specialisation and the audit fee premium (DeFond, 
Francis, & Wong, 2000; Francis, Reichelt, & Wang, 2005). Francis et al., (2005) identify U.S. 
industry leader auditors earn fee premium implying a higher audit quality compared to non-
industry specialist auditors. However, this strong correlation between the fee premium and the 
industry specialist only on the office-level and it does not occur when the industry specialist is 
viewed from the country-level (Francis et al., 2005). Francis et al. (2005) further find that the 
city-specific will also affect the auditor industry expertise which explains the importance of 




the auditor who national leader alone. However, fees premia exist when the auditor is both 
national industry and city leader. Using Hong Kong data, DeFond et al. (2000) examine the 
role of industry-specialist related to the fee premium. They find that Big 6 auditors earned fees 
premia compared to their non-Big six counterparts. The fee premium is a result of reputational 
auditor brand name and industry specialisation.  
Accounting and auditing research have reported the association between audit fees and 
earnings management. For example, Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, (2002) and Kinney and 
Libby (2002) examine the association between auditor fees and earnings management. They 
find that there is a negative association between audit fees and earnings management. However, 
there is no association between the audit fees and non-audit fees combined (total fees) 
withearnings management (Frankel et al., 2002). Frankel et al. (2002) also find evidence that 
there is a negative association between non-audit fees disclosure and the shares value. 
Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew (2003) challenge the Frankel et al.’s findings. In their study, 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) perform the same empirical experiments as Frankel et al., (2002) to 
provide evidence that there is association between fee ratios and the auditor independence. 
Using the adjusted discretionary accruals over the firm performance, they divide the income 
increasing discretionary accruals and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. In this 
empirical experiment, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find that there is no association between the 
discretionary accruals and audit fees metrics. Specifically, there is no association between fee 
ratio and income increasing discretionary accruals. 
Defond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) use the propensity issuance of going 
concern audit opinions as the proxy of the auditor independence. Furthermore, they find no 
association between the non-audit fees as well as the audit fees and auditor independence. 
Defond et al. (2002) argue that non-audit fees do not impair the independence because auditor 




Reynolds, Deis, and Francis, (2004) find that there is positive association between relative non-
audit fees and the discretionary accruals and they suggest that previous study fail to capture 
this positive association because they do not control for the firm growth. They also find that 
the fee ratio as the proxy for the auditor independence is insignificant because the fee ratio is 
an unstable measure. However, this finding is a cross-sectional finding and time series analysis 
might be more credible for future research. Moreover, this result is dependent on the Jones 
model to measure the discretionary accruals which the quality of the measurement depends on 
the credibility of the model.   
Prior literature has shown that accounting conservatism is associated with lower audit 
(Gul et al., 2002). Prior studies have confirmed the notion that audit fees are litigation risk and 
business risk-adjusted, especially in the litigious legal environment such as the US (Bell, 
Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001; Khurana & Raman, 2004; Seetharaman et al., 2002). Firms 
are less likely to be entangled in litigation when they exercise a higher degree of conservatism 
(DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Simunic & Stein, 1996). Therefore, 
past literature suggests that firms that exercising accounting conservatism are less likely to be 
sued by the clients and thus should have lower litigation risk that consequently, should have 
lower audit fees (Simunic & Stein, 1996). Using Hong Kong firms sample, Gul et al. (2002) 
find that in the 1996-1997 Asian financial crisis, firms are exercising a lower degree of 
accounting conservatism. Hence, auditors increase audit efforts to deal with firms less 
conservative reporting which could lead to a legal charge. They argue that due to the increase 
in audit efforts, audit fee increases accordingly. 
Hay, Knechel, and Wong (2006) conduct a meta-analysis to determine the supply and 
demand factors that could affect the determination of audit fees. They analyse well over 100 
journal articles and 186 control variables used in those studies. They group these independent 




attributes. They find that common independent variable such as size (e.g. total assets), 
complexity (e.g. foreign subsidiaries, number of segments), inherent risks (e.g. inventory and 
receivables), leverage (debt to asset ratio) are positively associated with audit fees where client 
profitability is associated with lower audit fees.  For the auditor attributes, they find that audit 
quality (e.g. Big-N auditors) and audit tenure are associated with higher audit fees. Lastly, they 
also find that engagement attributes such as report lag, busy season, audit problem and non-
audit services fees are associated with higher audit fee. 
Although Hay et al. (2006) document conflicting evidence on whether or not corporate 
governance should increase audit fees, some studies find that corporate governance influence 
audit fees nonetheless. Using Hong Kong settings, Tsui, Jaggi, and Gul (2001) document that 
more independent board member (less CEO domination) will reduce conflict because less 
likely that the CEO has the ability to control and monitor his own decisions. A more 
independent board member should increase board effectiveness by oversight and reviewing 
important decisions to provide the best decision for the entity. Therefore, the risk of material 
misstatement would be lower by making less risky decisions and auditor might perceive the 
entity as lower risk and consequently charge lower audit fees. The results in their study 
document that less CEO domination reduces internal control risk, hence reduce audit fees. 
Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and Riley (2002) examine deeper board characteristics and its 
impact to audit fees by using board member independence (proportion of independent 
directors), diligence (number of board meetings) and expertise (average number of directorship 
outside the organisation by independent directors) as the corporate governance indicators. The 
sample consists of Big 6’s Fortune 1000 clients between 1992 and 1994. They find significant 
positive relationship audit fees and board independence, diligence and expertise. They argue 
that a more independent, diligent and expert board tend to demand higher audit assurance and 




Board gender diversity could also influence audit effort and audit fees. Gul, Srinidhi, 
and Tsui (2008) find that female presence in the board is associated with higher audit fees, 
controlling for selection bias, board and industry characteristics. The results imply that female 
directors are associated with more monitoring through audit efforts which is translated into 
higher audit fees. The demand for more audit efforts is more pronounced for firms with high 
information asymmetry, business complexity and ethical issues. Lai, Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 
(2017) provide evidence that more gender-diverse board in the audit committee demand more 
audit effort and more likely to appoint industry-specialist auditors. The result support the notion 
that gender-diversity in the board improve financial performance such as stock price 
informativeness (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011), increase analyst forecast accuracy (Gul, 
Hutchinson, & Lai, 2013) and earnings quality (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011) by showing that 
female directors increase oversight and monitoring in the form of more audit efforts and higher 
quality auditor appointment. 
3.3.5.2. Political Activities and Audit Fees 
 
In relation to this study on political activities, only a handful of research that has 
analysed the relationship between political activities and audit fees. Some of these studies are 
conducted using developing economy such as Malaysia. For instance, Gul (2006) investigates 
whether auditors place more audit effort for politically connected firms during the Asian 
financial crisis because of the risk of financial misstatement. The research suggests that 
politically connected firms are associated with higher risk of financial misstatements because 
they lose government assistance in the form of subsidies. Consequently, he finds that politically 
connected firms are associated with higher audit fees than non-politically connected firms 
during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, he finds that politically connected firms are 
associated with lower audit fees after the capital control introduction, signalling that politically 




auditor’s assessed risks and consequently, reduced audit effort and audit fees. In addition, Gul 
(2006) controls for ethnicity, an alternative measure of audit fee and earnings management, 
and the main results remain unchanged. He finds the Bumiputeras connected firms (the 
indigenous ethnicity of the country) performed worst during the financial crisis and received 
more government assistance to bounce back from the crisis. 
Wahab et al. (2011) use the Malaysian audit market to analyse the impact of corporate 
governance on the political connections-audit pricing relationship. Following (Gul, 2006) 
argument, they posit that politically connected firms are riskier which in turn requires auditors 
to conduct more audit and hence increase audit fees. They hypothesise that better corporate 
governance practices should require auditor to conduct more work and consequently firms pay 
higher audit fees to the auditor. The study finds that politically connected firms are paying 
higher audit fees. Less government scrutiny and more generous government assistance might 
explain the positive association between political connections and audit fees because politically 
connected firms have higher risk of financial misstatements. In line with their hypothesis, they 
find that better corporate governance practices demand higher quality audit which increases 
audit fees. They also find that firms with corporate governance in place does not necessarily 
demand higher quality audit when they have ties with the politicians because they might receive 
certain preferential treatment by the government. 
Bliss, Gul, and Majid (2011) examine whether or not political connections have an 
impact on corporate governance-audit fees relationship. Corporate governance indicators that 
the study focuses on are audit committee independence and CEO duality. The independence of 
audit committee is measured by the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
and CEO duality is dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the chief executive officer is 
also the chairperson of the board. The study is motivated by Carcello et al. (2002) who find 




Specifically, Carcello et al. (2002) argue that more diligent and expert boards demand higher 
audit quality and require the auditor to conduct a more thorough audit. The sample span from 
the year 2001 to 2002 that includes 500 Malaysian top public companies. Firstly, the study 
finds consistent results with Carcello et al. (2002) that independent boards are associated with 
audit fees. This finding implies more independent directors demand higher audit quality. More 
importantly, they find that political connections weaken the association between independent 
boards and audit fees. Furthermore, they do not find significant association between CEO 
duality and audit fees. However, when they interact CEO duality with political connection, the 
interaction term is positively associated with audit fees. This means that political connections 
exacerbate CEO duality risks. Overall, the study presents the demand and supply side of audit 
fee research. Independent audit committees demand higher quality audit which is weakened by 
political connections and auditor perceive higher business risks for politically connected firms 
and firms with CEO duality.  
The more recent working paper by Heflin and Wallace (2015) analyse the relationship 
between political contributions and audit-client relationship. They argue that firms build 
political connections through political contributions and it provides them influence over audit 
outcomes. The results suggest that political contributions are associated with poorer accruals 
quality, consistent with Chaney et al.'s (2011) argument that politically connected firms 
associated with poorer accruals. Interestingly, they find that political contributions are 
associated with fewer restatements and fewer reported material weaknesses. This suggests that 
politically connected firms could influence audit outcomes and in return, auditor is willing to 
take additional risks for incremental fees. Thus, they test the relationship between political 
contributions and audit fees. They find political contributions are associated with higher audit 
fees and non-audit fees. This suggests that auditor earn additional fees that could potentially 




firms are associated with longer tenure auditors. This results consistent with the economic 
bonding notion between politically connected clients and auditors. Taken together, the findings 
of the study suggest that auditors are more likely to take more lucrative, prestigious, politically 
connected clients in exchange for higher fees. Given the gap in the literature on how political 
activities could affect auditor’s judgments and consequently determine audit fee, this study will 
extend prior literature by providing evidence that political ideology could also influence auditor 
judgement of risks and audit pricing.  
3.4. Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the prior literature in accounting and finance on several forms 
of political activities and prior studies on audit fees. The most prominent forms of CPA 
discussed above include political connections, corporate lobbying and political contributions. 
I present prior studies on CPA that are related to this study. Prior studies have found that CPA 
influence corporate decisions as well as financial outcomes. As the extension of political 
contributions research, quantitative research in accounting, finance and even management have 
also examined political contributions deeper and uses political contributions as a proxy for 
firms/CEOs’ political orientations.25 Prior studies document not only political activities that 
can alter firm decisions and policies, but political ideology could also influence a firm’s 
policies and financial outcomes.  
The second part of this chapter examines prior auditing literature, primarily audit fees 
literature. The sections begin with the history of early auditing practices by the English 
merchant guilds until the needs for professionals auditors to conduct audits. The demands for 
independent and professional auditors increase as the size and complexity of businesses 
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increase. Subsequently, the early studies on audit fees are presented. I also present the related 




Chapter 4. Hypotheses Development 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the supporting arguments and the theories to formulate the 
hypotheses. The first part of the chapter discusses the development of the hypothesis on the 
relationship between political ideologies and audit fees. Hypothesis two is discussed in the 
subsequent sections, which present the arguments on the channels through which political 
ideologies could impact audit fees. I posit that a possible channel could be financial reporting 
quality. The two proxies for financial report quality are conservatism and discretionary accruals 
as the measure for earnings management. I provide corroborating evidence to explain how 
conservatism and discretionary accruals could be the possible channels through which political 
ideology could affect audit fees.  
4.2. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees 
The definition of political ideology by Tedin (1987) is widely used in studies of 
psychology (Erikson & Tedin, 2015; Jost, 2006). Tedin (1987) defines political ideology as an 
interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should 
be achieved (p. 65). Based on this broad definition, political ideology seems to cover an 
individual’s political beliefs, morality and personality. Individuals could then embrace a 
political ideology based on their beliefs, moral positions and personality. From the firm 
perspective, a firm embosoms a particular ideology as long as that political ideology is in line 
with the corporation’s goals and objectives (Unsal et al., 2016). 
Hutton et al. (2015) argue that political ideologies might be an interesting attribute to 
examine as a factor influencing firm policies. Political ideologies could influence individuals 
to make political contributions according to their political views (Fremeth, Richter, & 




accept their political party’s doctrine in dealing with ethical issues. Furthermore, Hutton et al. 
(2015) state that, “Our key conjecture is that differences on corporate and local culture, as 
reflected by core political values, translate into differences in ethical values and norms across 
firms” (p. 4). In addition, Goren, Federico and Kittilson (2009) argue that political parties’ 
values shape one’s behaviour and attitude. These arguments set the tone for the premise that 
firms or individuals who subscribe to a party’s political values will likely embrace its values 
and make decisions according to these values. 
Dichotomous ideologies are common among individuals, and one is commonly situated 
in between and undecided (Jost, 2006). A person embraces a particular ideology as he or she 
realises that the particular ideology is more consistent with his or her personality (McClosky, 
1958). Research has suggested that there are significant differences between conservative and 
liberal ideologies. Wilson and Patterson (1968) argue that extreme conservatism is associated 
with religious fundamentalism; right-wing political orientation; insistence on strict rules and 
punishments; intolerance of minority groups; preference for conventional art, clothing and 
institutions; anti-hedonistic outlook; and superstitious resistance to science. These 
characteristics could influence one’s ideology, and he or she would embrace a political party 
that embraces similar ideologies when they see fit. 
This study focuses on the two biggest parties in the U.S., the Republicans and the 
Democrats, as these two political parties posit extreme ideologies. McClosky (1964) labels the 
Democrats as the liberals and the Republicans as the conservatives, and individuals tend to take 
on the extreme ends of the partisanship. Dutt and Mitra (2005) further describe the left-wing 
party as “pro-labor” and the right-wing party as “pro-capitalists”. Furthermore, Hankla (2006) 
also argues that “Leftist leaders are said to be more likely than their rightist counterparts to 
intervene in the economy, driven by suspicion of the free market’s ability to advance social 




more laissez-faire approach that is consonant with their understanding of individual initiative 
and the efficiency of free enterprise” (p. 1). 
Hutton et al. (2015) further summarise the key characteristics of the two biggest parties’ 
ideologies based on several resources. They argue that Republican ideology emphasises the 
implementation of free enterprise, which typically promotes efficient markets, limited 
government intervention and protection of individual economic interests and property rights. 
Furthermore, Hutton et al. (2015) state that the ideology focuses on maximising economic gain, 
which might not necessarily place attention on costly activities such as environmental 
protection, unionisation and, more importantly, compliance with certain affirmative actions 
that are adhered to if these actions provide benefits to the firm. Finally, Republican ideology 
believes that individual accountability and market discipline should be more effective as a 
solution to corporate misbehaviour than government intervention. 
On the other hand, Hutton et al. (2015) distinguish the Democrats’ ideology as a belief 
that stresses government intervention through regulations as a potentially more effective 
approach to limit corporate crime and protect public interests. Democrats’ ideology values 
labour rights, civil rights, environmental protection, and corporate social responsibility. For 
businesses, Democrats support the affirmative actions that value employment and labour rights 
and protect unionisation and employees from aggrieved social classes (Hutton et al., 2015, p.5.) 
26. Moreover, Democrats’ ideology supports environmental and labour protections and 
underweight socially “irresponsible” sectors such as guns, defence, natural resources and 
smoking (Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012). 
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Based on the propositions above, which suggest that Democrats’ firms are more 
concerned with regulations, Democrats’ firms should provide more information. Providing 
more information creates a higher risk that the auditors are less likely to discover material 
misstatement, and auditors should spend more time to provide reasonable assurances that these 
firms are free from material misstatements. Moreover, Hutton et al. (2014) document evidence 
that Republican CEOs are more conservative, signified by their firm’s lower debt, lower capital 
expenditures, lower R&D expenditures and higher profitability. Consistent with the strong 
association between Republican ideology and conservatism, CEOs’ conservatism influences 
their decisions on mergers and acquisitions, which translates to less engagement in mergers 
and acquisitions (Elnahas & Kim, 2017). The paper also finds that Republican CEOs are more 
likely to use the cash method to settle mergers and acquisitions and more likely to avoid 
information asymmetry in acquisitions. Kam and Simas (2010) also document that Democrats 
are more risk accepting than Republicans. The idea that Republican ideology is more 
conservative is shown by the anecdotal evidence from U.S. voters. According to the American 
National Election Studies (as cited by Hutton et al. (2014)), “During the 1960–2008 period, 
approximately 44%–68% of individuals held the belief that Republicans are more conservative 
than Democrats and only 9%–18% of survey participants thought that Democrats exhibit 
greater conservatism” (Hutton et al., 2014, p.1284).27 
From conservatism perspective, conservative individuals tend to subscribe to a political 
ideology that can embrace conservative traits. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) 
provide evidence that conservative individuals exhibit a strong disposition to preserve the 
status quo. The psychology literature has documented that conservative individuals are 
associated with certain attributes, including less openness to uncustomary views (Jost & 
                                                          
 




Thompson, 2000), less likelihood of seeking strong external stimulation (Wilson, 1973), and 
more likelihood of being cautious about making major decisions (Feather, 1979). With these 
traits, if Republican-leaning firms are more likely to be more conservative and more sensitive 
to the possibility of future losses, as indicated by Wilson (1973), Republican-leaning firms will 
likely produce higher quality financial reports because they tend to be more conservative.  
This evidence suggests that Republican- (Democrat)-oriented firms take fewer (more) 
risks, which could be translated to lower a probability that the business will fail and, thus, lower 
business risk. The notion that Democrat-leaning firms take higher risk is also supported by Di 
Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014). They find that Democrat-oriented firms are associated with 
engaging in more CSR activities at the expense of profitability and firm value. This finding 
could imply that Democrat-leaning firms are relatively riskier compared to their Republican 
counterparts. Notbohm, Campbell, Smedema and Zhang (2018) find that Republican CEOs are 
associated with lower absolute value of discretionary accruals and lower probability of 
restatement, which in general suggests that Republican managers are associated with less 
earnings management. With lower likelihood of engaging in earnings management, 
Republican-leaning firms could produce higher quality financial reports and, thus, lower the 
detection risks of material misstatements. This lower detection risk could in turn lower the 
audit efforts and reduce audit fees.  
With their lower business risks, auditors should perceive Republican firms as having 
lower risk and therefore charge them lower audit fees than they charge Democrats’ firms. 
Moreover, Republican-leaning individuals are more conservative and risk-averse (Kam & 
Simas, 2010). Because of that, Republican-leaning firms are less likely to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour and avoid risks. Therefore, Republican-leaning firms are more likely 
to produce higher quality financial reports which consequently affects auditors’ perceptions. 




reports are free from material misstatements and consistently place reasonably less effort in 
conducting the audit, as well as charging lower audit fees. Accordingly, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Democrat- (Republicans-) leaning firms are associated with higher (lower) audit fees 
compared to Republican- (Demorcrat-) leaning firms. 
 
4.3. Political Ideologies and Financial Reporting Quality 
I propose financial reporting quality as the channel by which auditors arrive at their 
decisions about audit risks. I advocate two proxies for financial reporting quality, conservatism 
and discretionary accruals (as the measure for earnings management). Thus, the second 
hypothesis is divided into two parts, H2a is the conservatism hypothesis and H2b is political 
ideologies and discretionary accruals. 
4.3.1. Political Ideologies and Conservatism 
In the psychology literature, it has been long argued that conservative ideology is 
associated with right-wing ideology (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Muller, 2001; Wilson, 1973; Wilson 
& Patterson, 1968). Research in politics and psychology has pointed out that conservative 
ideology emphasises the opposition to change as the main feature of conservatism (e.g., 
Neilson, 1958; Rossiter, 1968). This position is somewhat in line with the Republicans’ 
ideology. This conservative attitude could have an impact on the individuals within the 
company. In addition, conservative attributes of the individual within the company are 
expected to have an impact on the financial reporting, and right-wing orientation is expected 
to result in more conservative financial reporting. 
In the accounting literature, conservatism has been recognised as one of the most 




1967). Conservatism is also deemed to be a superior GAAP method to all other methods on 
specified financial reporting specified qualities (Staubus, 1985)28. Earlier studies have offered 
some definitions for accounting conservatism. Watts (2003a,b) based on Bliss (1924) defines 
conservatism as “the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits and versus 
losses” or in other words, “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses”. Other scholars, such 
as Devine (1963), define accounting conservatism as linked with the firm’s overall goals, as 
conservatism is associated with lower expectations regarding goal fulfilment. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defines conservatism as “A prudent reaction to 
uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are 
adequately considered”. Researchers argue that conservatism is one of the most critical features 
of a GAAP shaped by market forces (Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010). This fact is also 
shown by some empirical studies that suggest that conservatism is a useful and beneficial 
approach to several issues, such as debt monitoring (Beatty, Weber, & Yu, 2008; Zhang, 2008) 
and managerial investment decisions (Ahmed & Duellman, 2011, 2013).  
Prior research and textbooks have many interpretations of conservatism, and this would 
affect the measurement of conservatism. For example, accounting conservatism can be 
depicted through accounting choices. These accounting choices might include inventory 
recognition choices between the LIFO and FIFO methods, or investment choices such as R&D 
expenditures (Givoly, Hayn, & Natarajan, 2007; Penman & Zhang, 2002). Conservatism can 
also be a positive association between stock returns and operating assets after controlling for 
earnings and dividends (Feltham & Ohlson, 1995). Perhaps the more prominent measure of 
conservatism is introduced by Basu (1997) as the bias of bad news being reflected more timely 
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(more quickly) than good news, an idea well-known as the differential timeliness measure. 
Because Basu's (1997) model suffers from a few disadvantages, such as the ‘aggregation’ effect 
(Givoly et al., 2007) and lack of timeliness, Khan and Watts (2009) develop a firm-year 
measure of conservatism using C_SCORE.29 Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang (2012) argue that 
both differential timeliness and C_SCORE can be effective measures for conservatism.  
I select conservatism as one of the proxies for financial reporting quality because 
Penman and Zhang (2002) posit that “Conservative accounting affects not only the quality of 
the numbers reported on the balance sheet but also the quality of earnings reported on the 
income statement” (p. 238). This supports the idea that conservatism could, in fact, increase 
financial report quality. Conservatism could also affect accounting estimation, and less 
conservative accounting numbers could increase auditors’ inherent risks (Gul et al., 2002). 
Errors, such as misestimating bad debts, depreciation costs and other expenses, could increase 
auditors’ inherent risks. Because of the increase in inherent risks, auditors might need to 
increase audit efforts and audit fees. Moreover, since conservatism is about expecting lower 
assets and earnings and having higher expectations of liabilities and costs (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986), conservatism might mitigate the probability of misstatements as a result 
of inflated earnings and assets and reduced liabilities and expenses. Thus, auditors posit more 
substantive tests for firms with lower degrees of conservatism to reduce inherent risks and to 
protect their reputation in the form of litigation charges.  
Scholars have documented that litigation risk should be positively correlated with 
conservatism (DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998), and audit fees are lower for firms with lower 
litigation risk because litigation risk is a part of audit risks and auditors would decrease audit 
                                                          
 




effort (Simunic & Stein, 1996). DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) also support the argument 
that auditors prefer conservative reporting to avoid litigation costs and lawsuits generally. 
Thus, this study predicts that conservatism might be a channel through which political 
ideologies could influence audit fees. Gul et al. (2002) argue that audit efforts might increase 
when firms demonstrate less conservative accounting. Using the Hong Kong market setting, 
they find a negative relationship between accounting conservatism and audit fees. Therefore, 
accounting conservatism should provide some corroborating evidence that conservatism 
should affect audit fees.  
From the political activities viewpoint, corporations could make political contributions 
to alleviate political costs. Watts (1977) argues that, based on the political cost hypothesis, 
firms engage in lobbying activities to mitigate regulatory uncertainty, and these lobbying firms 
are more likely to employ accounting conservatism to deal with public scrutiny. A recent study 
by Kong, Radhakrishnan, and Tsang (2017) reveals that lobbying firms are more likely to adopt 
accounting conservatism. Based on these arguments, this study expects that firms that are 
involved in other corporate political activities adopt more conservative accounting to mitigate 
political costs and uncertainties. Furthermore, political preference has also been used as a 
measure for individual risk acceptance.  
This study expects that Republican-leaning firms are more conservative than their 
Democrat counterparts, as was also suggested by previous studies (Elnahas & Kim, 2017; 
Hutton et al., 2014; Kam & Simas, 2010; Notbohm et al., 2018). Kam and Simas (2010) 
measure the risk tolerance of individuals and find that individuals associated with the 
Republicans have significantly lower risk tolerance than Democrats. The notion that 
Republican ideology is more conservative than that of the Democrats has been empirically 
tested further in previous studies (Elnahas & Kim, 2017; Hutton et al., 2014; Notbohm et al., 




in intangible assets, reduced R&D expenses, less stock volatility and higher ROA. A recent 
study by Elnahas and Kim (2017) argue that Republican CEOs are associated with a lower 
likelihood of engaging in merger and acquisition activities, which signals a more conservative 
investment approach. Notbohm et al. (2018) find that Republican CEOs are associated with 
lower discretionary accruals and the probability of restatement.  
This study employs three measures to analyse the relationship between political 
ideologies’ conservatism scores (C_SCORE), developed by Khan and Watts (2009), and 
alternative measures used in (Hutton et al., 2014).30 Thus, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis on the relationship between political ideologies and accounting conservatism:  
 
H2a: Republican- (Democrat-) leaning firms are associated with a higher (lower) degree 
of conservatism compared to their Democrat (Republican) counterparts. 
 
4.3.2. Political Ideologies and Discretionary Accruals 
According to the FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6;  
“Accruals accounting attempts to record the financial effects on an entity of transactions and 
other events and circumstances that have cash consequences for the entity in the periods in 
which those transactions, events, and circumstances occur rather than only in the periods in 
which cash is received or paid by the entity” (FASB, 1985, SFAC No. 6, para. 139). 
“Accrual accounting uses accrual, deferral, and allocation procedures whose goal is to relate 
revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to periods to reflect an entity's performance during a 
                                                          
 




period instead of merely listing its cash receipt s and outlays. Thus, recognition of revenues, 
expenses, gains, and losses and the related increments or decrements in assets and liabilities—
including matching of costs and revenues, allocation, and amortization—is the essence of using 
accrual accounting to measure performance of entities. The goal of accrual accounting is to 
account in the periods in which they occur for the effects on an entity of transactions and other 
events and circumstances, to the extent that those financial effects are recognisable and 
measurable” (FASB, 1985, SFAC No. 6, para. 145). 
Accruals accounting, therefore, could be a tool for earnings management, as most 
analysis on earnings management focuses on discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Earnings management is defined by (Schipper, 1989) as “… ‘disclosure management’ in the 
sense of a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process)” (p. 92). Managers could then manage earnings to gain personal benefits using 
accruals accounting, which might not necessarily give the accounting information users the 
most accurate information regarding the financial report. 
Discretionary accruals have been widely used in the prior literature as one of the most 
prominent proxies for earnings management and financial reporting quality (e.g., Dechow, 
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). For example, 
Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) find that discretionary accruals are associated with 
material accounting misstatements. Discretionary accruals could possess potential reporting 
problems because “The normal accruals are meant to capture adjustments that reflect 
fundamental performance, while the abnormal accruals are meant to capture distortions 
induced by application of the accounting rules or earnings management (i.e., due to an 
imperfect measurement system)” (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, (2010), p.358). Thus, if normal 




represents distortion, which signals lower quality information (Dechow et al., 2010). Thus, a 
higher level of discretionary accruals might imply lower financial report quality. 
Consistent with hypothesis H2a, which states that Republican-leaning firms are 
associated with conservatism, the conservative attitude could also affect firm’s financial 
reporting quality and discretionary accruals. Conservative ideology emphasises value security, 
rule adherence (Feather, 1979; Jost et al., 2003), risk-aversion (Joe, 1974; Kam & Simas, 2010) 
and dislikes ambiguous information. The quality of financial reports is also determined by the 
accounting standards, as the accounting standards set the borders of what would be acceptable 
accounting practices (Notbohm et al., 2018). Having a high degree of discretionary accruals 
could distort the quality of financial reporting and could move away from the accounting 
standards. Discretionary accruals are associated with the number and magnitude of fraud cases 
(Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez, 2008). One study also finds that earnings management 
measured by abnormal accruals are associated with shareholders lawsuits (DuCharme, 
Malatesta, & Sefcik, 2004). Firms that engage in earnings management using discretionary 
accruals are more likely to be subjected to SEC enforcement (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 
1996). This combined evidence could imply that a higher level of discretionary accruals 
represents a lower quality of earnings management that is more likely to attract regulatory 
attention. Thus, I expect the conservative ideology adhered to by Republican-leaning firms is 
more cautious, less aggressive and strictly follows accounting standards to avoid regulatory 
risks and, hence, produces higher quality earnings reports – lower discretionary accruals. These 
features could play an important role in financial reporting by reporting fewer discretionary 
accruals.  
In the political ideology research, Notbohm et al. (2018) find that firms whose CEOs 
are conservative (measured by their political orientation - Republican CEOs being 




restatement. Elnahas and Kim (2017) find that Republican CEOs are less likely to engage in 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities and prefer the cash method as the payment. This 
evidence signals that Republican CEOs are more conservative. In addition, Elnahas and Kim 
(2017) also find that Republican CEOs are less likely to engage in acquisitions with high 
degrees of information asymmetry. This evidence suggests that the Republican ideology values 
less information asymmetry and more highly ranks a higher quality of information. Hence, 
intuitively, Republican-leaning firms should provide a better quality financial report with fewer 
discretionary accruals.  
I use two widely used methods of measuring discretionary accruals, (Jones, 1991) and 
the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995), as proxies for earnings 
management. Thus, the second part of the second hypothesis (H2b) is formulated as follows: 
 
H2b: Republican- (Democrat-) leaning firms are associated with lower (higher) level of 
discretionary accruals compared to their Democrat (Republican) counterparts. 
 
4.4. Summary 
This study examines two hypotheses related to the relationship between political 
ideologies and audit fees. The first hypothesis investigates whether political contributions have 
an impact on audit pricing. The second hypothesis proposes that political ideology could affect 
audit assessments and influence audit fees. Particularly, the second hypothesis predicts that 
Republican-leaning firms are associated with lower audit fees. In contrast, Democrat-leaning 
firms are associated with higher audit fees. The argument is that Republican-leaning firms are 
more conservative, risk-averse and tend to produce higher quality financial reports than their 




leaning firms invest more in corporate social responsibility at the expense of firm value. 
Moreover, Democrat-leaning firms are associated with higher agency costs, which can be 
translated into higher business risks. 
To provide corroborating evidence for the first hypothesis, this study analyses whether 
financial reporting quality could be a channel through which political ideologies have an impact 
on audit fees. There are two proxies used to measure financial report quality – conservatism 
and discretionary accruals. Thus, the second hypothesis is divided into two parts, H2a deals 
with the relationship between political ideology and conservatism, and H2b examines the 
relationship between political ideology and discretionary accruals. To provide evidence that 
political ideology could affect accounting conservatism, H2a expects that Republican firms are 
more conservative than their Democrat counterparts. Prior studies have provided evidence that 
Republican CEOs are more conservative, especially in regard to investment decisions. 
Moreover, accounting research has indicated that accounting conservatism is negatively 
associated with audit fees. Thus, H2a expects that Republican leaning firms are more likely to 
adopt more conservative accounting approaches. This study also examines the relationship 
between political ideology and discretionary accruals. Because Republican ideology is 
associated with conservatism, this study expects that Republican-leaning firms are less likely 
to engage in earnings management and having fewer discretionary accruals. Thus, H2b expects 
Republican-leaning firms are associated with fewer discretionary accruals, which also means 










This chapter discusses the methodology used for this study. The chapter starts by 
presenting the data collection method. Afterwards, the sample construction is indicated. In the 
Data and Sample section, I provide detailed steps to construct the sample, including merging 
the datasets from various sources. The second part of the chapter deals with the model 
specifications. The models are developed based on prior studies using variables that are 
commonly used in previous studies. The Model Specification section is divided into two main 
parts, including the main analyses and additional tests. The main analyses include the main 
model to test the political ideology-audit fee relationship, discretionary accruals tests and 
accounting conservatism tests. The additional analyses include the analysis of audit report lag 
and controlling for several factors such as lobbying, political connection indexes, earnings 
management and conservatism.  
 
5.2. Data and Sample 
 
I begin the data collection from the individual federal contributions data which comes 
from Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the Individual Contributions data which available 
from FEC website starting from the year 1979.31 The Individual Contributions data consists of 
the contributors’ information including names, occupations, employers of the individuals, 
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and other information on the contributions including to whom and date the contributions are made. The 
information on political contributions can be obtained from FEC’s website at www.fec.gov. The Federal Election 
Campaign Act (1971) promotes disclosures of campaign contributions and imposed limits on campaign 




locations, parties they contribute to, the amount contributed and the recipient, together with the 
recipient party affiliation. The contributions more than $200 must be reported to FEC together 
with detailed information as listed above. Because the enormous number of observations of the 
FEC data, this study excludes observations of individual political contributions without 
organisation (Company) information (missing), self-employed or observations that have no 
affiliation with a firm in the “EMPLOYER” field. Furthermore, I drop observations with 
missing date information. I merge the sample with Committee and Candidates files to get the 
information about to which party an individual makes the political contributions. The total 
number of observations from FEC dataset is 8,868,245 observations from the year 2000 to 
2016.32 
 From the individual contributions, I sum up the total contributions of all employees of 
a firm, including the lower level employees. This method makes up into an aggregate firm level 
contribution based on the total contributions made by all employees included in FEC dataset. 
Using this method, I can determine the political ideology of a firm based on the individual 
contributions made by the employees of the firms. The final sample for the aggregate firm-year 
observations and after dropping missing information for the EMPLOYER is 5,222,020 
observations. Since FEC file does not have a unique firm identifier, I conduct a name match 
using the Employer field. I standardise the name of the companies on the Employer field to be 
as similar as possible with Compustat company name field to have a more accurate matching 
process. I further use Iugum Data Software to perform the “fuzzy match”. Then, I match firms’ 
names in “Employer” field with company names in the Compustat database. In addition, to 
determine the year the donation is made, I use the contribution date and extract the year from 
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the dates. By using this method, I can construct a panel sample after merging with Compustat 
file. The FEC-Compustat matched sample consists of 119,209 observations. 
Table 1. Sample Construction for Political Ideologies and Audit Fees analysis 
Descriptions           Obs   Obs. 
FEC Individual Contributions data from the year 2000 to 
2016     
(after deleting missing EMPLOYER data and self-
employed observations)   
    
8,868,245  
          
minus: Aggregating individual contributions for each 
firm and drop observations with missing firm's name 
(EMPLOYER) information  (3,646,225)    
         
    
5,222,020  
minus: Unmatched observations with 
Compustat data   (5,102,811)    
         
       
119,209  
minus: Unmatched observations with 
AuditAnalytics data   (10,362)    
         
       
108,847  
minus: Missing information on the 
control variables      (94,735)      
Final Sample               
         
14,112  
 
The sample consists of all firms included in the Compustat database from the year 2000 
to 2016 excluding financial firms (SIC 4-digit code: 6000-6999). The year 2000 is chosen as 
the starting period of the sample because of the audit fees data is available on AuditAnalytics 
database starting from the year 2000. After matching the FEC sample and Compustat data, I 
match the sample with audit fee data. The audit fee data comes from “Audit Fee” section in 
AuditAnalytics database. The information that can be found in AuditAnalytics database 
includes audit fees, audit fees-related information and several auditor information. I merge 
already matched FEC-Compustat data with audit information from AuditAnalytics using firm’s 




AuditAnalytics matched sample, I obtain 108,847 firm-year observations. The final sample 
after considering missing data for the control variables, the sample for the main regression 
consists of 14,112 firm-year observations (for political ideology and audit relationship) from 
the year 2000 to 2016. The sample construction is indicated in Table 1. The significant drop in 
the sample is attributed to the inaccurate and inconsistencies in the firm name in the FEC 
dataset, making it challenging to name match with Compustat data. 
 The control variables, as well as related financial and accounting data, are obtained 
and calculated from the Compustat database. For the stock related information including 
holding period returns and bid-ask spread, the data is gathered from the CRSP database and 
they are used in the additional tests. The PAC and lobbying data for the additional analysis 
come from Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) database which is recently named as 
OpenSecret. The PAC and lobbying-related data can be downloaded through the OpenSecret 
website (www.OpenSecret.com). I also use executives and directors sample for additional tests 
which the data comes from the Execucomp database. The executives and directors sample is 
utilised to conduct the test for the relationship between political ideologies and audit fees at the 
higher-ranked employee level. 
5.3. Model Specifications 
5.3.1. Multivariate analyses 
5.3.1.1. Political Ideology and Audit Fees 
The main objective of this study is to examine the relationship between firm political 
ideology and audit fee. The political ideology measure is constructed based on individual 




employees’ political contributions included in the sample.33 The sum of employees’ political 
contributions reflects the whole firm political ideology and preference. I also use alternative 
proxies for firms’ political ideology which include top-level employees’ contributions and 
firms’ PAC contributions. Noticing that prior studies only focus on CEOs’ (e.g. Di Giuli & 
Kostovetsky, 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017; Francis et al., 2016; Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012; 
Hutton et al., 2014) and the board members’ contributions (Kim et al., 2013), this study also 
use executives and directors political contributions sample for the additional analysis. In 
addition, I also use PAC sample since previous studies have utilised firm PAC contributions as 
the proxy for a firm’s political donations (Cooper et al., 2010; Grier et al., 1994; Hansen & 
Mitchell, 2000; Keim & Baysinger, 1988) for further additional test.  
For the main test variables, this study employs firms’ political ideology (CPID), firms’ 
total contributions to Republican Party (LOGREP) and firms’ total contributions to Democratic 
Party (LOGDEM) as the main political ideology test variables. The variable CPID is 
constructed by calculating the difference between total contributions to the Republican and 
total contributions to the Democrats over total contributions (shown in Equation (1)) as has 
been used in previous studies (Francis et al., 2016; Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012; Hutton et al., 
2015; Unsal et al., 2016).34  
𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑫 =  




Thus, a firm with an extreme orientation to the Republican will have the value CPID 
equals to +1 and firm with extreme Democrats orientation will take the value of -1. Thus, CPID 
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shows how a firm political orientation based on the ratio of contribution given to the two 
parties. However, the CPID measure does not necessarily take into account the magnitude 
factor of political contributions. For example, $1,000 contribution to each party would be the 
same as $1 million contributions to each party using CPID calculation. This could be one of 
the limitations of using CPID approach. The relationship between political ideologies and audit 
fees is formulated as follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2LOG_ATit + β3MTBit + β4LOGSEGit 
+ β5FOREIGNit + β6ROAit + β7LEVit + β8RECINVit + β9PPEit+ β10LOSSit + 
β11SPIit + β12MERGERit + β13ISSUEit + β14BIGit + β15INDSPECit + β16YEit + 
β17LOGNASit  + β18INDUSit + β19YEARit  + εit35      (2) 
LOGFEES is the natural logarithm of audit fees. Political Ideology Measures include CPID, 
LOGREP and LOGDEM. Following Hay et al. (2006), this study utilises control variables that 
commonly used in audit pricing studies. The client-specific attributes this study uses LOG_AT 
which is the natural logarithm of total assets. The growth opportunity is measured by MTB 
which is market to book ratio. Client complexity is measured by LOGSEG which is the natural 
logarithm of the number of business segments that a firm involves in and FOREIGN which is 
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign operation, 0 otherwise. 
Client business profitability is measured by ROA is the return of assets which is return before 
extraordinary items over total assets and LOSS which is the loss dummy that takes the value 
of 1 of the firm incurred a loss in the current period, 0 otherwise. This thesis uses LEV which 
client’s leverage, measured by total liability over total assets to measure risk as suggested by 
Simunic (1980). As inventories and receivables are difficult to audit (Newton & Ashton, 1989) 
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which consequently increase client’s inherent risks (Hay et al., 2006), this study uses RECINV 
which is the sum of total inventory over total receivables. This study also includes PPE which 
is property plant and equipment over total assets to control for inherent risks as much discretion 
and a lot of estimation are in place for property, plant and equipment account. 
To add to the client business complexity, this study uses the following variables; SPI is 
a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm has special items, 0 otherwise; MERGER is a 
dummy which takes the value of 1 if a firm engages in merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities, 0 otherwise; ISSUE is dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm issue capital in 
that period, 0 otherwise. To control for auditor attributes, I use BIG which is the dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise and INDSPEC which 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the auditor is an industry specialist, 0 otherwise. Finally, 
for the engagement attributes, this study employs YE which is year-end dummy which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm’s fiscal year-end is 31 December, 0 otherwise and LOGNAS which 
is the natural logarithm of non-audit services fees. INDUS and YEAR are the industry fixed 
effect dummies and year fixed effect, respectively.36 This study controls for industry fixed-
effects because political activities seem to be industry concentrated (Hillman et al., 2004) and 
year dummies to control for year effects. The variables INDUS and YEAR are included in all 
regressions in this study. The model is clustered by company and year, following Petersen 
(2009) clustering approach. 
5.3.1.2. Political Ideologies and Accounting Conservatism 
5.3.1.2.1. Conservatism using C_SCORE 
 
                                                          
 





I conduct further tests on political ideologies and conservatism to provide additional 
corroborating evidence that shows conservatism might influence firm policies and 
consequently affect audit fees. To examine whether political ideologies affect accounting 
conservatism, I use conservatism measure (C_SCORE) developed by Khan and Watts (2009). 
The model attempts to reduce the weaknesses of Basu (1997) which also well-known as 
differential timeliness measures. Basu posits that conservatism incorporates bad news more 
timely than good news. However, Basu’s model is not a firm-year measure since it is estimated 
by using cross-sectional sample (Zhong & Li, 2017).  The conservatism score developed by 
Khan and Watts (2009) provides more timeliness measure of conservatism because the proxy 
takes into account time series and cross-sectional variation in conservatism. Thus, Khan and 
Watts (2009) design a firm-year conservatism measure because researchers demand more 
timeliness measure of conservatism and alleviate the problems posited in Basu's (1997) model. 
Furthermore, the conservatism score incorporates market-to-book ratio, equity size and 
leverage as they are related to conservatism. These three components are related to 
conservatism through investment opportunity set. Investment opportunity set is closely related 
to conservatism and can be explained through, contracting, litigation, taxation and regulation 
explanation. Therefore, Khan and Watts (2009) model provide the firm-year and firm-level 
characteristics that are related to conservatism.  
This study follows Khan and Watts (2009) by estimating the following equation for 
each year separately:  
NIi,t = β0 + β1LOSSit + RETit(γ1 + γ2SIZEit + γ3MTBit + γ4LEVit) + LOSSit × RETit (α1 
+ α2SIZEit + α3MTBit + α4LEVit) + (μ1SIZEit + μ2MTBit + μ3LEVit) + NEGit × 




 where NI is the reported earnings deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the fiscal year; RET is the 12-month buy-and-hold return calculated using average monthly 
returns beginning in the fourth month after the fiscal year-end; LOSS is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of 
a firm’s total equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; MTB is the ratio of the market value of 
equity to the book value of equity, and LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio.37 Subsequently, I 
compute the firm-specific C_SCORE using the coefficient estimates (α1t, α2t, α3t, and α4t) 
obtained from equation (3) as follows:  
C_SCOREit = α1t + α2tSIZEit + α3tMBit + α4tLEVit       (4)  
where a larger CSCORE indicates a greater level of accounting conservatism in a given 
Year. The relationship between political ideologies and firm conservatism using C_SCORE 
developed by Khan and Watts (2009)  is formulated as follows; 
C_SCOREit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2SDRET+ β3INVESTCYCLEit + 
β4BIDASKit + β5AGEit + β6INDUSit + β7YEARit εit     (5) 
5.3.1.2.2. Accounting Conservatism Based on Hutton et al. (2014) 
 
Hutton et al. (2014) analyse the relationship between CEOs’ political preference and 
conservatism. The results exhibit that Republican CEOs are more conservative based on several 
measures such as capital expenditures (INV), research and development expenditures (R&D), 
stock return volatility (SDRET) and return on assets (ROA). I employ these four measures as 
alternative measures of CEO’s conservatism. The relationship between political preference and 
                                                          
 




firm conservatism using alternative measures employed by Hutton et al. (2014)  is formulated 
as follows; 
(Alternative Conservativism Measures)it = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + 
β2LOG_ATit + β3MTBit + β4LOSSit + β5LAGLELVit 
+ β6INDUSit + β7YEARit + εit    (6) 
5.3.1.2.3. Discretionary Accruals 
 
Chaney et al. (2011) find that politically connected firms are correlated with poorer 
accruals. The results exhibit that politically connected firms are positively associated with a 
standard deviation of discretionary accruals. Therefore, this study expects that political 
orientation also influences discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals do not necessarily 
influence audit fees per se. However, higher earnings quality by having less discretionary 
accruals should limit auditor risk on material misstatements. Moreover, this study also uses 
negative signed of discretionary accruals to analyse if political ideologies have an impact on 
conservatism. The negative discretionary accrual is used as one of the proxies of conservatism 
because of the possible high correlation between litigation risks and income decreasing 
behaviour (DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). When litigation risk is relatively lower, auditors 
are less likely to pass the fee premium to the client since they are likely to be sued if they fail 
to discover material misstatements. Thus, by testing the impact of political ideologies on 
discretionary accruals, this study provides corroborating evidence that discretionary accruals 
could increase auditor’s material misstatement risks and ultimately increase audit fees. I 
measure the absolute and negative value of discretionary accruals using three models; Jones 
discretionary accruals model (JONES_DA), Modified Jones model (MODJONES_DA) and. 





(Discretionary Accruals Measures)it = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2LOG_ATit + 
β3MTBit + β4LOGSEGit + β5FOREIGNit + β6ROAit + 
β7LEVit + β8RECINVit + β9PPEit+ β10LOSSit + β11SPIit + 
β12MERGERit + β13ISSUEit + β14BIGit + β15INDSPECit + 
β16YEit + β17LOGNASit + β18INDUSit + β19YEARit + εit 
(7) 
5.3.2. Endogeneity Tests 
 
I perform endogeneity tests to alleviate some of the endogeneity and unobservable 
variables concerns. The endogeneity tests include excluding extreme political ideologies 
observations, Heckman Selection Bias procedure and Propensity Score Matching test. 
5.3.2.1. Heckman Selection Bias 
 
I  perform two-stage regressions based on Heckman (1979) to reduce possible 
endogeneity concerns of selection bias from observational data and unobservable variables. 
Specifically for this study, Heckman two-stage regression procedure alleviates unobservable 
variable concerns that could affect individual decisions on making political contributions. The 
first stage is the probit regression to examine the variables that could affect the test variables 
(political ideology measures). I then obtain the inverse mills ratio (LAMBDA) from the first 
stage probit regressions. In the probit regression, the dependent variable is the political 
ideology measures. However, since none of the measures is a dichotomous variable, I compose 
a new political orientation indicator based on CPID. I label this variable as CPIDREP which 
equals to 1 is CPID>0 (leaning towards the Republicans) and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables include control variables that significantly correlated with political ideology 




are LOG_AT, MTB, LOG_SEG, FOREIGN, ROA, LEV, RECINV, PPE, and MERGER. The 
first stage model is specified as follows; 
ProbCPIDREPit = β0 + β1LOG_ATit + β2MTBit + β3LOGSEGit + β4FOREIGNit + 
β5ROAit + β6LEVit + β7RECINVit + β8PPEit + β9MERGERit + εit  
(8) 
From the first stage, the inverse mills ratio (LAMBDA) can be obtained which can be 
interpreted as the possibility that a firm is leaning towards the Republicans over the cumulative 
probability decision. In the second stage of the procedure, the inverse mills ratio is included in 
the main model and the results of the main model are deemed to be robust if the results of the 
test variables remain unchanged. The model that includes the inverse mills ratio is specified as; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2LOG_ATit + β3MTBit + 
β4LOGSEGit + β5FOREIGNit + β6ROAit + β7LEVit + β8RECINVit + 
β9PPEit+ β10LOSSit + β11SPIit + β12MERGERit + β13ISSUEit + β14BIGit 
+ β15INDSPECit + β16YEit + β17LOGNASit + β18LAMBDAit + 
β19INDUSit + β20YEARit  + εit      (9) 
I perform similar tests for conservatism and discretionary accruals analysis. I run the same first 
stage regression for both conservatism and discretionary accruals analysis. For the second stage 
of regression, I include the inverse mills ratios I obtained from the first stage of the regression 
in the main model.38 
5.3.2.2. Propensity Score Matching 
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I perform more endogeneity checks using a propensity score matching technique on top 
of the multiple regression method. Propensity score matching is used to extenuate the 
misspecification concerns presented by multiple regression method as Shipman, Swanquist, 
and Whited (2016) state “Traditionally, archival studies use multiple regression (MR) models 
to mitigate endogeneity concerns in observational data. However, MR requires proper 
specification of the relation between outcome (Y) and explanatory variables (X) to obtain 
unbiased estimates. If the relation between Y and X is misspecified, then MR suffers from 
‘‘functional form misspecification’’ (FFM) and can produce biased estimates. The potential 
bias from FFM increases as treatment groups become more dissimilar (p. 213).” Because of 
this reason, I conduct propensity score matching analysis to mitigate the problems with 
multiple regression. The control and treatment effect is determined based on whether or not a 
firm is orientated to the Republicans (i.e. CPIDREP).  
In this test, I analyse and compare whether there are significant differences in audit fees 
between control and treatment group. The first step is to determine the propensity score obtain 
from a logit regressions using CPIDREP as the dependent variable and the control variables as 
the independent variables. Afterwards, the propensity score can be obtained and based on this 
propensity score, the observations from the treatment and control group can be matched. I use 
the calliper distance of 0.01 to determine the closeness a pair from each group can be matched, 
the higher the calliper the higher the higher the possibility one observation can be matched 
from the control group. The control and treatment groups are matched based on their 
characteristics using the control variables from the main model. Afterwards, I compare 
LOGFEES, whether or not it is significantly higher for the treatment group than the control 
group after matching the characteristics of the two groups. I also perform similar tests for 




5.3.2.3. Difference in Differences 
 
The studies analyse the possibility of exogenous shocks in the 2008 election year where 
there is a change in the government, particularly the ruling party. Using difference and 
difference method this study examines the change in audit fees where there is a change in 
government in 2008 and the change in firms’ political ideologies. The variable SHIFT is the 
dummy variable for the shift in political ideology. SHIFT takes the value of 1 if a firm shifts 
its ideology from extreme Republican (CPID=+1) to less extreme Republican (CPID<+1). The 
YEAR_2008 is the year 2008 dummy which equals to if the financial year is 2008 and 0 
otherwise. Thus, the variable SHIFT X YEAR_2008 represents firms that shift their ideology 
from an extreme Republican to become a less extreme Republican after the 2008 election year. 
Using this method, I expect that when firms shift their ideology to a less extreme Republican 
after 2008 the audit fees are higher. The model for the difference-in-difference test is 
formulated as follows;  
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1SHIFTit + β2YEAR_2008it + β3SHIFT X YEAR_2008it + 
β4LOG_ATit + β5MTBit + β6LOGSEGit + β7FOREIGNit + β8ROAit + 
β9LEVit + β10RECINVit + β11PPEit+ β12LOSSit + β13SPIit + 
β14MERGERit + β15ISSUEit + β16BIGit + β17INDSPECit + β18YEit + 
β19LOGNASit + β20INDUSit + εit     (10) 
I also conduct a similar test with conservatism and discretionary accruals analyses to 
examine the differences regarding conservatism and discretionary accruals level when a firm 
shifts its ideology after the year 2008. The models are presented below. 
Conservatism test 
C_SCOREit = β0 + β1SHIFTit + β2SDRET+ β3INVESTCYCLEit + β4BIDASKit + β5AGEit + 




Discretionary Accruals tests 
Discretionary Accruals Measures)it = β0 + β1SHIFTit + β2YEAR_2008it + β3SHIFT X 
YEAR_2008it + β4LOG_ATit + β5MTBit + β6LOGSEGit 
+ β7FOREIGNit + β8ROAit + β9LEVit + β10RECINVit + 
β11PPEit+ β12LOSSit + β13SPIit + β14MERGERit + 
β15ISSUEit + β16BIGit + β17INDSPECit + β18YEit + 
β19LOGNASit + β20INDUSit + εit   (12) 
5.4. Additional Tests 
5.4.1. Political Contributions and Audit Fees. 
I test the relationship between political contributions and audit fees to provide evidence 
that political contribution as means for firm to engage in political activities could affect auditor 
risk judgment. Prior literature suggests that political activities could raise agency problems 
(Mathur et al., 2013; Ozer & Alakent, 2012). A working paper by (Heflin & Wallace, 2015) 
suggests that political contributions influence audit fees. They find that political contributions 
are positively associated with audit fees. In this study, I use the total political contribution made 
by all employees to as test variable for political contributions. In addition, I also use director 
sample, PAC sample, and Bush – Obama regimes sample to indicate the relationship between 
political contributions and audit fees. The model is specified as follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1TCONTit + β2LOG_ATit + β3MTBit + β4LOGSEGit + β5FOREIGNit + 
β6ROAit + β7LEVit + β8RECINVit + β9PPEit+ β10LOSSit + β11SPIit + 
β12MERGERit + β13BIGit + β14INDSPECit + β15YEit + β16LOGFEESit + 





5.4.2. Audit Report Lag 
 
This study argues that audit fees are higher for Democrats leaning firms because 
auditors place more effort to conduct the audit for Democrats leaning firms. Auditors need to 
conduct more thorough audits for Democrats leaning firms because these firms disclose more 
information than Republican-leaning firms. More information provided places more risks for 
auditors to fail to detect financial information misstatement. The auditor would need more time 
to perform the audit to limit the risk of misstatement and in the end, able to provide reasonable 
assurance that financial statement is free from material misstatement. Furthermore, the auditors 
should spend more time to produce the audit report and consequently, audit report lag or the 
period between financial year-end and published an audit report should increase. Therefore, 
this study expects that Democrats leaning firms should be associated with longer audit report 
lag. The model includes LOGFEES because audit fees could be a proxy for audit efforts and 
consequently should affect audit report lag. The relationship between political ideologies and 
audit report lag is formulated as follows; 
REPORTLAGit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2LOG_ATit + β3MTBit + 
β4LOGSEGit + β5FOREIGNit + β6ROAit + β7LEVit + β8RECINVit + β9PPEit+ 
β10LOSSit + β11SPIit + β12MERGERit + β13ISSUEit + β14BIGit + β15INDSPECit 
+ β16YEit + β17LOGFEESit + β18INDUSit + β19YEARit + εit   (14) 
5.4.3. Controlling for Lobbying 
 
The next test is political ideology and audit fees controlling for lobbying. Firms 
lobbying activities are indicated to have an impact on financial bottom lines and firm value 
(Blau et al., 2013; H. Chen et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2010; Unsal et al., 2016). This evidence 
indicates that lobbying could also affect audit fees. In other words, audit fees might be affected 




between political ideologies and audit fees, controlling for lobbying activities is formulated as 
follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2SUMLOBBYit + β3LOG_ATit + 
β4MTBit + β5LOGSEGit + β6FOREIGNit + β7ROAit + β8LEVit + β9RECINVit + 
β10PPEit+ β11LOSSit + β12SPIit + β13MERGERit + β14ISSUEit + β15BIGit + 
β16INDSPECit + β17YEit + β18LOGNASit + β19INDUSit + β20YEARit + εit  
          (15) 
5.4.4. Controlling for Discretionary Accruals and Conservatism 
 
I also include discretionary accruals measures, JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA and 
firm-year conservatism measure, C_SCORE. The discretionary accruals and conservatism 
variables are included to the model in order to control for the possibility that earnings 
management and accounting conservatism drive the results. The JONES_DA and 
MODJONES_DA are included in the main model as one of the control variables. The model 
controlling for discretionary accruals is specified as follows;  
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2(Discretionary Accruals 
Measures)it + β3LOG_ATit + β4MTBit + β5LOGSEGit + β6FOREIGNit + 
β7ROAit + β8LEVit + β9RECINVit + β10PPEit+ β11LOSSit + β12SPIit + 
β13MERGERit + β14ISSUEit + β15BIGit + β16INDSPECit + β17YEit + 
β18LOGNASit + β19INDUSit + β20YEARit + εit   (16) 
The model controlling for accounting conservatism is specified as follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2C_SCOREit + β3LOG_ATit + 
β4MTBit + β5LOGSEGit + β6FOREIGNit + β7ROAit + β8LEVit + 




β14ISSUEit + β15BIGit + β16INDSPECit + β17YEit + β18LOGNASit + 
β19INDUSit + β20YEARit + εit      (17) 
5.4.5. Controlling for Corporate Governance 
 
This study considers corporate governance variables such as female boards and 
independent board members. Prior studies have established that female board members are 
positively associated with audit fees (e.g. Gul et al. (2008); Lai et al. (2017)). It argued that 
female directors are more diligent and require a higher quality audit, consequently increase 
audit fee. Research also provides evidence that gender-diversity in the board improve financial 
performance such as stock price informativeness (Gul et al., 2011), earnings quality (Srinidhi 
et al., 2011), analyst forecast accuracy (Gul et al., 2013) and indicate that female directors 
improve oversight and monitoring role in the form of more audit efforts and higher quality 
auditor appointment. Research has also established that independent board member demands a 
higher quality audit and in turn increase audit fee (Bliss et al., 2011; Carcello et al., 2002; Tsui 
et al., 2001). Thus, this study also includes the proportion of female (FEMALEBOARD) and 
independent (INDBOARD) board members over the total board member size.39 The model is 
specified as follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2(CG Measures)it + 
β3LOG_ATit + β4MTBit + β5LOGSEGit + β6FOREIGNit + β7ROAit + 
β8LEVit + β9RECINVit + β10PPEit+ β11LOSSit + β12SPIit + β13MERGERit 
+ β14ISSUEit + β15BIGit + β16INDSPECit + β17YEit + β18LOGNASit + 
β19INDUSit + β20YEARit + εit      (18) 
 
                                                          
 
39 FEMALEBOARD is the total number of female board member over total board member size. INDBOARD is 




5.4.6. Controlling for Political Indicators 
 
I use the strength and ability political indicators based on Cooper et al. (2010), with 
slight modification. I use the PIPARTY to measure how long a firm has oriented to a certain 
party, which equals to 1 if a firm is oriented (contributes) to the same party in the last five 
years, and 0 otherwise. The variable PIHOME to measure how intense a firm establish political 
connections with local politicians, which equals to 1 if a firm contributes to a candidate in the 
same state as the firm headquartered, 0 otherwise. The model is similar to the main model with 
the inclusion of the political indicators, and the model is specified as follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures)it + β2(Political Indicators)it + 
β3LOG_ATit + β4MTBit + β5LOGSEGit + β6FOREIGNit + β7ROAit + 
β8LEVit + β9RECINVit + β10PPEit+ β11LOSSit + β12SPIit + β13MERGERit 
+ β14ISSUEit + β15BIGit + β16INDSPECit + β17YEit + β18LOGNASit + 
β19INDUSit + β20YEARit + εit      (19) 
 
5.4.7. The interaction between Political Ideology and Political Indicators 
 
I also interact political ideology measures with political indicator variables. The models 
use the same controls as the main model with the inclusion of the interaction between political 
ideology measures and political indicator variables. The model is specified as follows; 
LOGFEESit = β0 + β1(Political Ideology Measures × Political Indicators)it  + β2(Political 
Ideology Measures)it + β2(Political Indicators)it + β3LOG_ATit + 
β4MTBit + β5LOGSEGit + β6FOREIGNit + β7ROAit + β8LEVit + 




β14ISSUEit + β15BIGit + β16INDSPECit + β17YEit + β18LOGNASit + 
β19INDUSit + β20YEARit + εit      (20) 
 
5.4.8. Excluding Extreme Republican and Extreme Democrat Observations 
 
To alleviate the concern that extreme Republicans or extreme Democrats observations 
could drive the results, I remove these observations and test whether political orientations 
influence audit fees. An observation is extreme Republican if CPID=+1 and extreme Democrat 
if CPID = -1. In other words, all observations with CPID=+1 or CPID=-1 are removed in this 




This chapter presents the methodology used in this research to achieve the research 
objective and whether or not the hypotheses should be accepted. The chapter begins with 
sample construction steps including descriptions from the data sources, up to the data merging 
processes from various databases.  The second part of this chapter (model specifications) 
describes with the regression models used in this study. The model specification sections 
exhibit the models used in this study which include, the main test models to test hypothesis 1 
and 2, the endogeneity tests and additional tests. Furthermore, in the Model Specifications 
sections, I describe the test variables used as well as the control variables included in the 
models. First, the main model is presented. The main test models include the models to test the 
relationship between political ideologies and audit fees as well as the political ideology-
conservatism analyses. Second, the last part of the section explains the methods used to deal 
with endogeneity concerns which include Heckman selection bias procedure, propensity score 




analyses are presented. The additional analyses include political contributions tests, negative 
discretionary accruals tests, audit report lag tests, and controlling for various factors that could 
affect audit fees (e.g. lobbying, discretionary accruals, conservatism, corporate governance and 
political indicators). Finally, I also remove extreme Republican and Democrat-leaning firms 
because firms tend to contribute to both parties to gain political favours to the future incumbent 
government. Thus, by removing extreme Republicans and Democrats, I can test whether 








The following chapter presents the data analysis results of this study. This section has 
three main parts, Univariate Analyses (6.2.) and Multivariate Analyses (6.3. which include the 
main tests for hypothesis testing) and Endogeneity tests (6.4). Moreover, this part also exhibits 
political orientation over the sample period (6.2.1). This method shows the dynamics of firms’ 
political orientation to the Republican and Democrat over the years indicated by the descriptive 
statistics of CPID from the year 2000 to 2016. The following part (6.2.2.) part presents the 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in this study.  
The Multivariate Analyses part (6.3.) exhibits and discusses the regression results for 
this study. The Main Analyses section discuss the main results of the relationship between 
political ideologies and audit fees. The discussions include the main political ideologies-
relationship, using the full sample and director sample. Furthermore, the results of political 
ideologies-audit fees relationship in two different presidential eras will be presented. Last but 
not least, this study also tests the relationship between political ideologies and audit fees using 
director sample because previous research on political ideologies employs management level 
sample. This thesis investigates the channels on which political ideologies could affect audit 
pricing to provide further explanations of the results indicated in the Main Analyses section, 
Specifically, this study analyses the relationship between political ideologies and discretionary 
accruals and also several measures of accounting conservatism in the fourth and fifth sections 
of this chapter. 
In this chapter, I also test the relationship between political ideologies financial 
reporting quality proxies – conservatism and discretionary accruals to provide corroborating 




test the relationship between political ideology and conservatism. I test conservatism using 
conservatism score (C_SCORE) developed by Khan and Watts (2009). I also use four measures 
of conservatism which include investment of tangible assets (INV), research and development 
expenditures (R&D), the return on assets (ROA) and stock return volatility (SDRET). 
Subsequently, I test the relationship between political ideologies and discretionary accruals. I 
use JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA as the proxies for discretionary accruals. 
In the last sections of the chapter, I perform endogeneity checks for audit fees and 
conservatism analyses using Heckman selection bias and propensity score matching approach. 
These endogeneity tests attempt to mitigate some of the endogeneity concerns caused omitted 
or unobservable variables. To extend the effect on presidential incumbency on political 
ideologies-audit fees relationship, I examine the exogenous shocks or the effects on the 
presidential election in 2008 using difference-in-differences method for audit fee, conservatism 
and discretionary accruals analysis. 
6.2.Univariate Analyses 
6.2.1. Political Orientations (CPID) Over Sample Period. 
Table 2 shows the political orientations of the firm throughout the sample periods, by 
exhibiting the descriptive statistics of CPID over the sample period. From the year 2000 to 206 
the firms’ political orientation is slanted towards the Republicans as shown by positive means 
and medians in most of the years.  Interestingly, overall firm’ political ideologies are slightly 
leaning to the Democrats in 2008 and 2016 election cycles based on the negative means and 
medians of CPID in these two years. Moreover, the means and medians are also negative in the 
year before 2008 and 2016 election years (2007 and 2015) signalling that firms are leaning 
towards the Democrats even before the election years. It shows the possible uncertainty among 
businesses on which party to support to achieve their strategic goals and objectives. Thus, 




able to predict the outcome of the election. In most of the years, the medians are larger than the 
means which indicate left skewness and most of the observations are having low CPIDs. Low 
CPIDs suggest less extreme orientation towards one particular party. 
Table 2. Political Orientations (CPID) over the Sample Period. 
         
Year n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
                  
2000 472 0.2445 0.8640 -1 -1 0.7836 1 1 
2001 700 0.0977 0.8951 -1 -1 0.3333 1 1 
2002 640 0.0279 0.9037 -1 -1 0.0525 1 1 
2003 1082 0.1257 0.8900 -1 -1 0.5000 1 1 
2004 868 0.0182 0.8925 -1 -1 0.0000 1 1 
2005 715 0.1115 0.8907 -1 -1 0.3333 1 1 
2006 900 0.0464 0.8805 -1 -1 0.1462 1 1 
2007 1139 -0.0433 0.8515 -1 -1 -0.0980 1 1 
2008 1040 -0.1681 0.8486 -1 -1 -0.4977 0.9322 1 
2009 738 0.0505 0.8845 -1 -1 0.1194 1 1 
2010 787 0.2073 0.8661 -1 -1 0.6386 1 1 
2011 991 0.2068 0.8588 -1 -0.9355 0.6667 1 1 
2012 1096 0.2030 0.8443 -1 -0.8310 0.5910 1 1 
2013 635 0.1043 0.9014 -1 -1 0.3958 1 1 
2014 670 0.1509 0.8911 -1 -1 0.5761 1 1 
2015 989 -0.0786 0.8718 -1 -1 -0.2541 0.9901 1 
2016 650 -0.3096 0.8292 -1 -1 -0.8603 0.6529 1 
 
6.2.2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. The 
descriptive statistics are divided into three parts, Dependent variables, Test variables and 
Independent variables.40 The main dependent variable LOGFEES is considerably normally 
distributed which exhibited by the mean and the median. The variable LOGREP is denoted as 
0 if a firm makes political donations to another party and does not make any political 
contribution to the Republican, and same goes with LOGDEM variable. Overall, the variable 
                                                          
 




LOGREP and LOGDEM have a similar median and mean which make the two variables 
comparable. The variable CPID is fairly distributed based on the closeness distance of the mean 
and median. Furthermore, the variable CPID mean and median are above 0, implying that in 
average, firms in the sample are oriented towards the Republicans. 
The control variables are fairly distributed. The mean for MTB is 3.5338 which shows 
that the sample consists of relatively high growth firms. The variable ISSUE the value of 1 at 
0.25, suggesting shows that most of the firms in the sample are issue new capital. The variable 
BIG also shows the value of 1 in the first quartile, signalling most firms in the sample audited 
by Big N auditors, which also shown by the mean and median. The variable LOGNAS has the 
mean of 12.4553 which implies that in average, the non-audit service fees takes a considerably 





Table 3. Descriptive Statistics        
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
Dependent Variables                 
LOGFEES (1) 14,112 14.0784 1.3597 10.6573 13.1932 14.1054 14.9766 17.3990 
JONES_DA(2) 8,303 0.1031 0.1668 0 0.0250 0.0600 0.1179 4.2544 
MODJONES_DA (3) 8,297 0.1075 0.2917 0 0.0252 0.0607 0.1197 15.5677 
REPORTLAG (4) 15,252 4.5699 0.3053 3.8918 4.3944 4.5433 4.7095 6.1442 
INV (5) 18,275 0.2730 1.3021 0 0.1199 0.1994 0.3288 152.8571 
R&D (6) 10,535 0.0730 0.1461 0 0.0038 0.0306 0.0952 8.1751 
SDRET (7) 18,332 11.5639 8.4681 0.6131 6.3845 9.3522 13.9822 159.5527 
C_SCORE (8) 9,644 0.0863 0.363 -2.6566 -0.0227 0.0036 0.0412 5.578 
Test Variables                 
TCONT (9) 14,112 10.0675 31.5293 0.0035 0.3536 1.3598 5.7470 271.5412 
LOGREP(10) 14,112 5.0541 3.6653 0 0 6.4394 7.8244 10.6988 
LOGDEM (11) 14,112 4.6195 3.6570 0 0 6.2166 7.6014 10.5290 
CPID (12) 14,112 0.0543 0.8831 -1 -1 0.1803 1 1 
SHIFT X YEAR_2008 
(13) 14,112 0.0136 0.1159 0 0 0 0 1 
Independent Variables                 
LOG_AT (14) 14,112 7.2371 2.1319 1.8043 5.7803 7.2364 8.6956 13.2152 
MTB (15) 14,112 3.5359 4.2610 0.3016 1.4401 2.2724 3.8619 30.8059 
LOGSEG (16) 14,112 1.6866 0.7997 0 1.0986 1.7918 2.3979 3.4965 
FOREIGN (17) 14,112 0.5149 0.4998 0 0 1 1 1 
ROA (18) 14,112 0.0049 0.1755 -1.0472 0.0013 0.0388 0.0789 0.2877 
LEV (19) 14,112 0.5114 0.2187 0.0582 0.3452 0.5232 0.6749 0.9996 
RECINV (20) 14,112 0.2351 0.1817 0 0.0889 0.1954 0.3342 0.8322 
PPE (21) 14,112 0.2472 0.2377 0.0001 0.0633 0.1578 0.3699 0.8944 
LOSS (22) 14,112 0.2458 0.4306 0 0 0 0 1 
SPI (23) 14,112 0.1431 0.3502 0 0 0 0 1 
MERGER (24) 14,112 0.1992 0.3994 0 0 0 0 1 
ISSUE (25) 14,112 0.9972 0.0532 0 1 1 1 1 
BIG (26) 14,112 0.8774 0.3280 0 1 1 1 1 
INDSPEC (27) 14,112 0.2662 0.4420 0 0 0 1 1 
YE (28) 14,112 0.7046 0.4562 0 0 1 1 1 
LOGNAS (29) 14,112 12.4587 1.8499 7.6009 11.2534 12.5318 13.7364 16.8310 
SHIFT (30) 14,112 0.2195 0.4139 0 0 0 0 1 
RESTRUCTURE (31) 14,528 0.0006 0.0235 0 0 0 0 1 
SI (32) 14,528 0.0211 0.0536 0 0 0.0037 0.0155 0.3608 
LAGLEV (33) 18,281 0.5675 2.3817 0.0001 0.3513 0.5346 0.6899 252 
INVESTCYCLE (34) 9,644 0.0348 0.0295 0 0.0171 0.0314 0.046 0.5301 
BIDASK (35) 9,644 0.0023 0.0075 -0.0230 0.0002 0.0005 0.0015 0.4082 
AGE (36) 9,644 28.6187 22.2931 0 11 25 41 91 
SUMLOBBY (37) 4,361 11.8422 3.6634 0 11.2898 12.5425 13.8155 17.6334 
FEMALE (38) 7,506 0.1276 0.0983 0 0.0769 0.1111 0.1818 0.6250 
INDEPENDENT (39) 7,506 0.7595 0.1404 0 0.6667 0.7857 0.8750 1 
PIPARTY (40) 14,104 0.3181 0.4657 0 0 0 1 1 





LOGFEES: Natural logarithm of audit fees obtained from AuditAnalytics database; JONES_DA: Discretionary accruals 
model based on Jones (1991); MODJONES_DA: Modified Jones discretionary accruals model based on Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney (1995); INV: Capital expenditures divided by net property plant and equipment; R&D: Research and 
development expenditures divided by total assets; SDRET: Stock return volatility, measured by the standard deviation of 
daily stock return; C_SCORE: Firm-year measure of accounting conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009) which 
is measure by using three variables; Size (natural log of equity value), MTB (market to book ratio) and Leverage (long 
term and short term debt of market value of equity); REPORTLAG: Natural logarithm of number days from financial year-
end until audit report is signed; LOGDEM: Natural logarithm of aggregate individual political contributions to the 
Democrats Party; LOGREP: Natural logarithm of aggregate individual political contributions to the Republican Party; 
CPID: Corporate political ideology which is measured by contributions to Republican Party minus contributions to 
Democrats Party over total contributions in a given year; TCONT: Total political contributions measure which is measured 
by firm-year aggregate individual political contributions divided by total assets (total assets is in millions); LOG_AT: 
Firm’s size measure which is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets; MTB: Market to book ratio which is measured 
by share price multiplied by common share outstanding over total common/ordinary equity; LOGSEG: Natural logarithm 
of a number of business segments that a firm involved in; FOREIGN: A dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm has a 
foreign operation and 0 otherwise; ROA: Return on assets which are measured by net income over total assets; LEV: 
Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; RECINV: Sum of total inventories over total receivables; PPE: Property, plant 
and equipment is net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; LOSS: The loss dummy that takes the value of 
1 of the firm incurred a loss in the current period and 0 otherwise; SPI: A dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm 
has special items and 0 otherwise; ISSUE: A dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm issue capital in the period, and 
0 otherwise; BIG: Auditor size dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big N auditor, and 0 
otherwise; INDSPEC: Auditor industry specialist dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor is an industry 
specialist (obtain more than 30% market share in a specific industry), 0 otherwise; YE: A fiscal year-end dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the firm’s fiscal year-end is 31 December; LOGNAS: The natural logarithm of non-audit services 
fees; SHIFT: A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is moving from an extreme Republican (CPID=+1) to 
a less extreme, neutral or to lean towards the Democrat (CPID<1); YEAR_2008: A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
financial year end is 2008 and afterwards; LAGLEV: Lagged total liabilities over total assets; INVESTCYCLE: 
Depreciation and amortisation over total assets; BIDASK: Bid–Ask is the bid–ask spread, scaled by the midpoint of the 
spread; AGE: The number of years since the company was incorporated; SUMLOBBY: Natural logarithm of total firm’s 
lobbying expenses; INDBOARD: The total number of independent board members over total board size; 
FEMALEBOARD: The total number of female board members over total board size; PIPARTY: The dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if a firm contributes to the same party in the last five years, 0 otherwise; PIHOME: The dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if a firm contributes to the candidate in the same state as the company’s headquarter in the last five years, 0 
otherwise; LAMBDA: The inverse mills ratio obtained from the first stage of the Heckman selection bias process; SI: The 
absolute value of special items divided by total assets; RESTRUCTURE: Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
company undergoes restructuring, 0 otherwise; MERGER: A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm engages 




Table 3. Correlation Matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) 1          
(2) -0.1086 1         
(3) -0.0644 0.6947 1        
(4) -0.2224 0.0744 0.0488 1       
(5) -0.04670 0.0228 0.0090 0.0280 1      
(6) -0.2211 0.0179 0.0173 0.1921 0.0427 1     
(7) -0.2478 0.1294 0.0751 0.1854 0.0309 0.2398 1    
(8) 0.0150 0.0604 0.0350 -0.0077 -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0060 1   
(9) -0.3744 0.0431 0.0226 0.1609 0.0526 0.2996 0.1633 -0.0035 1 
(10) 0.1800 -0.0469 -0.0193 -0.1247 -0.0277 -0.1506 -0.1325 0.0082 0.0100 
(11) 0.2662 -0.0350 -0.0248 -0.0012 0.0084 0.0487 -0.0257 0.0090 -0.0017 
(12) -0.0566 -0.0090 0.0072 -0.0750 -0.0193 -0.1203 -0.0634 -0.0022 0.0068 
(13) 0.0089 -0.0057 -0.0050 0.0144 0.0155 0.0140 0.0038 -0.0014 0.0085 
(14) 0.8173 -0.0932 -0.0514 -0.3188 -0.0663 -0.3297 -0.3313 0.0135 -0.4677 
(15) -0.0402 0.0538 0.0219 0.0278 0.0236 0.2196 0.0158 -0.0083 0.1759 
(16) 0.3338 -0.0334 -0.0117 -0.1235 -0.0301 -0.1980 -0.0545 0.0158 -0.1502 
(17) 0.3677 -0.0908 -0.0436 -0.0525 -0.0108 -0.0771 -0.0131 0.0028 -0.1278 
(18) 0.2455 -0.0772 -0.0453 -0.2059 -0.0173 -0.5179 -0.3714 0.0001 -0.3414 
(19) 0.3248 0.1071 0.0667 -0.0936 -0.0515 -0.0774 -0.1011 0.0150 -0.1585 
(20) -0.0475 -0.0454 -0.0043 -0.0402 -0.0107 -0.1539 -0.0023 -0.0091 0.0054 
(21) 0.0014 0.0486 0.0250 -0.0895 -0.0713 -0.1706 -0.0369 -0.0098 -0.0789 
(22) -0.2134 0.0824 0.0425 0.2076 0.0147 0.2985 0.3684 0.0037 0.1978 
(23) 0.0397 -0.0043 -0.0085 -0.0294 -0.0038 -0.0425 -0.0149 -0.0067 -0.0114 
(24) 0.2220 0.0286 0.0208 -0.0174 -0.0075 -0.0498 -0.0106 0.0250 -0.0857 
(25) 0.1059 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0220 0.0002 -0.0525 -0.0313 0.0008 -0.1968 
(26) 0.4291 -0.0454 -0.0247 -0.1482 -0.0220 -0.0649 -0.1105 0.0049 -0.3464 
(27) 0.1993 -0.0325 -0.0176 -0.0674 -0.0130 -0.0455 -0.0568 0.0011 -0.1023 
(28) 0.0842 0.0290 0.0245 -0.0189 0.0088 0.0540 -0.0133 0.0069 -0.0496 
(29) 0.6524 -0.0569 -0.0354 -0.1848 -0.0296 -0.2641 -0.1771 0.0126 -0.2849 
(30) 0.0405 -0.0230 -0.0198 0.0245 0.0074 0.0217 -0.0070 -0.0004 0.0182 
(31) 0.0204 -0.0057 -0.0043 -0.0112 -0.0021 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0064 
(32) -0.0398 0.0686 0.0364 0.0869 0.0139 0.1025 0.2286 -0.0049 0.0882 
(33) -0.0054 0.0137 0.0087 0.0325 -0.0382 -0.0702 0.0035 0.0001 0.0710 
(34) -0.0929 0.0432 0.0138 0.0637 -0.0084 0.0564 0.1594 -0.0071 0.0403 
(35) -0.2854 0.0296 0.0121 0.1004 0.0193 0.1163 0.0610 -0.0638 0.1474 
(36) 0.3602 -0.1028 -0.0522 -0.1927 -0.1328 -0.0923 -0.0352 0.0386 -0.0999 
(37) 0.4404 -0.0802 -0.0800 -0.0984 -0.1056 -0.0809 -0.1468 -0.0064 -0.0880 
(38) 0.3338 -0.0371 -0.0370 -0.1030 -0.1056 -0.1296 -0.0537 -0.0255 -0.1184 
(39) 0.3520 -0.0522 -0.0514 -0.0935 -0.0768 -0.0130 -0.0343 -0.0837 -0.0864 
(40) -0.1555 0.0070 -0.0018 -0.0164 -0.0136 -0.0684 0.0082 0.0009 0.0528 
(41) -0.0066 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0237 -0.0041 -0.0096 -0.0128 -0.0005 -0.0078 




  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(10) 1           
(11) -0.3548 1          
(12) 0.7968 -0.7879 1         
(13) -0.0564 0.0880 -0.0868 1        
(14) 0.2473 0.2052 0.0223 -0.0128 1       
(15) -0.0636 0.0689 -0.0768 -0.0327 -0.1151 1      
(16) 0.1891 0.0182 0.1053 0.0161 0.3388 -0.1244 1     
(17) 0.0311 0.1170 -0.0517 0.0719 0.1487 0.0533 0.1269 1    
(18) 0.1532 0.0055 0.0847 -0.0278 0.3478 -0.1293 0.1850 0.1296 1   
(19) 0.0973 0.0186 0.0507 -0.0057 0.4422 0.1228 0.1767 -0.1022 0.0153 1 
(20) 0.0373 -0.1060 0.0879 0.0066 -0.0263 -0.1072 0.1040 0.0268 0.1170 0.2117 
(21) 0.1118 -0.0929 0.1315 -0.0071 0.1290 -0.0612 0.0299 -0.1440 0.0753 0.0870 
(22) -0.1583 -0.0153 -0.0840 0.0347 -0.3365 0.0628 -0.1848 -0.0508 -0.6288 -0.0519 
(23) 0.0226 0.0136 0.0059 -0.0033 0.0459 -0.0361 0.0591 0.0096 0.0858 0.0146 
(24) 0.0107 0.0534 -0.0317 0.0151 0.1470 -0.0078 0.0617 0.3852 0.0517 0.0238 
(25) 0.0198 0.0166 0.0013 0.0019 0.1129 -0.0037 0.0545 0.0449 0.0636 0.0651 
(26) 0.0635 0.1104 -0.0269 -0.0238 0.4209 -0.0139 0.1440 0.1670 0.1501 0.1094 
(27) 0.0349 0.0685 -0.0171 -0.0154 0.1947 0.0080 0.0691 0.0602 0.0560 0.0613 
(28) 0.0189 -0.0056 0.0216 -0.0065 0.1233 0.0050 0.0062 -0.0969 -0.0595 0.1530 
(29) 0.1524 0.2120 -0.0401 -0.0204 0.6624 -0.0151 0.3127 0.2478 0.2009 0.2836 
(30) -0.1848 0.3797 -0.3264 0.2439 0.0215 0.0219 0.0716 0.2924 -0.0115 -0.0046 
(31) 0.0115 0.0076 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0158 0.0126 0.0110 0.0281 0.0061 0.0133 
(32) -0.0564 0.0103 -0.0371 0.0636 -0.1399 0.0248 -0.0390 0.0388 -0.3749 -0.0265 
(33) 0.0111 -0.0094 0.0133 -0.0038 0.0056 0.0827 -0.0089 -0.0300 -0.0713 0.0813 
(34) -0.0335 -0.0401 0.0095 0.0005 -0.1375 0.0294 -0.0776 0.0181 -0.1776 -0.0579 
(35) -0.0641 -0.0868 0.0212 -0.0075 -0.2718 -0.0612 -0.0667 -0.1252 -0.1691 -0.0430 
(36) 0.1815 0.1011 0.0509 0.0383 0.3120 0.0468 0.2949 0.3876 0.0877 0.1009 
(37) 0.1979 0.2230 -0.0237 0.0201 0.4366 -0.0104 0.1803 0.0770 0.0854 0.1145 
(38) 0.0002 0.1636 -0.1099 0.0239 0.3027 0.0957 0.1062 0.1870 0.0562 0.2196 
(39) 0.0270 0.0734 -0.0274 0.0067 0.2209 0.0129 -0.0222 -0.0110 0.0121 0.1747 
(40) 0.3853 -0.5131 0.5593 -0.0784 -0.0970 -0.0511 -0.1020 -0.3585 0.0182 0.0008 
(41) 0.0219 -0.0064 0.0124 -0.0053 0.0137 -0.0109 0.0167 -0.0129 0.0113 0.0158 
  (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) 
(20) 1           
(21) -0.3652 1          
(22) -0.1143 -0.0507 1         
(23) 0.0115 0.0217 -0.0860 1        
(24) -0.0307 -0.1301 -0.0364 -0.0070 1       
(25) 0.0101 0.0338 -0.0369 0.0102 0.0230 1      
(26) -0.1303 0.0740 -0.1306 0.0036 0.0584 0.0897 1     
(27) -0.0606 0.0935 -0.0488 0.0020 0.0078 0.0278 0.2446 1    
(28) -0.1451 0.0813 0.0231 -0.0108 0.0119 0.0209 0.0491 0.0360 1   
(29) -0.0177 -0.0341 -0.1822 0.0230 0.1327 0.0625 0.3484 0.1586 0.0468 1 




  (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
(30) -0.0264 -0.0183 0.0144 0.0108 0.1681 -0.0086 -0.0178 -0.0092 0.0092 
(31) -0.0116 0.0014 -0.0062 0.0102 0.0155 0.0017 0.0102 0.0094 -0.0091 
(32) -0.0316 -0.0662 0.3222 0.0259 0.0299 0.0042 -0.0388 -0.0205 0.0003 
(33) 0.0043 -0.0009 0.0171 0.0016 -0.0114 0.0024 -0.0272 -0.0025 0.0156 
(34) -0.1912 0.3363 0.1573 -0.0054 -0.0369 0.0207 -0.0060 0.0144 -0.0220 
(35) 0.0892 -0.0220 0.1235 -0.0215 -0.0853 -0.1579 -0.1559 -0.0577 -0.0317 
(36) -0.0327 0.1506 -0.0939 0.0161 0.1786 0.0210 0.1452 0.1260 0.0300 
(37) -0.0880 0.0260 -0.1016 -0.0093 0.0591 0.0161 0.0852 0.1407 0.1001 
(38) -0.0305 0.0055 -0.0618 -0.0124 0.1379 -0.0044 0.1157 0.0645 0.0031 
(39) -0.0524 0.0362 -0.0290 -0.0278 0.0737 -0.0093 0.0854 0.0720 0.1128 
(40) 0.0889 0.0813 -0.0174 0.0047 -0.2349 -0.0185 -0.0765 -0.0433 -0.0067 
(41) 0.0158 0.0106 -0.0209 -0.0060 -0.0027 0.0030 0.0052 -0.0056 0.0032 
  (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) 
(30) 0.0471 1        
(31) 0.0179 -0.0013 1       
(32) -0.0210 0.0163 -0.0056 1      
(33) 0.1202 -0.0120 0.0005 0.0053 1     
(34) -0.0662 -0.0081 -0.0020 0.1685 -0.0175 1    
(35) -0.1291 -0.0648 -0.0043 0.0593 -0.0056 0.0412 1   
(36) 0.2771 0.1997 0.0192 -0.0056 0.0928 0.0298 -0.1313 1  
(37) 0.3538 0.0393 -0.0079 -0.0293 0.0611 -0.0412 -0.0854 0.2682 1 
(38) 0.2022 0.1247 0.0072 -0.0212 0.1984 -0.0577 -0.1294 0.2071 0.1400 
(39) 0.0899 -0.0496 0.0072 -0.0142 0.1491 -0.0370 -0.2333 0.2409 0.0932 
(40) -0.1068 -0.3156 -0.0132 -0.0137 0.0059 0.0255 0.1316 -0.3094 -0.0758 
(41) 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0132 0.0009 -0.0122 -0.0006 0.0303 -0.0098 
  (38) (39) (40) (41)           
(38) 1          
(39) 0.1674 1         
(40) -0.2238 0.0541 1        
(41) 0.0056 -0.0104 0.0123 1           




The correlation matrix shows the statistical correlation of all variables used in this 
study. The variables are numbered for parsimony (please refer to the Descriptive Statistics for 
the numbering). Based on the correlation matrix, the variable LOGDEM (variable (11)) and 
LOGREP (variable (10)) are positively and significantly correlated with audit fees (LOGFEES, 
variable (1)). These results show that firms that engage in political contributions are associated 
with higher audit fees. As for political ideology measures, the coefficient for CPID (variable 
(12)) is negatively and significantly correlated with LOGFEES, implying that Republican-
leaning firms are correlated with lower audit fees which supports the second hypothesis (H1). 
The variable LOGREP, LOGDEM and CPID are not significantly correlated with C_SCORE 
(variable (8)). Both LOGREP and LOGDEM are negatively associated with both discretionary 
accruals measures (JONES_DA (2) and MODJONES_DA (3)). 
6.3. Multivariate Analyses 
6.3.1. Main Analyses 
The main results in Table 4 indicate the relationship between political ideologies and 
audit fees. The results in column (1) indicate that audit fees are higher for Democratic-leaning 
party when controlling for contribution to the Republican Party.41 In other words, firms that 
contribute to the Democrats are associated with higher audit fees. Consistently, firms that are 
contributing to the Democrats pay higher audit fees, as indicated on column (4). In contrary, 
firms that contribute to the Republicans are paying lower audit fees, as column (3) of the results 
indicated. When using the CPID measure (column (2)), the variable CPID is negative 
significant with audit fees. These results indicate that Republican-leaning firms are 
significantly paying lower audit fees compared to their Democrats counterparts. However, I do 
                                                          
 
41 An F-test to compare LOGREP and LOGDEM coefficient shows that the coefficient of the two variables are 




not find a significant relationship between political contributions to the Republican and audit 
fees when controlling for contributions to the Democrats in column (1). Nonetheless, the result 
in column (2) and (3) still suggest that Republican-leaning firms are associated with lower audit 
fees.  
Overall, the results support the argument that auditors perceive Republican-leaning 
firms as less risky than Democrats leaning firms. The results are consistent with the notion that 
Republican-leaning firms are taking less risk and this could affect auditor judgement of risk. 
This indication can be translated into lower audit fees because auditor perceives these firms to 
be less risky which lower the probability of future litigation if auditor fail report material 
misstatement. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is accepted – Republican (Democrat) leaning firms are 
associated with lower (higher) audit fees than their Democrats (Republican) leaning 
counterparts. 
Furthermore, all control variables seem to consistent with prior audit fee literature 
except MTB and ISSUE (insignificant), and PPE which is inconsistent with previous audit fee 
studies. Other than those variables mentioned above, the client’s complexity variables such as 
LOG_AT, FOREIGN, LOGSEG are positively correlated with LOGFEES. Auditor 
characteristics control variables such as BIG and INDSPEC are also positively associated with 
higher audit fees as prior literature already suggests that higher audit quality provided by the 
Big N auditors and industry specialist auditors demand higher audit fees. Profitability variables 




negatively associated with audit fees and firms incurred loss is associated with higher audit 
fees.42 I control for firm and state fixed effect, and the results remain unchanged.43
                                                          
 
42 The mean of ISSUE is about 0.99. Because the high level issuance among sample firms, I run the regression 
without controlling for ISSUE, the results qualitatively remain unchanged. 
43 The results for the firm fixed remain unchanged except for the variable LOGREP where I find positive and 





Table 4. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees using all Employees Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0282*** (61.63) 9.0372*** (61.76) 9.0487*** (61.53) 9.0255*** (61.57) 
LOGREP -0.0017 (-0.73)    -0.0062*** (-3.39)    
LOGDEM 0.0113*** (4.56)       0.0121*** (5.90) 
CPID    -0.0408*** (-6.17)       
LOG_AT 0.4039*** (37.58) 0.4084*** (40.91) 0.4118*** (40.17) 0.4029*** (39.53) 
MTB 0.0009 (0.46) 0.0014 (0.67) 0.0018 (0.90) 0.0009 (0.45) 
LOGSEG 0.1023*** (8.08) 0.1028*** (8.13) 0.1015*** (8.02) 0.1019*** (8.01) 
FOREIGN 0.2974*** (12.22) 0.2985*** (12.28) 0.2994*** (12.36) 0.2976*** (12.24) 
ROA -0.1910*** (-3.35) -0.1959*** (-3.46) -0.2015*** (-3.55) -0.1917*** (-3.35) 
LEV 0.2887*** (4.46) 0.2801*** (4.37) 0.2706*** (4.23) 0.2886*** (4.48) 
RECINV 0.1281* (1.85) 0.1254* (1.81) 0.1154* (1.67) 0.1280* (1.85) 
PPE -0.4386*** (-7.96) -0.4394*** (-7.98) -0.4505*** (-8.30) -0.4384*** (-7.97) 
LOSS 0.1004*** (5.13) 0.0996*** (5.08) 0.1013*** (5.20) 0.1008*** (5.07) 
SPI 0.0224 (1.63) 0.0234* (1.73) 0.0242* (1.80) 0.0222 (1.62) 
MERGER 0.0362** (1.97) 0.0355* (1.91) 0.0356* (1.87) 0.0363** (1.99) 
ISSUE 0.1327 (1.38) 0.1294 (1.36) 0.1284 (1.32) 0.1332 (1.38) 
BIG 0.3002*** (8.40) 0.2972*** (8.30) 0.2946*** (8.18) 0.3015*** (8.34) 
INDSPEC 0.0795*** (4.75) 0.0811*** (4.84) 0.0822*** (4.84) 0.0794*** (4.74) 
YE 0.1315*** (2.94) 0.1313*** (2.92) 0.1301*** (2.89) 0.1315*** (2.94) 
LOGNAS 0.1143*** (10.63) 0.1148*** (10.65) 0.1156*** (10.73) 0.1143*** (10.61) 
N 14112   14112   14137   14117   
Adjusted R2 0.8487   0.8484   0.8482   0.8487   
F 2004.7995   2032.3632   2027.8824   2051.8970   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.      




6.3.1.1.Using Executives and Directors Sample 
 
Recent accounting and management literature conduct political ideology analyses at 
CEO level (Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017; Francis et al., 2016; Hutton 
et al., 2014). The auditor might only consider higher level employee contribution instead of all 
employees in a firm. Thus, this study also employs alternative proxy for firms political ideology 
which is political contributions at directors-level which includes CEO, CFO and other 
managerial positions included in the Execucomp database as the proxy for firms political 
ideology. Thus, this study attempts to find the evidence whether or not political contributions 
by directors affects audit fees in Table 5. The results are consistent with the all-employees 
sample. Firms that contribute to the Democrats are significantly paying higher audit fees at 
10% level when controlling for contributions for the Republicans (column (1)). In column (4), 
contribution to the Democrats or LOGDEM is positively and significantly associated with audit 
fees where on column (3), the relationship between firms’ contributions to the Republicans are 
as1sociated with lower audit fees. The variable CPID is negatively significant with audit fees 
at 1% significance level, signalling that Republican-leaning firms are paying lower fees than 
Democrats leaning firms which is consistent with all-employee contributions sample. The 






Table 5. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Using Executives and Directors Sample     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.1763*** (44.28) 9.1880*** (44.56) 9.1979*** (44.29) 9.1688*** (44.65) 
LOGREP -0.0024 (-0.60)     -0.0067** (-2.03)     
LOGDEM 0.0070* (1.91)         0.0084*** (2.71) 
CPID     -0.0361*** (-2.90)         
LOG_AT 0.4097*** (31.35) 0.4109*** (31.40) 0.4131*** (31.48) 0.4088*** (31.11) 
MTB 0.0025 (0.51) 0.0026 (0.53) 0.0030 (0.62) 0.0024 (0.49) 
LOGSEG 0.1266*** (6.35) 0.1263*** (6.34) 0.1268*** (6.33) 0.1265*** (6.35) 
FOREIGN 0.2838*** (8.44) 0.2830*** (8.37) 0.2819*** (8.30) 0.2843*** (8.39) 
ROA 0.0625 (0.31) 0.0636 (0.32) 0.0612 (0.31) 0.0576 (0.29) 
LEV 0.3511*** (3.47) 0.3509*** (3.48) 0.3447*** (3.41) 0.3512*** (3.48) 
RECINV 0.0634 (0.51) 0.0624 (0.51) 0.0588 (0.48) 0.0618 (0.50) 
PPE -0.5225*** (-6.45) -0.5221*** (-6.48) -0.5276*** (-6.59) -0.5254*** (-6.45) 
LOSS 0.0965** (2.54) 0.0957** (2.53) 0.0967** (2.55) 0.0968** (2.55) 
SPI -0.0075 (-0.39) -0.0074 (-0.38) -0.0065 (-0.34) -0.0078 (-0.41) 
MERGER 0.0130 (0.42) 0.0137 (0.44) 0.0134 (0.42) 0.0127 (0.41) 
BIG 0.0871 (1.15) 0.0869 (1.15) 0.0857 (1.13) 0.0864 (1.14) 
INDSPEC 0.0861*** (3.30) 0.0859*** (3.28) 0.0847*** (3.23) 0.0864*** (3.30) 
YE 0.1533** (2.44) 0.1527** (2.43) 0.1502** (2.38) 0.1534** (2.44) 
LOGNAS 0.1250*** (8.51) 0.1250*** (8.52) 0.1253*** (8.51) 0.1251*** (8.52) 
N 4299   4299   4303   4299   
Adjusted R2 0.8366   0.8366   0.8362   0.8366   
F 584.5811   599.6887   598.9630   595.9835   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    




6.3.1.2. PAC Sample  
 
Firms in the U.S. are not allowed to make direct contributions to a desired political 
candidate. Despite that, a firm can still and must establish a separate legal body known as 
political action committee (PAC) which gather contributions from the members of the firm and 
channel the donation as they see fit. Earlier literature (e.g. Akey, 2015; Cooper et al., 2010; 
Grier et al., 1994; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Keim & Baysinger, 1988) employs firm level 
PAC contributions as a proxy for political contributions. Akey (2015) argue that political 
contributions through PACs are somewhat depicted the substantive evidence of the firm’s 
ideological perspective. He states that ” In contrast, individuals’ contributions may reflect their 
own ideological biases or other characteristics that are unrelated to the firm, so the 
interpretation of these donations is not clear.”(p. 3194). Thus, to test the consistency of the 
findings, this study also uses firm PAC contributions to examine the relationship between 
political ideologies and audit fees. Table 6 exhibits the relationship between political ideologies 
and audit fees using a PAC contribution sample.  
The results show that the contributions to the Democrats are positively significant affect 
audit fees on both column (1) and (4). However, the results do not indicate that the contributions 
to the Republican are significantly affects audit fees. In addition, the relationship between 
CPID and audit fees is negative and significant at 10% significance level. The negative 
relationship between CPID and audit fees indicate that Republican-leaning firms based on their 
PAC contributions are paying lower audit fees compared to the firms that are leaning towards 
the Democrats. In addition, I do not find the evidence for the relationship between PAC 
contributions and audit fees. Given the smaller sample for PAC contributions, further evidence 
using a larger sample might be needed to conclude whether or not PAC contributions could 





Table 6. Political Ideologies using PAC sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 8.6099*** (22.75) 7.4368*** (19.78) 7.4268*** (17.17) 7.3883*** (17.40) 
LOGREP -0.0104 (-1.18)     -0.0018 (-0.21)    
LOGDEM 0.0166*** (2.64)         0.0138** (2.48) 
CPID     -0.0659* (-1.69)        
LOG_AT 0.4179*** (31.62) 0.4240*** (37.83) 0.4277*** (32.67) 0.4126*** (33.73) 
MTB 0.0082** (2.29) 0.0086** (2.34) 0.0086** (2.39) 0.0080** (2.24) 
LOGSEG 0.0987*** (5.11) 0.1001*** (5.21) 0.0919*** (4.95) 0.0967*** (5.03) 
FOREIGN 0.2607*** (6.93) 0.2634*** (7.01) 0.2642*** (7.11) 0.2622*** (6.98) 
ROA -0.2122 (-1.51) -0.2248 (-1.62) -0.2340* (-1.67) -0.1874 (-1.29) 
LEV 0.2664** (2.56) 0.2599** (2.40) 0.2447** (2.23) 0.2782** (2.57) 
RECINV -0.0334 (-0.16) -0.0392 (-0.18) -0.0398 (-0.19) -0.0398 (-0.19) 
PPE -0.5786*** (-6.02) -0.5781*** (-5.95) -0.5979*** (-6.35) -0.5828*** (-6.04) 
LOSS 0.0899* (1.80) 0.0885* (1.71) 0.0958* (1.82) 0.0985* (1.91) 
SPI 0.0447** (2.10) 0.0451** (2.12) 0.0480** (2.08) 0.0473** (2.27) 
MERGER 0.0123 (0.63) 0.0099 (0.50) 0.0120 (0.60) 0.0159 (0.88) 
BIG -0.0420 (-0.37) -0.0339 (-0.31) -0.0365 (-0.33) -0.0377 (-0.33) 
INDSPEC -0.0149 (-0.42) -0.0178 (-0.49) -0.0190 (-0.53) -0.0151 (-0.42) 
YE 0.1901* (1.68) 0.1924* (1.69) 0.1900* (1.66) 0.1884* (1.66) 
LOGNAS 0.1656*** (7.06) 0.1664*** (6.92) 0.1667*** (7.21) 0.1658*** (6.95) 
N 2391   2390   2416   2423   
Adjusted R2 0.8064   0.8057   0.8049   0.8073   
F 307.5675   320.3026   314.6078   326.4051   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    




6.3.1.3. President Bush’s (Republicans) and President Obama’s (Democrats) Era 
 
The results in Table 7 could be influenced by the incumbency where political 
connections research has argued that firms could obtain favourable treatment by the 
government. Moreover, Goldman et al. (2009) find that firms with Republican connected board 
member(s) experience an increase in cumulative abnormal return as well as abnormal stock 
returns upon the 2000 election cycle where the Republican party was the incumbent 
presidential party. Furthermore, Snyder (1990) also argues that “Incumbent candidates 
probably can deliver more favours than nonincumbents because of their extra experience and 
the seniority norms (p. 1197). From the individual investing perspective, there was a shift in 
individual investors’ optimism depending upon the political affiliation of the individual and 
the incumbent president party. Bonaparte et al. (2017) show that the Democrats investors were 
slightly more optimistic than Republican investors regarding stock market performance, 
economic growth, income and inflation. However, the optimism drops once the result of the 
election was announced in 2000 and when President George W. Bush took office in 2001.44 
Furthermore, during the first years of Obama’s administration, the issue of governance of 
corporate political activities had been becoming more prominent as the administration focused 
on improving the ethical standards in policy making and governmental oversight of business 
activities (Dahan, Hadani, & Schuler, 2013). This evidence shows that presidential party 
incumbency could play an important role in determining financial outcomes. Thus, this notion 
that the incumbent presidential party could also affect the relationship between political 
ideologies and audit fees.  
                                                          
 




Therefore, I split the sample into two different regimes, President George W. Bush 
period (the year 2000 to 2007, the Republican period) and President Barrack Obama regime 
(2008 to 2016, the Democrats period) in Table 7 Panel B. The full sample of this study is 
between the years 2000 to 2016. Thus, splitting these two presidential eras will give roughly 
half number of observations for each regime sub-sample. The results on Panel A (Bush’s era) 
and Panel B (Obama’s era) exhibit similar results to the main analysis using the full sample. 
Both panels show that contributions to the Democrats are negatively associated with lower 
audit fees, shown on column (1) in each panel. The results are statistically more significant in 
Panel B than Panel A, the contributions to the Democrats are statistically more significant 
during President Obama period. This finding does not necessarily provide the evidence that 
firms embrace the political ideology of a certain political party receive preferential treatment 
by the incumbent government. The results provide stronger evidence that auditor supply 
reassurance to mitigate the effect of agency conflicts between managers and owners emerged 




Table 7. Political Ideologies in Two Political Regimes     
Panel A. Subsample of Bush's Era     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 7.8004*** (24.65) 7.8123*** (24.74) 7.8314*** (24.84) 7.5099*** (25.48) 
LOGREP -0.0021 (-0.54)     -0.0064** (-2.45)    
LOGDEM 0.0100*** (2.74)         0.0109*** (4.58) 
CPID     -0.0366*** (-4.97)        
LOG_AT 0.3904*** (17.85) 0.3939*** (19.86) 0.3969*** (19.38) 0.3892*** (19.21) 
MTB 0.0047* (1.82) 0.0051** (2.05) 0.0055** (2.25) 0.0046* (1.84) 
LOGSEG 0.0980*** (5.61) 0.0982*** (5.60) 0.0969*** (5.53) 0.0975*** (5.51) 
FOREIGN 0.3138*** (8.90) 0.3152*** (9.00) 0.3163*** (9.09) 0.3139*** (8.91) 
ROA -0.2707*** (-4.62) -0.2741*** (-4.77) -0.2750*** (-4.80) -0.2705*** (-4.59) 
LEV 0.3597*** (3.88) 0.3526*** (3.89) 0.3436*** (3.84) 0.3598*** (3.91) 
RECINV 0.1432 (1.64) 0.1428 (1.63) 0.1365 (1.59) 0.1416 (1.60) 
PPE -0.4380*** (-6.40) -0.4404*** (-6.45) -0.4469*** (-6.67) -0.4390*** (-6.38) 
LOSS 0.0712*** (2.84) 0.0711*** (2.86) 0.0738*** (2.98) 0.0720*** (2.82) 
SPI 0.0398** (2.06) 0.0399** (2.11) 0.0406** (2.17) 0.0394** (2.05) 
MERGER 0.0017 (0.05) -0.0002 (-0.00) -0.0008 (-0.03) 0.0020 (0.06) 
ISSUE -0.1002 (-0.75) -0.1008 (-0.76) -0.1063 (-0.79) -0.1012 (-0.75) 
BIG 0.2355*** (4.94) 0.2335*** (4.77) 0.2298*** (4.71) 0.2359*** (4.85) 
INDSPEC 0.0962*** (5.36) 0.0971*** (5.39) 0.0996*** (5.55) 0.0963*** (5.35) 
YE 0.2002** (2.48) 0.2002** (2.47) 0.2002** (2.48) 0.1999** (2.48) 
LOGNAS 0.1478*** (7.14) 0.1479*** (7.09) 0.1485*** (7.12) 0.1478*** (7.14) 
N 6516   6516   6529   6519   
Adjusted R2 0.8304   0.8302   0.8303   0.8305   
F 1095.3951   1123.3652   1122.8678   1131.9499   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    





Panel B. Subsample of Obama's Era     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.1555*** (65.17) 9.1658*** (64.98) 9.1711*** (63.93) 9.1523*** (64.71) 
LOGREP -0.0014 (-0.64)     -0.0063*** (-3.17)    
LOGDEM 0.0134*** (5.08)         0.0140*** (5.66) 
CPID     -0.0468*** (-5.85)        
LOG_AT 0.4095*** (41.54) 0.4156*** (45.38) 0.4195*** (44.85) 0.4087*** (42.23) 
MTB -0.0014 (-0.63) -0.0009 (-0.41) -0.0004 (-0.20) -0.0015 (-0.64) 
LOGSEG 0.1024*** (7.28) 0.1033*** (7.38) 0.1020*** (7.32) 0.1020*** (7.23) 
FOREIGN 0.2672*** (9.63) 0.2686*** (9.64) 0.2698*** (9.72) 0.2673*** (9.65) 
ROA -0.1115 (-1.20) -0.1190 (-1.28) -0.1301 (-1.39) -0.1130 (-1.21) 
LEV 0.2235*** (3.37) 0.2117*** (3.22) 0.2009*** (3.04) 0.2231*** (3.38) 
RECINV 0.1313* (1.68) 0.1244 (1.58) 0.1103 (1.39) 0.1324* (1.70) 
PPE -0.4427*** (-6.56) -0.4421*** (-6.55) -0.4580*** (-6.89) -0.4417*** (-6.60) 
LOSS 0.1323*** (4.62) 0.1310*** (4.57) 0.1318*** (4.57) 0.1323*** (4.56) 
SPI 0.0023 (0.13) 0.0044 (0.26) 0.0057 (0.33) 0.0022 (0.13) 
MERGER 0.0475** (2.39) 0.0469** (2.31) 0.0467** (2.24) 0.0475** (2.41) 
ISSUE 0.2581** (2.48) 0.2518** (2.42) 0.2539** (2.38) 0.2589** (2.48) 
BIG 0.3676*** (9.56) 0.3626*** (9.61) 0.3607*** (9.32) 0.3693*** (9.63) 
INDSPEC 0.0601*** (2.97) 0.0625*** (3.08) 0.0625*** (3.02) 0.0599*** (2.96) 
YE 0.0636*** (2.67) 0.0631*** (2.65) 0.0607** (2.55) 0.0638*** (2.67) 
LOGNAS 0.0929*** (13.23) 0.0939*** (13.41) 0.0949*** (13.45) 0.0929*** (13.23) 
N 7596   7596   7608   7598   
Adjusted R2 0.8507   0.8503   0.8496   0.8507   
F 1284.8178   1304.6229   1298.0545   1319.2939   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    





6.3.2. Political Ideologies and Conservatism Analyses 
 
This section indicates a possible explanation of why political ideologies could impact 
audit fees. This study expects such relationship between political ideology and audit fee is 
existed because of Republican (Democrat) ideology adopts more (less) conservative 
approaches to conduct businesses. Thus, conservatism ideology could affect firm policies and 
risk-taking. I conduct analyses to test the relationship between political ideology and 
accounting conservatism. First, I measure conservatism using C_SCORE as proposed by Khan 
and Watts (2009). Second, I use Hutton et al. (2014) approach to measure conservatism.,  
6.3.2.1. Conservatism using C_SCORE 
 
I analyse the relationship between political ideologies and accounting conservatism. 
Table 8 shows the results of the political ideologies influence to conservatism. I use 
conservatism score (C_SCORE) measure developed by (Khan & Watts, 2009) as a proxy for 
conservatism. Specifically, C_SCORE is proxy for conservatism against bad news. It is argued 
that a firm is deemed to be more conservative if it reacts to bad news more severely than to 
good news (Basu, 1997). The control variables include the standard deviation of stock return 
(SDRET), investment cycle (INVESTCYCLE), bid-ask spread (BIDASK) and the age of the 
firms (AGE). The result indicates that the firms that contribute to either Republican or 
Democrats are conservative as shown in column (1), (3) and (4). In overall, contributing firms 
are less conservative as indicated in column (1). While this study does not find the evidence 
that contribution to a certain party could influence conservatism score, the results in column 
(2) support H2 and the findings in Hutton et al. (2014) which prompts that Republican-leaning 
firms are more conservative than their Democrats leaning counterparts. This argument is shown 




 Taken together, the evidence on accounting conservatism analyses provide 
corroborating evidence that that conservatism associated with Republican ideology could affect 
the determination of audit fees. This evidence also supports Gul et al. (2002) argument where 
a firm is less conservative; audit fees would increase because of higher audit efforts. The 
evidence on political contributions affect conservatism also confirms the agency problem, 
theory and auditor could charge higher audit fees to mitigate agency problems. Auditors 
conduct more audit efforts to reduce the litigations risk when a firm is less conservative.  The 





Table 8. Political Ideologies and Conservatism using C_SCORE       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.0859*** (7.10) 0.1501*** (16.14) 0.1115*** (10.97) 0.1416*** (14.00) 
LOGREP 0.0085*** (8.17)     0.0073*** (7.51)     
LOGDEM 0.0043*** (4.49)         0.0026*** (2.81) 
CPID     0.0161*** (4.31)         
SDRET -0.0081*** (-11.96) -0.0083*** (-12.31) -0.0081*** (-12.03) -0.0084*** (-12.49) 
INVESTCYCLE 0.2999** (2.16) 0.2503* (1.87) 0.2753** (2.03) 0.2750** (2.00) 
BIDASK -1.6891*** (-3.40) -2.0770*** (-3.47) -1.8981*** (-3.41) -1.9318*** (-3.59) 
AGE -0.0001 (-1.08) 0.0001 (0.90) -0.0000 (-0.28) 0.0001 (0.70) 
N 9644   9644   9661   9651   
Adjusted R2 0.0279   0.0227   0.0261   0.0223   
F 45.4543   40.8447   48.4454   45.4077   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    




6.3.2.2. Conservatism Score using Executives and Directors Sample 
I also test conservatism using executive and director sample as the alternative proxy for 
firms’ political ideology. Table 9 exhibits the relationship between political ideology and 
conservatism (C_SCORE) using only executives and directors sample. I find that both 
contributions towards the Republican are significantly and positively with C_SCORE (column 
(1) and (3)), suggesting that Republican ideology is associated with conservatism. This finding 
is consistent with the all-employee sample. Furthermore, the relationship between political 
contributions to the Democrats is not significant. The variable CPID is also insignificant using 





Table 9. Political Ideologies and Conservatism using C_SCORE – Director Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.0547*** (6.96) 0.0641*** (11.04) 0.0584*** (8.90) 0.0648*** (10.62) 
LOGREP 0.0014** (2.08)     0.0011* (1.92)     
LOGDEM 0.0005 (0.90)         -0.0001 (-0.24) 
CPID     0.0021 (0.89)         
SDRET -0.0050*** (-11.95) -0.0050*** (-12.02) -0.0050*** (-11.98) -0.0050*** (-12.03) 
INVESTCYCLE 0.0418 (0.62) 0.0390 (0.57) 0.0352 (0.52) 0.0454 (0.67) 
BIDASK -0.8703 (-1.56) -0.9566* (-1.72) -0.8923 (-1.60) -0.9654* (-1.73) 
AGE 0.0000 (0.52) 0.0001 (0.67) 0.0001 (0.58) 0.0001 (0.72) 
N 3829   3829   3837   3832   
Adjusted R2 0.0446   0.0439   0.0447   0.0437   
F 30.7775   36.1918   36.9131   36.0120   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 







6.3.2.3. Conservatism based on Hutton et al. (2014) 
 
Following Hutton et al. (2014) arguments that Republican managers are more 
conservative, I conduct analyses on firms political ideologies and conservatism. Table 10 
shows this relationship between political ideology and four measures of conservatism, which 
are investments in tangible capital (INV), research and development expenses (R&D), stock 
return volatility (SDRET) and return on assets (ROA) which are divided into four panels. The 
variable CPID is significantly and negatively associated with R&D and SDRET which implies 
Republican-leaning firms spend less on R&D expenses and less volatile stock returns.  
The variable CPID is significant in Panel A column (2), which suggests there is 
evidence that Republican leanings firms invest more intangible assets. In column (1) and (4), 
the variable LOGDEM is positive and significant at 10% level in column (1) and significant at 
5% level in column (4), signalling that firms that contribute to the Democrats are more likely 
to spend more on tangible assets. There is no evidence that donating firms are associated with 
investment in tangible assets. Panel B describes the relationship between the test variables and 
R&D expenses. Firms that are contributing to the Democrats are spending more on R&D as 
shown by the positive and significant coefficient (column (1) and (4)). In contrast, the variable 
LOGREP is negative and significant at 10% level signalling that firms contributing to the 
Republican spend less on R&D. The variable CPID shows negative and significant relationship 
with R&D, signalling that the firms leaning towards the Republican are spending less on R&D. 
Furthermore, in Panel C column (1) firms that are contributing to the Republicans 
(Democrats) are associated with less (more) stock return volatility. The results in column (2) 
support this finding by indicating a significant and negative relationship between Republican-




significantly associated with ROA (column (2)). This evidence shows that Republican-leaning 
firms are more conservative in allocating their firm resources and only invest their resources 
in profitable projects. In column (1) the variable LOGDEM is also negatively and significantly 
associated with ROA which supports the results in column (2). The overall findings support 
hypothesis 2 (H2) that expects Republican-leaning firms are more conservative. Therefore, 
auditors are more likely to spend less time and effort to perform the audit to Republican-leaning 
firms since these firms are more conservative and less risky because these firms are more likely 




Table 10. Political Ideologies and Conservatism based on Hutton et al. (2014) 
Panel A. Investment in tangible capital (INV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables INV INV INV INV 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.4900*** (6.53) 0.4936*** (6.59) 0.4966*** (6.64) 0.4883*** (6.52) 
LOGREP -0.0011 (-0.36)     -0.0033 (-1.18)     
LOGDEM 0.0056* (1.87)        0.0061** (2.19) 
CPID     -0.0193* (-1.71)        
MTB 0.0055** (2.32) 0.0057** (2.40) 0.0059** (2.48) 0.0055** (2.31) 
LOG_AT -0.0408*** (-7.72) -0.0388*** (-8.02) -0.0372*** (-7.53) -0.0414*** (-8.26) 
LOSS -0.0351 (-1.46) -0.0347 (-1.44) -0.0335 (-1.39) -0.0345 (-1.44) 
LAGLEV 0.0007 (0.18) 0.0007 (0.18) 0.0007 (0.17) 0.0007 (0.17) 
N 18275   18275   18309  18282   
Adjusted R2 0.0054   0.0053   0.0052  0.0054   
F 4.2980   4.3775   4.3211  4.4432   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 






Panel B. Research and Development Expenses (R&D)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables R&D R&D R&D R&D 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.1103*** (11.34) 0.1109*** (11.38) 0.1131*** (11.59) 0.1098*** (11.29) 
LOGREP -0.0007* (-1.72)     -0.0025*** (-7.23)     
LOGDEM 0.0045*** (11.60)        0.0048*** (13.60) 
CPID     -0.0170*** (-12.10)        
MTB 0.0049*** (18.28) 0.0050*** (18.75) 0.0052*** (19.20) 0.0049*** (18.26) 
LOG_AT -0.0174*** (-25.53) -0.0156*** (-25.52) -0.0143*** (-22.69) -0.0178*** (-28.10) 
LOSS 0.0670*** (22.85) 0.0670*** (22.81) 0.0684*** (23.22) 0.0674*** (23.04) 
LAGLEV 0.0117*** (30.15) 0.0117*** (30.16) 0.0117*** (29.99) 0.0116*** (30.12) 
N 10535   10535   10555  10538   
Adjusted R2 0.2983   0.2957   0.2895  0.2981   
F 150.2806   153.4797   149.3077  155.3486   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 






Panel C. Stock Return Volatility (SDRET)         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables SDRET SDRET SDRET SDRET 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 15.1181*** (30.72) 15.0964*** (30.55) 15.1279*** (30.47) 15.0623*** (30.53) 
LOGREP -0.0554*** (-3.17)     -0.0716*** (-4.14)     
LOGDEM 0.0437** (2.48)        0.0641*** (3.68) 
CPID     -0.3232*** (-4.43)        
MTB 0.0052 (0.25) 0.0056 (0.26) 0.0083 (0.40) 0.0049 (0.23) 
LOG_AT -0.9385*** (-20.34) -0.9434*** (-22.28) -0.9098*** (-21.23) -0.9711*** (-21.79) 
LOSS 6.0579*** (31.51) 6.0646*** (31.59) 6.0625*** (31.50) 6.0943*** (31.70) 
LAGLEV 0.1483 (1.23) 0.1484 (1.23) 0.1460 (1.23) 0.1474 (1.21) 
N 18332   18332   18368  18340   
Adjusted R2 0.3683   0.3683   0.3678  0.3682   
F 133.7266   138.0368   137.7261  138.7096   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






Panel D. Return on Assets (ROA)         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons -0.0247** (-2.46) -0.0253** (-2.49) -0.0260** (-2.57) -0.0239** (-2.36) 
LOGREP 0.0005 (1.47)     0.0010*** (3.01)     
LOGDEM -0.0013*** (-3.64)        -0.0015*** (-4.34) 
CPID     0.0056*** (3.83)        
MTB -0.0032*** (-4.82) -0.0032*** (-4.86) -0.0033*** (-4.91) -0.0032*** (-4.81) 
LOG_AT 0.0125*** (11.99) 0.0122*** (12.81) 0.0116*** (12.20) 0.0128*** (12.75) 
LOSS -0.2339*** (-54.53) -0.2340*** (-54.55) -0.2342*** (-54.30) -0.2342*** (-54.62) 
LAGLEV -0.0042*** (-4.62) -0.0042*** (-4.59) -0.0042*** (-4.60) -0.0042*** (-4.60) 
N 19292   19292   19330  19300   
Adjusted R2 0.4394   0.4392   0.4387  0.4393   
F 109.7962   112.6344   111.6896  113.5289   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    




6.3.3. Discretionary Accruals Tests 
 
I conduct tests to analyse the relationship between political ideologies and discretionary 
accruals to show differences in financial reporting quality. Table 11 Panel A and B show the 
relationship between political ideologies and discretionary accruals using Jones discretionary 
accruals (JONES_DA) based on Jones (1991) and modified Jones discretionary accruals 
(MODJONES_DA) based on Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) measures. Panel A shows 
the results using the absolute values of discretionary accruals and Panel B indicates the results 
using the negative values of discretionary accruals. The evidence in Panel A shows that the 
coefficient of firms that are contributing the Republicans (LOGREP) and firms contributing to 
the Democrats (LOGREP) are negative. However, the coefficient for LOGREP is negative and 
significant at 5% level (p-value<0.05), signalling that firms contributing to the Republican 
(LOGREP) are less likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals (column (1)). 
Similarly, LOGREP is also negatively and significantly associated with 
MODJONES_DA in panel B., which implies that firms that are contributing to the Republican 
have lower discretionary accruals. The findings also suggest that firms that are contributing to 
the Republican provide higher quality earnings because of less discretionary accruals. In 
auditors’ perspective, the auditor should have more confidence with higher quality earnings 
presented by the Republican firms which can be translated into lower audit fees because of 
lower risk or material misstatement. The analyses fail to find consistent results with the variable 
CPID in column (2) in both panels. This finding suggests that political orientation 




Table 11. Political Ideologies and Discretionary Accruals     
Panel A. Political Ideologies and Discretionary Accruals using Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals (JONES_DA) 
Dependent Variables JONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.1184*** (3.66) 0.1159*** (3.68) 0.1171*** (3.71) 0.1168*** (3.64) 
LOGREP -0.0020** (-2.25)    -0.0018** (-1.98)    
LOGDEM -0.0006 (-0.81)       0.0000 (0.04) 
CPID     -0.0047 (-1.38)       
LOG_AT -0.0135*** (-6.90) -0.0148*** (-7.99) -0.0139*** (-7.22) -0.0148*** (-7.77) 
MTB 0.0011 (1.30) 0.0010 (1.20) 0.0011 (1.24) 0.0011 (1.27) 
LOGSEG 0.0011 (0.27) 0.0009 (0.22) 0.0011 (0.28) 0.0005 (0.13) 
FOREIGN -0.0168*** (-2.91) -0.0165*** (-2.91) -0.0167*** (-2.90) -0.0163*** (-2.89) 
ROA 0.0227 (1.00) 0.0237 (1.05) 0.0232 (1.02) 0.0228 (1.01) 
LEV 0.1234*** (5.34) 0.1255*** (5.40) 0.1245*** (5.27) 0.1241*** (5.42) 
RECINV -0.0751*** (-3.39) -0.0750*** (-3.40) -0.0744*** (-3.41) -0.0771*** (-3.48) 
PPE 0.0386 (1.22) 0.0400 (1.26) 0.0398 (1.28) 0.0378 (1.20) 
LOSS 0.0160** (2.04) 0.0166** (2.12) 0.0161** (2.06) 0.0171** (2.22) 
SPI -0.0020 (-0.38) -0.0025 (-0.47) -0.0024 (-0.45) -0.0024 (-0.45) 
MERGE 0.0326*** (7.34) 0.0327*** (7.38) 0.0326*** (7.31) 0.0328*** (7.48) 
ISSUE 0.0299* (1.83) 0.0307** (2.00) 0.0300* (1.91) 0.0310* (1.93) 
BIG -0.0085 (-0.73) -0.0077 (-0.68) -0.0083 (-0.73) -0.0076 (-0.66) 
INDSPEC -0.0052 (-1.13) -0.0056 (-1.22) -0.0053 (-1.17) -0.0053 (-1.14) 
YE -0.0009 (-0.22) -0.0008 (-0.20) -0.0008 (-0.21) -0.0009 (-0.24) 
LOGNAS 0.0025 (1.21) 0.0024 (1.18) 0.0025 (1.20) 0.0026 (1.23) 
N 8303   8303   8321   8307   
Adjusted R2 0.0574   0.0566   0.0574   0.0561   
F 10.9164   11.1622   11.2294   10.8937   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




Panel B Political Ideologies and Discretionary Accruals using Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals (MODJONES_DA) 
Dependent Variables MODJONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.0966** (2.56) 0.0940** (2.54) 0.0950*** (2.58) 0.0949** (2.52) 
LOGREP -0.0021** (-2.14)    -0.0019** (-1.96)    
LOGDEM -0.0008 (-0.75)       -0.0001 (-0.12) 
CPID     -0.0034 (-0.94)       
LOG_AT -0.0142*** (-6.19) -0.0157*** (-6.92) -0.0147*** (-6.39) -0.0156*** (-6.86) 
MTB 0.0009 (0.92) 0.0008 (0.83) 0.0008 (0.85) 0.0008 (0.88) 
LOGSEG 0.0048 (0.89) 0.0045 (0.84) 0.0048 (0.89) 0.0042 (0.79) 
FOREIGN -0.0124 (-1.58) -0.0121 (-1.53) -0.0124 (-1.57) -0.0119 (-1.52) 
ROA 0.0051 (0.18) 0.0062 (0.21) 0.0059 (0.20) 0.0054 (0.19) 
LEV 0.1175*** (4.69) 0.1195*** (4.78) 0.1189*** (4.70) 0.1182*** (4.77) 
RECINV -0.0501 (-1.59) -0.0505 (-1.64) -0.0492 (-1.57) -0.0523* (-1.70) 
PPE 0.0455 (1.40) 0.0465 (1.43) 0.0470 (1.48) 0.0446 (1.38) 
LOSS 0.0106 (0.93) 0.0114 (1.01) 0.0107 (0.94) 0.0118 (1.06) 
SPI -0.0064 (-0.92) -0.0069 (-0.99) -0.0068 (-0.98) -0.0068 (-0.97) 
MERGE 0.0336*** (5.37) 0.0337*** (5.54) 0.0336*** (5.39) 0.0339*** (5.56) 
ISSUE 0.0315* (1.82) 0.0325** (1.99) 0.0316* (1.90) 0.0327* (1.93) 
BIG 0.0036 (0.16) 0.0045 (0.21) 0.0038 (0.17) 0.0045 (0.21) 
INDSPEC -0.0148 (-1.32) -0.0151 (-1.35) -0.0149 (-1.33) -0.0148 (-1.32) 
YE 0.0022 (0.44) 0.0023 (0.45) 0.0023 (0.45) 0.0021 (0.42) 
LOGNAS 0.0027 (1.23) 0.0027 (1.21) 0.0027 (1.21) 0.0028 (1.26) 
N 8297   8297   8315   8301   
Adjusted R2 0.0344   0.0340   0.0344   0.0340   
F 10.2835   10.4743   10.5767   10.2826   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




6.4. Endogeneity Tests 
 
This section shows some endogeneity tests to alleviate potential omitted variables bias 
to the analysis. The first test is similar to the main test, excluding the extreme Republican and 
Democrat observations based on CPID variable. The second test is Heckman Selection bias 
test. Finally, the third test propensity score matching will be presented. 
6.4.1.1. Heckman Selection Bias – Audit Fees Analysis 
 
To reduce the possible endogeneity concerns of selection bias from observational data 
and unobservable variables, I conduct endogeneity test based on Heckman (1979) selection 
model. The Heckman procedure deals with unobservable variables that could affect individual 
decisions on making political contributions. The procedure consists of two stages; the first 
stage is the probit regression to analyses the variables that could affect the test variable. From 
the first stage, the inverse mills ratio will be obtained as this represents the unobservable 
variable that might affect the probability of the test variable. In the second stage of the 
procedure, the inverse mills ratio is included in the main model and the results of the main 
model are said to be robust if the results (including the significance) of the test variables remain 
unchanged. I test whether there are unobservable variables that could impact audit fees. 
Because the main test variables (CPID, LOGREP and LOGDEM) in this study are not 
dichotomous, I use the dummy of political orientation towards the Republican (CPIDREP) as 
the dependent variable for the first stage of test and the test variable, which take the value of 1 
if CPID>0 and 0 otherwise. This represents firms probability to be oriented to the Republicans. 
The control variables for the first stage of the test include LogAT, MTB, LogSEG, FOREIGN, 
ROA, LEV, RECINV, PPE, and MERGER as these variables are significantly correlated with 
LOGREP, LOGDEM and CPID showed by the significant relationships in the univariate test. 




find all variables to be significant, implying that the selected controls affect the whether or not 
firms are leaning towards the Republicans. From the probit regression in Table 12 Panel A, I 
also obtain the inverse mills ratio (LAMBDA) from the probit regression and include the 
inverse mills ratio in the second stage for each regression. The results qualitatively remain 
unchanged after including the inverse mill ratio in our main model. 
The results of the Heckman selection bias procedure is presented in Table 12 below. 
 
6.4.1.2. Heckman Selection Bias - Conservatism Analysis 
 
I perform endogeneity tests for conservatism analysis using Heckman selection bias 
procedures. Similar to the Heckman selection bias test for political ideology-audit fee 
relationship, the Heckman selection bias test for political ideology – conservatism also 
incorporates two-stage regression. In the first stage of analysis, I conduct the same probit 
regression as the previous Heckman selection bias test for audit fee analysis. I use the same 
dummy variable of the propensity of firms leaning towards the Republicans (CPIDREP)45 and 
I also utilise the same control variables for the probit regression (LogAT, MTB, LogSEG, 
FOREIGN, ROA, LEV, RECINV, PPE, and MERGER). From the probit regression, I obtain 
the inverse mills ratio (LAMBDA) from the probit regression and include the inverse mills 
ratio in the second stage for each main regression, similar to the previous Heckman procedures. 
In the second stage regression, I use C_SCORE as the measure of firms’ conservatism. The 
results are qualitatively similar to the main conservatism results. Column (1) indicates that both 
contributions to the Republican and Democrat are positively and significantly associated with 
conservatism. In column (2) the variable CPID shows positive and significant relationship with 
                                                          
 




conservatism, indicating that Republican-leaning firms are associated with higher 
conservatism. The results are shown in Table 13.   
 
Table 12 - Panel A   
First Stage - Heckman Selection Bias   
  (1) 
Dependent Variable CPIDREP 
  Coeff. t-stats 
_cons -0.5917*** (-6.00) 
LOG_AT -0.0398*** (-5.50) 
MTB -0.0130*** (-4.57) 
LOGSEG 0.1078*** (6.76) 
FOREIGN -0.0817*** (-3.21) 
ROA 0.4873*** (6.79) 
LEV 0.3390*** (5.23) 
RECINV 0.5014*** (6.72) 
PPE 0.7486*** (11.72) 
MERGE -0.0149 (-0.49) 
N 14112   
Pseudo R2 0.0639   
Wald Chi2 (33) 1155.00   
p 0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. CPIDREP 




Table 12 – Panel B - Heckman Selection Bias Test Results Audit Fess Analysis        
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.4904*** (14.70) 9.5468*** (14.63) 9.5303*** (14.76) 9.4824*** (14.78) 
LOGREP -0.0018 (-0.77)    -0.0062*** (-3.44)    
LOGDEM 0.0113*** (4.55)       0.0121*** (5.89) 
CPID    -0.0410*** (-6.25)       
LOG_AT 0.4126*** (30.05) 0.4179*** (31.75) 0.4208*** (32.18) 0.4114*** (30.98) 
MTB 0.0037 (0.96) 0.0044 (1.14) 0.0047 (1.22) 0.0037 (0.96) 
LOGSEG 0.0760** (2.03) 0.0738* (1.95) 0.0741** (1.98) 0.0759** (2.04) 
FOREIGN 0.3217*** (8.57) 0.3253*** (8.62) 0.3248*** (8.68) 0.3216*** (8.60) 
ROA -0.3231* (-1.74) -0.3415* (-1.82) -0.3391* (-1.83) -0.3223* (-1.74) 
LEV 0.2201** (2.25) 0.2045** (2.09) 0.1991** (2.05) 0.2208** (2.30) 
RECINV -0.0031 (-0.02) -0.0192 (-0.10) -0.0213 (-0.11) -0.0018 (-0.01) 
PPE -0.6212** (-2.49) -0.6407** (-2.54) -0.6407*** (-2.58) -0.6190** (-2.49) 
LOSS 0.0990*** (5.17) 0.0981*** (5.12) 0.0998*** (5.25) 0.0995*** (5.11) 
SPI 0.0221 (1.61) 0.0230* (1.71) 0.0238* (1.78) 0.0218 (1.60) 
MERGE 0.0411* (1.90) 0.0409* (1.86) 0.0406* (1.83) 0.0411* (1.91) 
ISSUES 0.1365 (1.42) 0.1336 (1.40) 0.1324 (1.36) 0.1370 (1.42) 
BIG 0.3003*** (8.42) 0.2973*** (8.33) 0.2947*** (8.20) 0.3016*** (8.37) 
INDSPEC 0.0793*** (4.75) 0.0808*** (4.84) 0.0819*** (4.85) 0.0792*** (4.74) 
YE 0.1314*** (2.94) 0.1312*** (2.92) 0.1300*** (2.89) 0.1314*** (2.94) 
LOGNAS 0.1141*** (10.68) 0.1146*** (10.71) 0.1154*** (10.79) 0.1141*** (10.67) 
LAMBDA -0.4126 (-0.72) -0.4551 (-0.78) -0.4300 (-0.75) -0.4080 (-0.71) 
N 14112   14112   14137   14117   
Adjusted R2 0.8487   0.8484   0.8482   0.8487   
F 1963.8158   1990.4592   1985.7238   2009.0273   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    







Table 13. Heckman Selection Bias Test Results – Conservatism Analysis 
  (1) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.1279*** (5.28) 0.1663*** (6.82) 0.1365*** (5.62) 0.1781*** (7.48) 
LOGREP 0.0077*** (6.44)    0.0066*** (5.93)    
LOGDEM 0.0042*** (3.55)       0.0025** (2.29) 
CPID    0.0148*** (3.35)       
SDRET -0.0071*** (-8.74) -0.0074*** (-9.08) -0.0072*** (-8.86) -0.0074*** (-9.19) 
INVESTCYCLE 0.1664 (1.00) 0.1460 (0.87) 0.1673 (1.01) 0.1356 (0.81) 
BIDASK -1.6003*** (-2.97) -1.8836*** (-3.07) -1.7602*** (-3.01) -1.7965*** (-3.13) 
AGE -0.0001 (-0.87) 0.0001 (0.69) -0.0000 (-0.23) 0.0001 (0.45) 
LAMBDA -0.0594** (-2.39) -0.0321 (-1.31) -0.0389 (-1.64) -0.0582** (-2.32) 
N 7375   7375   7390   7379   
Adjusted R2 0.0248   0.0203   0.0232   0.0201   
F 23.2354   20.2317   24.3089   22.2362   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  






6.4.1.3. Heckman Selection Bias – Discretionary Accruals 
I also perform an endogeneity test using a Heckman selection bias technique for 
discretionary accruals analysis. In the first stage of analysis, I conduct the same probit 
regression as the previous Heckman selection bias tests for audit fee and conservatism analyses. 
I use the same dummy variable of the propensity of firms leaning towards the Republicans 
(CPIDREP) and I also utilise the same control variables for the probit regression (LogAT, 
MTB, LogSEG, FOREIGN, ROA, LEV, RECINV, PPE, and MERGER).46 From the first stage 
probit regression, I obtain the inverse mills ratio (LAMBDA) from the probit regression and 
include the inverse mills ratio in the second stage for each main regression, similar to the 
previous Heckman procedures on audit fees and conservatism analysis. In the second stage 
analysis, I use both the absolute value of JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA as the measures 
for earnings management. I find that the results qualitatively remain unchanged. Both the 
coefficients for contributions to the Republicans and Democrats are negative. However, only 
contributions to the Republican is negative and significant (column (1) in both panels). The 
variables CPID in both panels (column (2)) also show negative and significant relationship 
with both measures of discretionary accruals. These findings show that Republican-leaning 
firms are associated with lower discretionary accrual – less earnings management. The results 
are presented in Table 14 Panel A and B below. 
  
                                                          
 




Table 14. – Panel A - Heckman Selection Bias Test Results – JONES_DA       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable JONES_DA JONES_DA JONES_DA JONES_DA 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.0408 (0.30) 0.0350 (0.25) 0.0331 (0.24) 0.0302 (0.22) 
LOGREP -0.0012** (-2.03)    -0.0012** (-2.05)    
LOGDEM -0.0003 (-0.52)       0.0001 (0.27) 
CPID    -0.0037* (-1.87)       
LOG_AT -0.0149*** (-5.40) -0.0158*** (-5.54) -0.0152*** (-5.36) -0.0159*** (-5.67) 
MTB 0.0004 (0.43) 0.0003 (0.33) 0.0003 (0.35) 0.0003 (0.34) 
LOGSEG 0.0052 (0.58) 0.0054 (0.58) 0.0056 (0.61) 0.0054 (0.59) 
FOREIGN -0.0150* (-1.76) -0.0150* (-1.75) -0.0153* (-1.78) -0.0152* (-1.77) 
ROA 0.0528 (1.47) 0.0548 (1.48) 0.0551 (1.51) 0.0557 (1.51) 
LEV 0.1322*** (5.20) 0.1341*** (5.14) 0.1337*** (5.18) 0.1339*** (5.17) 
RECINV -0.0482 (-1.14) -0.0467 (-1.09) -0.0458 (-1.08) -0.0466 (-1.09) 
PPE 0.0641 (1.15) 0.0669 (1.18) 0.0676 (1.20) 0.0675 (1.19) 
LOSS 0.0135** (2.43) 0.0137** (2.49) 0.0136** (2.47) 0.0141*** (2.58) 
SPI -0.0011 (-0.20) -0.0014 (-0.26) -0.0013 (-0.25) -0.0013 (-0.24) 
MERGE 0.0269*** (6.50) 0.0269*** (6.51) 0.0268*** (6.46) 0.0269*** (6.55) 
ISSUES 0.0214 (1.47) 0.0217 (1.57) 0.0213 (1.49) 0.0219 (1.55) 
BIG -0.0041 (-0.49) -0.0036 (-0.44) -0.0041 (-0.49) -0.0035 (-0.42) 
INDSPEC -0.0042 (-1.28) -0.0045 (-1.37) -0.0042 (-1.29) -0.0042 (-1.29) 
YE -0.0009 (-0.26) -0.0009 (-0.25) -0.0009 (-0.26) -0.0010 (-0.28) 
LOGNAS 0.0017 (1.25) 0.0017 (1.21) 0.0017 (1.25) 0.0017 (1.27) 
LAMBDA 0.0709 (0.58) 0.0747 (0.60) 0.0772 (0.62) 0.0795 (0.64) 
N 8297   8297   8315   8301   
Adjusted R2 0.0827   0.0824   0.0829   0.0819   
F 13.8950   14.0759   14.2253   13.9935   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




Table 14. – Panel B - Heckman Selection Bias Test Results – MODJONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable MODJONES_DA MODJONES_DA MODJONES_DA MODJONES_DA 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.0457 (0.34) 0.0406 (0.29) 0.0377 (0.27) 0.0361 (0.26) 
LOGREP -0.0011* (-1.89)    -0.0011* (-1.91)    
LOGDEM -0.0002 (-0.44)       0.0001 (0.26) 
CPID    -0.0035* (-1.71)       
LOG_AT -0.0149*** (-5.43) -0.0157*** (-5.59) -0.0152*** (-5.42) -0.0158*** (-5.70) 
MTB 0.0004 (0.48) 0.0003 (0.39) 0.0003 (0.39) 0.0003 (0.39) 
LOGSEG 0.0051 (0.55) 0.0052 (0.56) 0.0055 (0.59) 0.0053 (0.57) 
FOREIGN -0.0149* (-1.71) -0.0150* (-1.69) -0.0153* (-1.73) -0.0151* (-1.71) 
ROA 0.0490 (1.34) 0.0507 (1.35) 0.0513 (1.38) 0.0516 (1.38) 
LEV 0.1303*** (5.02) 0.1321*** (4.98) 0.1319*** (5.02) 0.1319*** (5.00) 
RECINV -0.0437 (-1.02) -0.0423 (-0.97) -0.0413 (-0.95) -0.0422 (-0.98) 
PPE 0.0654 (1.15) 0.0679 (1.18) 0.0688 (1.20) 0.0684 (1.19) 
LOSS 0.0136** (2.39) 0.0138** (2.43) 0.0137** (2.42) 0.0142** (2.51) 
SPI -0.0011 (-0.20) -0.0013 (-0.26) -0.0013 (-0.25) -0.0013 (-0.24) 
MERGE 0.0272*** (6.29) 0.0272*** (6.30) 0.0271*** (6.25) 0.0272*** (6.34) 
ISSUES 0.0236 (1.61) 0.0239* (1.69) 0.0235 (1.63) 0.0241* (1.67) 
BIG -0.0066 (-0.77) -0.0062 (-0.73) -0.0066 (-0.78) -0.0060 (-0.71) 
INDSPEC -0.0041 (-1.24) -0.0043 (-1.33) -0.0041 (-1.25) -0.0041 (-1.25) 
YE -0.0003 (-0.07) -0.0002 (-0.06) -0.0002 (-0.06) -0.0003 (-0.09) 
LOGNAS 0.0018 (1.29) 0.0017 (1.25) 0.0018 (1.29) 0.0018 (1.31) 
LAMBDA 0.0630 (0.51) 0.0663 (0.52) 0.0695 (0.55) 0.0708 (0.56) 
N 8297   8297   8315   8301   
Adjusted R2 0.0814   0.0812   0.0816   0.0808   
F 13.8823   14.0795   14.2096   14.0231   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




6.4.2.1. Propensity Score Matching - Audit Fess Analysis 
 
I conduct further endogeneity test using propensity score matching (PSM). Shipman et 
al. (2016) argue that studies using non-experimental data are bound to raise endogeneity 
concerns, particularly non-random treatment assignment. Although multiple regression could 
reduce some of these concerns, multiple regression could produce biased estimates if 
incorrectly specified. Thus, PSM techniques alleviate this biased estimates by reducing reliance 
on the specification of the relationship among variables (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Shipman 
et al., 2016). Essentially, propensity score matching procedure compares the control and 
treatment groups and their effects to the dependent variables. The PSM mechanism matches 
the control and treatment groups based on the propensity score. Observations that have close 
propensity score from the treatment and control groups are matched. The outcome of the 
matching process illustrates how the treatment and control groups influence the dependent 
variable. 
I determine the treatment and control groups based on the corporate political ideology 
variable (CPID). The treatment group receive the value of 1 if a firm’s CPID>0, and 0 
otherwise. This implies that the treatment group is for firms are leaning towards the Republican 
and the control groups are Democrat-leaning firms. This analysis uses calliper distance of 0.01 
to determine the likelihood an observation will be chosen from the treatment and control group. 
The results showed in Table 15 Panel A, 3,351 observations are successfully matched from the 
treatment and control groups using PSM procedure. The dependent variable LOGFEES is 
statistically significant (p<0.05) and the control variables are not significant which means that 
the PSM procedure is successful. There are statistical differences in LOGFEES between 
treatment and control groups (i.e. Republican and non-Republican leaning groups). This 
finding confirms the main results that Republican-leaning firms are paying higher audit fees 




Table 15. - Panel A - Propensity Score Matching Results – Audit Fee Analysis 
N-each_group Treatment Control Difference T-stat P-value          
3,351 14.0986 14.1710 -0.0724 -2.1900 0.0286** LOGFEES 
3,351 7.3084 7.2818 0.0266 0.5167 0.6054 LOG_AT 
3,351 3.3554 3.4458 -0.0904 -0.9423 0.3461 MTB 
3,351 1.7404 1.7439 -0.0035 -0.1844 0.8537 LOGSEG 
3,351 0.5336 0.5154 0.0182 1.4921 0.1357 FOREIGN 
3,351 0.0168 0.0154 0.0015 0.3880 0.6980 ROA 
3,351 0.5175 0.5212 -0.0037 -0.6961 0.4864 LEV 
3,351 0.2494 0.2499 -0.0005 -0.1134 0.9097 RECINV 
3,351 0.2425 0.2431 -0.0005 -0.0959 0.9236 PPE 
3,351 0.2211 0.2175 0.0036 0.3542 0.7232 LOSS 
3,351 0.1388 0.1444 -0.0057 -0.6656 0.5057 SPI 
3,351 0.2005 0.2011 -0.0006 -0.0610 0.9514 MERGER 
3,351 0.9985 0.9988 -0.0003 -0.3335 0.7388 ISSUE 
3,351 0.8842 0.8768 0.0075 0.9413 0.3466 BIG 
3,351 0.2686 0.2614 0.0072 0.6642 0.5066 INDSPEC 
3,351 0.6923 0.7046 -0.0122 -1.0912 0.2752 YE 
3,351 12.5122 12.5112 0.0010 0.0218 0.9826 LOGNAS 
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 
The year and industry fixed effects are included in the analyses above. 
 
I then run the regressions for political ideology-audit fee analyses using PSM sample. 
The results in Table 15 Panel B show that LOGDEM is positively significant with LOGFEES 
and the variable CPID is negatively significant with LOGFEES. These findings are consistent 
with hypothesis 1, suggesting that Republican (Democrats) leaning firms are associated with 





Table 15. – Panel B - Political Ideologies and Audit Fees using PSM Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 8.9410*** (41.52) 8.9561*** (41.74) 8.9654*** (41.78) 8.9368*** (41.89) 
LOGREP -0.0017 (-0.56)    -0.0076*** (-3.20)    
LOGDEM 0.0145*** (4.28)       0.0152*** (5.56) 
CPID    -0.0537*** (-6.18)       
LOG_AT 0.4090*** (40.12) 0.4148*** (43.47) 0.4181*** (42.71) 0.4079*** (42.24) 
MTB 0.0030 (1.23) 0.0037 (1.53) 0.0040* (1.66) 0.0029 (1.22) 
LOGSEG 0.0987*** (7.19) 0.0994*** (7.25) 0.1002*** (7.34) 0.0984*** (7.16) 
FOREIGN 0.2784*** (10.38) 0.2795*** (10.52) 0.2787*** (10.42) 0.2782*** (10.36) 
ROA -0.1585** (-2.24) -0.1625** (-2.29) -0.1672** (-2.30) -0.1577** (-2.23) 
LEV 0.2038*** (3.00) 0.1921*** (2.87) 0.1870*** (2.80) 0.2058*** (3.06) 
RECINV 0.1377 (1.55) 0.1325 (1.49) 0.1297 (1.45) 0.1383 (1.56) 
PPE -0.4283*** (-6.37) -0.4315*** (-6.47) -0.4338*** (-6.52) -0.4276*** (-6.36) 
LOSS 0.1314*** (5.93) 0.1318*** (5.91) 0.1298*** (5.73) 0.1317*** (5.93) 
SPI 0.0200 (0.89) 0.0209 (0.93) 0.0223 (0.99) 0.0199 (0.88) 
MERGER 0.0269 (1.26) 0.0277 (1.28) 0.0287 (1.29) 0.0268 (1.26) 
ISSUE 0.1390 (0.81) 0.1396 (0.82) 0.1413 (0.82) 0.1402 (0.82) 
BIG 0.3273*** (8.72) 0.3237*** (8.60) 0.3206*** (8.50) 0.3280*** (8.66) 
INDSPEC 0.0703*** (3.38) 0.0723*** (3.52) 0.0727*** (3.52) 0.0700*** (3.37) 
YE 0.1317*** (2.85) 0.1317*** (2.84) 0.1321*** (2.85) 0.1318*** (2.86) 
LOGNAS 0.1200*** (9.76) 0.1202*** (9.75) 0.1206*** (9.79) 0.1199*** (9.73) 
N 6702   6702   6702   6702   
Adjusted R2 0.8473   0.8470   0.8462   0.8473   
F 986.6472   1002.8798   993.3659   1010.1906   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 





6.4.2.2. Propensity Score Matching - Conservatism Analysis 
 
I utilise propensity score matching to analyse the relationship between political 
ideology and conservatism to mitigate endogeneity issues due to omitted variables. I conduct 
similar method with audit fee analysis using control variables used in the conservatism using 
C_SCORE analysis. The PSM procedure allows this study to compare control (firms that are 
not leaning to the Republicans) and treatment (firms leaning to the Republicans) group 
regarding their conservatism score (C_SCORE). I successfully matched 1,134 paired 
observations from the treatment and control groups when they have similar characteristics. The 
results show that C_SCORE is statistically insignificant. This finding implies that there are no 
significant differences regarding conservatism between the treatment and control groups which 
is also inconsistent with previous results from earlier analyses. Although the results fail to find 
significant differences between the treatment and the control groups, earlier findings still 
suggest that conservatism could be a channel in which political ideology could affect audit 
fees. The results are shown in Table 16 Panel A below. 
Table 16. - Panel A - Conservatism Propensity Score Matching Results 
N-each_group Treatment Control Difference T-stat P-value Variable 
2,706 0.0670 0.0755 -0.0085 -0.9410 0.3468 C_SCORE 
2,706 8.6726 8.7131 -0.0405 -0.2817 0.7782 SDRET 
2,706 0.0322 0.0325 -0.0002 -0.3349 0.7377 INVESTCYCLE 
2,706 0.0020 0.0019 0.0001 0.5783 0.5631 BIDASK 
2,706 27.8319 28.0255 -0.1936 -0.3398 0.7340 AGE 
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 
The year and industry fixed effects are included in the analyses above. 
  
I use the sample from the matched sample for the second step regression. I find both 
contributions to the Republicans and the Democrats are positively associated with C_SCORE. 
However, the variable CPID is not significantly associated with C_SCORE. This result is not 




Table 16. - Panel B - Political Ideologies and Conservatism using C_Score using PSM Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE C_SCORE 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.0746*** (4.49) 0.1315*** (9.56) 0.1130*** (7.45) 0.1063*** (7.56) 
LOGREP 0.0049*** (3.79)     0.0034*** (2.74)     
LOGDEM 0.0065*** (5.29)         0.0054*** (4.65) 
CPID     -0.0040 (-0.85)         
SDRET -0.0077*** (-7.19) -0.0078*** (-7.29) -0.0077*** (-7.20) -0.0078*** (-7.29) 
INVESTCYCLE 0.3921** (2.21) 0.3651** (2.02) 0.3823** (2.14) 0.3689** (2.05) 
BIDASK -3.8759*** (-4.33) -4.6365*** (-5.08) -4.4331*** (-4.86) -4.2623*** (-4.73) 
AGE -0.0001 (-0.40) 0.0002 (0.86) 0.0001 (0.49) 0.0001 (0.28) 
N 5412   5412   5412   5412   
Adjusted R2 0.0281   0.0222   0.0234   0.0256   
F 20.3824   18.5084   19.6840   22.2670   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 




6.4.2.3. Propensity Score Matching – Discretionary Accruals 
I also use propensity score matching process to compare the treatment (CPID>0, 
Republican-leaning firms) and control groups in term of the propensity of earnings 
management. Specifically, I compare JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA between the 
treatment and controls groups. In both analyses, I successfully matched 1,926 paired 
observations with similar characteristics. I find that the treatment group is associated with 
lower discretionary accruals. In particular, the treatment group is negatively and significantly 
associated with lower JONES_DA (at 5% level) and MODJONES_DA (at 10% level). The 
control variables are insignificant, meaning that the observations from both groups are matched 
using similar control variables’ characteristics. Overall the results suggest that Republican-
leaning firms are associated with the lower absolute value of discretionary accruals, consistent 
with the results from the main analyses.  The results for the propensity score matching test is 
presented in Table 17 both panel A and B. 
Table 17. - Panel A.1. - Propensity Score Matching Results – JONES_DA 
N-each_group Treatment Control Difference T-stat P-value Variable 
1,926 0.0914 0.0987 -0.0073 -1.9932 0.0463 ** JONES_DA 
1,926 7.5835 7.6552 -0.0717 -1.1507 0.2499 LOG_AT 
1,926 3.3263 3.3503 -0.0240 -0.2088 0.8346 MTB 
1,926 1.7984 1.7944 0.0040 0.1611 0.8720 LOGSEG 
1,926 0.5774 0.5805 -0.0031 -0.1958 0.8448 FOREIGN 
1,926 0.0277 0.0285 -0.0008 -0.1717 0.8637 ROA 
1,926 0.5134 0.5204 -0.0070 -1.0714 0.2840 LEV 
1,926 0.2284 0.2324 -0.0040 -0.7752 0.4383 RECINV 
1,926 0.2647 0.2708 -0.0060 -0.8099 0.4180 PPE 
1,926 0.1885 0.1854 0.0031 0.2479 0.8042 LOSS 
1,926 0.1449 0.1475 -0.0026 -0.2280 0.8197 SPI 
1,926 0.2196 0.2274 -0.0078 -0.5800 0.5619 MERGER 
1,926 0.9995 0.9995 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 ISSUE 
1,926 0.9138 0.9112 0.0026 0.2851 0.7756 BIG 
1,926 0.2715 0.2928 -0.0213 -1.4678 0.1422 INDSPEC 
1,926 0.6833 0.6895 -0.0062 -0.4166 0.6770 YE 
1,926 12.6779 12.7415 -0.0637 -1.1021 0.2705 LOGNAS 
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 





Table 17 – Panel A.2. - Political Ideologies and JONES_DA using PSM Sample    
Dependent Variables JONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.1544*** (4.81) 0.1527*** (4.91) 0.1542*** (4.86) 0.1513*** (4.55) 
LOGREP -0.0016** (-2.01)    -0.0016* (-1.93)    
LOGDEM -0.0002 (-0.43)       0.0003 (0.55) 
CPID     -0.0051* (-1.81)       
LOG_AT -0.0119*** (-6.55) -0.0128*** (-7.33) -0.0120*** (-6.60) -0.0130*** (-7.38) 
MTB 0.0010 (1.48) 0.0010 (1.40) 0.0010 (1.48) 0.0010 (1.38) 
LOGSEG 0.0015 (0.47) 0.0013 (0.39) 0.0015 (0.47) 0.0012 (0.35) 
FOREIGN -0.0064 (-1.23) -0.0060 (-1.17) -0.0063 (-1.22) -0.0059 (-1.16) 
ROA 0.0358 (1.58) 0.0369 (1.62) 0.0360 (1.59) 0.0370 (1.63) 
LEV 0.1020*** (4.51) 0.1033*** (4.52) 0.1022*** (4.50) 0.1034*** (4.52) 
RECINV -0.0631*** (-2.81) -0.0625*** (-2.78) -0.0630*** (-2.81) -0.0616*** (-2.75) 
PPE 0.0402 (1.59) 0.0414 (1.63) 0.0404 (1.60) 0.0418 (1.64) 
LOSS 0.0174** (2.13) 0.0178** (2.21) 0.0174** (2.14) 0.0179** (2.23) 
SPI 0.0007 (0.10) 0.0004 (0.06) 0.0006 (0.09) 0.0004 (0.07) 
MERGE 0.0255*** (3.45) 0.0254*** (3.45) 0.0254*** (3.45) 0.0256*** (3.45) 
ISSUE -0.0079 (-0.31) -0.0084 (-0.36) -0.0079 (-0.32) -0.0083 (-0.32) 
BIG 0.0034 (0.40) 0.0041 (0.48) 0.0036 (0.42) 0.0040 (0.47) 
INDSPEC -0.0089*** (-2.80) -0.0090*** (-2.83) -0.0089*** (-2.82) -0.0089*** (-2.75) 
YE -0.0023 (-0.46) -0.0023 (-0.47) -0.0023 (-0.46) -0.0023 (-0.46) 
LOGNAS -0.0005 (-0.31) -0.0005 (-0.32) -0.0005 (-0.32) -0.0005 (-0.29) 
N 3852   3852   3852   3852   
Adjusted R2 0.0805   0.0798   0.0807   0.0785   
F 7.7095   7.7909   7.8661   7.7142   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




Table 17. - Panel B.1. - Propensity Score Matching Results – MODJONES_DA 
N-each_group Treatment Control Difference T-stat P-value Variable 
1,926 0.0928 0.0998 -0.0070 -1.8858 0.0594 * MODJONES_DA 
1,926 7.5835 7.6552 -0.0717 -1.1507 0.2499 LOG_AT 
1,926 3.3263 3.3503 -0.0240 -0.2088 0.8346 MTB 
1,926 1.7984 1.7944 0.0040 0.1611 0.8720 LOGSEG 
1,926 0.5774 0.5805 -0.0031 -0.1958 0.8448 FOREIGN 
1,926 0.0277 0.0285 -0.0008 -0.1717 0.8637 ROA 
1,926 0.5134 0.5204 -0.0070 -1.0714 0.2840 LEV 
1,926 0.2284 0.2324 -0.0040 -0.7752 0.4383 RECINV 
1,926 0.2647 0.2708 -0.0060 -0.8099 0.4180 PPE 
1,926 0.1885 0.1854 0.0031 0.2479 0.8042 LOSS 
1,926 0.1449 0.1475 -0.0026 -0.2280 0.8197 SPI 
1,926 0.2196 0.2274 -0.0078 -0.5800 0.5619 MERGER 
1,926 0.9995 0.9995 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 ISSUE 
1,926 0.9138 0.9112 0.0026 0.2851 0.7756 BIG 
1,926 0.2715 0.2928 -0.0213 -1.4678 0.1422 INDSPEC 
1,926 0.6833 0.6895 -0.0062 -0.4166 0.6770 YE 
1,926 12.6779 12.7415 -0.0637 -1.1021 0.2705 LOGNAS 
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 
The year and industry fixed effects are included in the analyses above. 
 
I run both JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA analyses using PSM samples. I find that 
LOGREP is negatively associated with JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA in column (1) in 
both panels. The variable CPID is negatively associated with JONES_DA and 
MODJONES_DA at 10% level (p-value<0.1). These findings suggest Republican-leaning 





Table 17. – Panel B.2. - Political Ideologies and MODJONES_DA using PSM 
Sample    
Dependent Variables MODJONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.1449*** (4.07) 0.1433*** (4.14) 0.1447*** (4.11) 0.1420*** (3.86) 
LOGREP -0.0015* (-1.85)    -0.0014* (-1.77)    
LOGDEM -0.0002 (-0.41)       0.0003 (0.47) 
CPID     -0.0048* (-1.67)       
LOG_AT -0.0119*** (-5.93) -0.0128*** (-6.58) -0.0120*** (-5.99) -0.0129*** (-6.62) 
MTB 0.0009 (1.36) 0.0009 (1.28) 0.0009 (1.36) 0.0009 (1.26) 
LOGSEG 0.0016 (0.48) 0.0014 (0.41) 0.0016 (0.48) 0.0012 (0.37) 
FOREIGN -0.0069 (-1.36) -0.0066 (-1.31) -0.0069 (-1.35) -0.0065 (-1.31) 
ROA 0.0326 (1.55) 0.0337 (1.59) 0.0328 (1.56) 0.0337 (1.60) 
LEV 0.1012*** (4.24) 0.1024*** (4.25) 0.1014*** (4.23) 0.1025*** (4.25) 
RECINV -0.0560** (-2.41) -0.0554** (-2.39) -0.0559** (-2.41) -0.0546** (-2.35) 
PPE 0.0447* (1.71) 0.0457* (1.75) 0.0449* (1.73) 0.0461* (1.76) 
LOSS 0.0184** (2.32) 0.0188** (2.40) 0.0185** (2.34) 0.0189** (2.41) 
SPI -0.0000 (-0.00) -0.0003 (-0.04) -0.0001 (-0.02) -0.0003 (-0.04) 
MERGE 0.0256*** (3.36) 0.0256*** (3.37) 0.0256*** (3.36) 0.0257*** (3.37) 
ISSUE 0.0010 (0.03) 0.0005 (0.02) 0.0009 (0.03) 0.0006 (0.02) 
BIG 0.0010 (0.12) 0.0017 (0.19) 0.0012 (0.14) 0.0015 (0.18) 
INDSPEC -0.0088*** (-2.70) -0.0089*** (-2.74) -0.0088*** (-2.73) -0.0088*** (-2.66) 
YE -0.0017 (-0.35) -0.0018 (-0.35) -0.0017 (-0.34) -0.0018 (-0.35) 
LOGNAS -0.0004 (-0.22) -0.0004 (-0.23) -0.0004 (-0.22) -0.0003 (-0.19) 
N 3852   3852   3852   3852   
Adjusted R2 0.0785   0.0780   0.0787   0.0769   
F 7.5853   7.6686   7.7354   7.6113   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. The year and industry 




6.4.3.1.Difference-in-Differences Audit Fee Analysis 
 
This study analyses the possibility of exogenous shocks in the 2008 election year where 
there is a change in the government, and there is a change of the ruling party in 2008 from the 
Republicans to the Democrats. This change in the ruling party could also affect the firm 
performance (Goldman et al., 2013) 47 and firms are benefiting from their orientation to the 
ruling party (Houston et al., 2014)48. Using difference-in-differences method, I examine the 
change in audit fees where there is a change in government in 2008 and the change in firms’ 
political ideologies. This test allows us to analyse the impact on the firm’s political ideology 
and audit fees relationship if firms divert their political ideology during the general election.  
The result of the 2008 presidential election was unknown as well as its impact on 
political ideology and also firm policies. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the exogenous 
shock of the 2008 presidential election towards political ideology-audit fee relationship using 
the difference-in-differences model indicated in Table 18.49  There is a possible movement in 
political ideology, notably during the 2008 general election when there is a change in the ruling 
party. I use the variable SHIFT if there is a shift in firm’s ideology from the Republican to the 
Democrats. The variable SHIFT is a political ideology shift dummy variable which equals to 1 
if a firm is extreme Republicans (CPID=+1) in the previous year and less extreme Republicans 
(CPID<+1) in the current year and 0 otherwise. The variable YEAR_2008 is the year 2008 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the financial year end is 2008 and afterwards, 
                                                          
 
47 For example, in Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2013) study, they find Phillip Petroleum (connected to the 
Republicans) receive more government contracts after the 1994 midterm election where there is a change in ruling 
party from the Democrats to the republicans. On the other hand, Occidental Petroleum (connected to the 
Democrats) receive less contract after the election. 
48 Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014) find that firms connected to the Democrats after the midterm election 2006 
enjoys more favourable loan terms compare to the Republican connected firms (The Democratic Party won the 
midterm election in 2006). 




and 0 otherwise. The variable SHIFT is not significantly influenced audit fees, and variable 
YEAR_2008 is positively correlated with audit fees. The possible explanation of why variable 
YEAR_2008 affect audit the increase in audit fees significantly might be because of global 
financial crisis effects. The interaction term SHIFT X YEAR_2008 is positively significant 
with audit fees. This finding can be interpreted as firms that shift its political ideology from 
extreme Republican to less extreme Republican in the 2008 election pay higher audit fees.50 
Table 18. Exogenous Shocks on Audit Fees After the 2008 
Election 
 (1)   
Dependent Variables LOGFEES   
  Coeff. t-stats   
_cons 9.5145*** (34.02)   
SHIFT -0.1131 (-1.28)   
YEAR_2008 0.2770*** (3.62)   
SHIFT X YEAR_2008 0.2518** (1.99)   
LOG_AT 0.4806*** (30.28)   
MTB 0.0057** (2.27)   
LOGSEG 0.0589*** (2.73)   
FOREIGN 0.4012*** (9.41)   
ROA -0.1687** (-2.41)   
LEV 0.2614*** (3.84)   
RECINV -0.0384 (-0.41)   
PPE -0.5987*** (-7.57)   
LOSS 0.0676** (2.18)   
SPI 0.0432** (2.00)   
MERGER 0.1860*** (2.92)   
ISSUE 0.0239 (0.20)   
BIG 0.1225 (1.60)   
INDSPEC 0.0772*** (2.66)   
YE 0.1076* (1.77)   
LOGNAS 0.0357 (1.62)   
N 14112     
Adjusted R2 0.7787     
F 2028.9654     
p 0.0000     
                                                          
 
50 The relationship between SHIFT X YEAR_2008 and LOGFEES is significant (p-value<0.05) using 3 years 




***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% 
level and 10% level, two tails. The year and industry fixed effects are 
included in the analyses above.   
6.4.3.2.Difference-in-Differences Conservatism Analysis 
I perform difference-in-differences analysis for the shifting ideology from the 
Republican ideology to less extreme Republican ideology.  I Use similar method as the audit 
fee analysis and conservatism model as previous tests to conduct the analysis. I expect when a 
firm becomes “less Republican” it should show lower degree of conservatism. However, I find 
no evidence of lower conservatism when a firm became less extreme Republican after 2008. 
The interaction variable SHIFT X YEAR_2008 is not significant with C_SCORE, signalling 
that when a firm shift from extreme Republican to become less extreme Republican after 2008 
election year, it does not show a lower level of conservatism. The results are presented in Table 
19 below. 
Table 19. Difference-in-differences Analysis - Conservatism 
 (1) 
Dependent Variables C_SCORE 
  Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.2815*** (25.88) 
SHIFT 0.0161 (0.82) 
YEAR_2008 -0.2352*** (-30.49) 
SHIFT X YEAR_2008 -0.0143 (-0.73) 
SDRET -0.0072*** (-10.89) 
INVESTCYCLE 0.2035** (2.02) 
BIDASK -4.5796*** (-3.57) 
AGE 0.0003** (2.57) 
N 9668   
Adjusted R2 0.1233   
F 274.8737   
p 0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. The year 





6.4.3.3.Difference-in-Differences Discretionary Accruals Analysis 
I also conduct difference-in-differences analysis for discretionary accruals. This test 
shows the differences in firms’ discretionary accruals level when a firm shift its political 
ideology from extreme Republican to less extreme Republican after the 2008 election year. 
Therefore, I expect SHIFT X YEAR_2008 to be positive and significant because I expect when 
a firm becomes adopt less extreme Republican ideology, the earnings quality would be lower 
after the exogenous event of 2008 general election. However, I find insignificant differences 
regarding discretionary accruals level when a firm shifts its political ideology after the 2008 
election year. The variable SHIFT X YEAR_2008 are insignificant with both Jones and 
Modified model. The results are shown in Table 20 below. 
Table 20. Difference-in-differences for Discretionary Accruals  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables JONES_DA MODJONES_DA 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 0.1426*** (3.98) 0.1216*** (3.00) 
SHIFT -0.0093** (-2.16) -0.0095** (-2.31) 
YEAR_2008 -0.0230*** (-3.45) -0.0164* (-1.82) 
SHIFT X YEAR_2008 0.0060 (0.93) -0.0031 (-0.32) 
LOG_AT -0.0144*** (-8.94) -0.0148*** (-7.65) 
MTB 0.0012 (1.37) 0.0010 (1.10) 
LOGSEG -0.0002 (-0.06) 0.0026 (0.59) 
FOREIGN -0.0156*** (-2.72) -0.0110 (-1.38) 
ROA 0.0249 (1.11) 0.0081 (0.28) 
LEV 0.1238*** (5.12) 0.1181*** (4.57) 
RECINV -0.0776*** (-3.55) -0.0528* (-1.76) 
PPE 0.0365 (1.19) 0.0432 (1.38) 
LOSS 0.0171** (2.24) 0.0116 (1.04) 
SPI -0.0019 (-0.35) -0.0061 (-0.88) 
MERGER 0.0331*** (7.02) 0.0353*** (5.60) 
ISSUE 0.0255 (1.48) 0.0239 (1.23) 
BIG -0.0087 (-0.78) 0.0018 (0.09) 
INDSPEC -0.0056 (-1.31) -0.0149 (-1.40) 
YE 0.0007 (0.18) 0.0042 (0.76) 
LOGNAS 0.0024 (1.05) 0.0024 (1.00) 
N 8325   8319   
Adjusted R2 0.0551   0.0337   




p 0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. The year 




This chapter indicates the empirical results of this study. There are three main sections 
of this chapter; (1) univariate analyses, (2) multivariate analyses (hypothesis testing), and (3) 
endogeneity tests. I begin this chapter with the univariate analyses by indicating the political 
orientations (measured by CPID) over the sample period. From this examination, it is important 
to highlight that in the year, or one year before the general election (especially at the end of the 
two-term periods), firms’ political orientations tend to lean towards the Democrats, as shown 
by negative medians and means for these years. Following the political orientations over the 
sample period, the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in this 
study are presented. 
The multivariate analyses include all regression results to test this study’s hypotheses. 
I begin with the main analyses of political ideology and audit fees tests. The variable LOGDEM 
is also positively associated with higher audit fees, indicating that firms that are leaning towards 
the Democrats are paying higher audit fees because auditors post higher risks. The coefficient 
for CPID shows a significant and negative relationship with audit fees, implying that firms 
leaning to the Republicans are significantly paying lower audit fees. Qualitatively similar 
results are found using alternative political ideology measures such as; directors sample, PAC 
contributions sample. I also use President Bush’s and Obama’s era division sample and find 
that the results qualitatively remain unchanged. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2 (H2), I 
conduct several conservatism tests as a possible channel for the relationship between political 




as INV, R&D, SDRET and ROA.51 The results show that Republican-leaning firms invest less 
in the tangible capital, spend less on R&D, less stock volatility (SDRET) and higher ROA, 
exhibiting more conservative investment approaches. Second, I examine political ideology 
using C_SCORE. The results indicate that political contributions are associated with lower 
conservatism. Political contributions to both the Republicans and Democrats are associated 
with higher conservatism scores. More importantly, the variable CPID is positively and 
significantly associated with C_SCORE, implying that Republican-leaning firms are associated 
with higher degree of conservatism which could explain the negative relationship between 
Republican-leaning firms and audit fee. I also examine the relationship between political 
ideology and discretionary accruals using JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA as one of the 
channels that political ideology could have an impact on audit fees. I find that Republican-
leaning firms are negatively associated with discretionary accruals which could in turn, in turn, 
explain the negative association between Republican-leaning firms and audit fees. 
The endogeneity tests include Heckman selection bias procedures and propensity score 
matching. Similarly, firms leanings towards the Democrats are paying higher audit fees in the 
second stage of Heckman selection bias procedure. The propensity score matching results 
suggest that audit fees are significantly different between firms that are leaning towards the 
Republicans and Democrats. The endogeneity tests consolidate the notion that Republican 
(Democrats) leaning firms are associated with lower (higher) audit fees. I also perform 
endogeneity tests for conservatism and discretionary accruals using similar approach used for 
audit fee analyses. Consistent with the main results, I find that firms leaning towards the 
Republicans are more conservative (using the Heckman Selection Bias method) and negatively 
associated with earnings management compared to Democrat-leaning counterparts. This 
                                                          
 




evidence provides corroborating evidence that conservatism and earnings management could 
offer some explanations on how political ideology could affect audit fees. Using the difference-
in-differences method, I also reveal that audit fees are significantly higher for firms that shifted 
its political orientation from Republican ideology to (less) Democrat ideology after 2008. 
However, I do not find the evidence that there are significant differences in conservatism level 
and discretionary accruals level of when firms shift their political ideology and after 2008 





Chapter 7. Additional Analyses 
 
This section exhibits further analyses on the impact of political ideologies on other 
accounting or financial measures used in prior literature. The following sections deal with 
omitted variables that could have some influences on the relationship between political 
ideology and audit fee. I test the relationship between political contributions and audit fees 
since prior literature suggests that political activities, particularly political contributions could 
affect the audit fee. The analyses of this thesis also consider other variables that influence audit 
fees including audit report lag and controlling for lobbying expenses, political indicators, 
conservatism, discretionary accruals and corporate governance variables. In addition, I also 
remove extreme Republican and Democrat-leaning firms observations. 
 
7.1. Political Contributions and Audit Fees 
 
Research has documented the association between political contribution, in the form 
of PAC contributions or individual contributions, and firm policies as well as firms’ financial 
outcomes. The arguments presented by Ozer & Alakent (2012) exhibit that CPA engagements 
come with greater uncertainty and information asymmetry. They also argue that CPA might 
not be alligned with shareholders’ interests which might create agency problems. Moreover, 
managers have the discretions to involve in riskier CPA choices and could obtain personal 
benefits (Boubakri et al., 2013; Ozer & Alakent, 2012). Thus, CPA should increase agency 
costs and could ultimately affect audit fees. 
Several studies also find that firms that involve in CPA are riskier and utilise the 
relation with the government to attain benefits. Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically 




involve in risky projects because they are more likely to receive government assistance in the 
form of bailouts if the projects fail. However, there is a risk that the government would be 
unable to bail out firms that engage in political activities, especially during the financial crisis 
which increases the financial misstatement risks and in turn increase assessed audit risks (Gul, 
2006). The argument that politically connected firms have greater protection against 
policymakers and regulators is supported by Chaney et al. (2011) that find politically connected 
firms are associated with poorer earnings quality. They further argue that politically connected 
firms devote lesser time to produce better quality earnings because they face greater protections 
from the connections with the government. Blau et al. (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura (2012) 
find that politically active firms are more likely to receive the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). Blau et al. (2013) find that lobbying banks are more likely to receive TARP and 
Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that politically connected firms are more likely to receive 
funding under the TARP. Yu and Yu (2011) find that lobbying firms have a significantly lower 
fraud detection rate compared to firms that do not involve in lobbying activities. The fraud 
detection delays allow managers to allocate resources for self-interests such as sell more of 
their shares during the fraudulent periods. Correia (2014) finds that firms establish political 
connections through political contributions and lobbying and these firms are less likely to 
involve in SEC enforcement and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted.  
Based on this evidence, this study expects that audit fees should be higher for firms 
that donate more to the politicians. The reason why audit fees should be higher is mainly 
beacuse political contributions come with a degree of uncertainty in the form of firms might 
face uncertain outcomes of engaging this political activity. Consequently, public firms’ 
managers have put efforts to increase transparency to convince investors that they are not 
exploiting their connections to gain personal benefits by employing Big 4 auditors (Guedhami 




Using agency theory perspective, managers could embrace personal political 
ideologies and preferences and by engaging in political activities and this could be costly and 
wasteful because it might not be necessary to gain firm value (Mathur et al., 2013). By doing 
so, it could in turn cause concerns for investors, increase information asymmetry and increase 
agency costs. Thus, auditors should place more audit efforts to reduce agency problems. Hence, 
audit fees might be higher to reduce higher agency problems. 
The results in Table 21 show that total contribution (TCONT) is associated with audit 
fees (LOGFEES) in column (1) (p<0.1). The results are consistent with the notion that political 
contributions as an approach to engage political activities, might increase auditor risk judgment 
and thus increase audit fees. The results show that political contributions are positively 
associated with audit fees using executives and directors sample (Column (2)), and during 
Obama’s era (Column (5)). Because during the first years of Obama’s administration, the issue 
of governance of corporate political activities had been becoming more prominent as the 
administration focused on improving the ethical standards in policy making and governmental 
oversight of business activities (Dahan et al., 2013). This evidence perhaps could be the reason 
why firms that engage in political activities could be deemed as more risky and thus, auditor 
perform more audit efforts in this period. 
The possible explanation for the results is because auditors perceive firms that are 
involved in the political sphere through political contributions are riskier. Firms face 
uncertainty when they involve in politics because the outcomes of CPA are somehow erratic 
and firms should allocate resources to implicate themselves in politics. This idea is consistent 
with agency theory which suggests that corporate political activities can raise agency problems 
and information asymmetries (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Mathur et al., 2013; Ozer & Alakent, 
2012), thus increase audit fee. Moreover, these firms might receive preferential treatment from 




them exposed to risks. Auditor place more efforts to conduct the audit to provide reasonable 
assurance that these firms are free from misstatement because politically active firms are more 





Table 21. Political Contributions and Audit Fees        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
Sample Main Sample Exec & Directors PAC Bush Obama 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 8.9909*** (54.76) 9.1021*** (44.32) 7.3438*** (16.91) 7.5004*** (23.18) 9.1017*** (56.89) 
TCONT 0.0005* (1.85) 0.0041** (2.51) 0.0006 (1.29) 0.0004 (1.03) 0.0006* (1.65) 
LOG_AT 0.4120*** (42.60) 0.4179*** (31.02) 0.4316*** (35.05) 0.3971*** (21.78) 0.4193*** (42.71) 
MTB 0.0014 (0.68) 0.0022 (0.45) 0.0082** (2.29) 0.0050* (1.89) -0.0008 (-0.37) 
LOGSEG 0.0989*** (7.76) 0.1258*** (6.32) 0.0913*** (4.83) 0.0942*** (5.32) 0.0992*** (7.06) 
FOREIGN 0.3017*** (12.49) 0.2852*** (8.31) 0.2661*** (7.21) 0.3176*** (9.20) 0.2728*** (9.83) 
ROA -0.1884*** (-3.32) 0.0526 (0.26) -0.1749 (-1.10) -0.2628*** (-4.58) -0.1168 (-1.23) 
LEV 0.2715*** (4.23) 0.3518*** (3.53) 0.2672** (2.36) 0.3424*** (3.76) 0.2037*** (3.09) 
RECINV 0.1071 (1.54) 0.0403 (0.33) -0.0509 (-0.24) 0.1250 (1.45) 0.1061 (1.34) 
PPE -0.4555*** (-8.44) -0.5389*** (-6.63) -0.5864*** (-6.06) -0.4535*** (-6.74) -0.4622*** (-7.09) 
LOSS 0.1071*** (5.43) 0.0982** (2.55) 0.1068* (1.96) 0.0797*** (3.16) 0.1372*** (4.72) 
SPI 0.0224* (1.67) -0.0090 (-0.46) 0.0487** (2.26) 0.0378** (2.01) 0.0048 (0.28) 
MERGER 0.0363* (1.92) 0.0140 (0.44) 0.0179 (0.98) -0.0006 (-0.02) 0.0478** (2.32) 
BIG 0.3063*** (8.62) 0.0999 (1.31) -0.0279 (-0.25) 0.2388*** (5.39) 0.3741*** (9.54) 
INDSPEC 0.0822*** (4.82) 0.0859*** (3.25) -0.0186 (-0.51) 0.1007*** (5.60) 0.0615*** (2.97) 
YE 0.1307*** (2.91) 0.1482** (2.35) 0.1859 (1.61) 0.1993** (2.47) 0.0627*** (2.63) 
LOGNAS 0.1155*** (10.74) 0.1255*** (8.53) 0.1666*** (7.07) 0.1484*** (7.17) 0.0947*** (13.35) 
N 14142   4303   2448   6532   7610   
Adjusted R2 0.8481   0.8362   0.8062   0.8302   0.8494   
F 2036.4326   593.6292   327.2632   1130.5914   1294.2382   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails. 




7.2. Negative Value of Discretionary Accruals 
 
Table 22 exhibits the regression results of the negative value of discretionary accruals 
tests as a measure for conservatism. This study posits that an income decreasing approach is a 
form of conservatism (Hirst, 1994; Kim, Chung, & Firth, 2003) and the auditor is more likely 
to be sued for overstatement of income (Lys & Watts, 1994). In Panel A and B, CPID is 
positively associated with the negative value of discretionary accruals, measured by Jones 
model (column (2)). This positive association means that Republican-leaning firms take more 
conservative approach by have negative discretionary accruals. In other words, Republican-
leaning firms are taking more conservative fashion in managing their earnings by taking 
income decreasing approach. In both panel A and B, column (4) of each table shows LOGDEM 
to be negative and significant with the discretionary accruals measures, which means that the 
firms contributing to the Democrats are less likely to take incomes decreasing or more 
conservative approach. Whereas, in Panel B.1. Column (3) the variable LOGREP is positively 
associated with the negative value of JONES_DA, which shows that firms contributing to the 
Republican are more conservative and choose to manage earnings more conservatively. The 
results also support the argument by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) that firms tend to minimise 
reported earnings to avoid public attention. They argue that high profits could draw public 
attention and eventually attract government intrusion. The results tend to be consistent with the 
notion that income decreasing strategy could be employed by Republican-leaning firms as they 
wish to reduce government intrusion which is also in line with Hutton et al. (2015) that claim 




Table 22 - Panel A - Political Ideologies and Discretionary Accruals using Negative Value of Discretionary Accruals (JONES_DA) 
Dependent Variables JONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons -0.1204*** (-3.12) -0.1178*** (-3.00) -0.1210*** (-3.11) -0.1151*** (-2.88) 
LOGREP 0.0022* (1.80)    0.0025* (1.92)    
LOGDEM -0.0008 (-1.05)       -0.0014* (-1.65) 
CPID    0.0094** (2.05)       
LOG_AT 0.0119*** (4.32) 0.0127*** (5.00) 0.0113*** (4.21) 0.0134*** (5.17) 
MTB -0.0013 (-1.37) -0.0013 (-1.36) -0.0013 (-1.44) -0.0013 (-1.33) 
LOGSEG -0.0051 (-0.96) -0.0047 (-0.91) -0.0050 (-0.96) -0.0043 (-0.84) 
FOREIGN 0.0056 (0.74) 0.0052 (0.71) 0.0055 (0.73) 0.0050 (0.69) 
ROA 0.0035 (0.11) 0.0032 (0.10) 0.0052 (0.17) 0.0034 (0.11) 
LEV -0.0317 (-1.26) -0.0328 (-1.32) -0.0308 (-1.22) -0.0328 (-1.33) 
RECINV 0.0153 (0.67) 0.0159 (0.70) 0.0161 (0.72) 0.0183 (0.81) 
PPE -0.1185*** (-3.22) -0.1195*** (-3.23) -0.1170*** (-3.24) -0.1178*** (-3.23) 
LOSS -0.0114 (-1.26) -0.0118 (-1.31) -0.0112 (-1.24) -0.0126 (-1.41) 
SPI -0.0027 (-0.60) -0.0025 (-0.55) -0.0029 (-0.64) -0.0025 (-0.55) 
MERGE -0.0032 (-1.26) -0.0034 (-1.40) -0.0032 (-1.27) -0.0036* (-1.66) 
ISSUE -0.0099 (-0.38) -0.0107 (-0.40) -0.0096 (-0.36) -0.0143 (-0.54) 
BIG -0.0022 (-0.21) -0.0028 (-0.28) -0.0017 (-0.17) -0.0037 (-0.35) 
INDSPEC 0.0110* (1.78) 0.0111* (1.81) 0.0105* (1.75) 0.0110* (1.77) 
YE 0.0014 (0.23) 0.0013 (0.21) 0.0013 (0.22) 0.0018 (0.30) 
LOGNAS -0.0014 (-0.68) -0.0014 (-0.68) -0.0016 (-0.75) -0.0014 (-0.69) 
N 5087   5087   5097   5091   
Adjusted R2 0.0831   0.0825   0.0827   0.0811   
F 11.6451   11.7477   11.9131   11.6345   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




Table 22 - Panel B - Political Ideologies and Discretionary Accruals using Negative Value of Discretionary Accruals (MODJONES_DA) 
Dependent Variables MODJONES_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons -0.1213*** (-3.04) -0.1194*** (-2.94) -0.1220*** (-3.01) -0.1167*** (-2.83) 
LOGREP 0.0019 (1.63)    0.0023* (1.77)    
LOGDEM -0.0009 (-1.32)       -0.0015* (-1.73) 
CPID     0.0092** (2.02)       
LOG_AT 0.0123*** (4.48) 0.0129*** (4.99) 0.0116*** (4.29) 0.0136*** (5.16) 
MTB -0.0013 (-1.30) -0.0012 (-1.30) -0.0013 (-1.36) -0.0012 (-1.28) 
LOGSEG -0.0059 (-1.08) -0.0057 (-1.06) -0.0058 (-1.07) -0.0052 (-1.00) 
FOREIGN 0.0074 (1.02) 0.0071 (0.99) 0.0072 (1.00) 0.0069 (0.98) 
ROA 0.0020 (0.06) 0.0018 (0.06) 0.0040 (0.12) 0.0018 (0.06) 
LEV -0.0338 (-1.36) -0.0346 (-1.39) -0.0330 (-1.31) -0.0346 (-1.41) 
RECINV 0.0105 (0.47) 0.0108 (0.49) 0.0117 (0.54) 0.0129 (0.59) 
PPE -0.1240*** (-3.38) -0.1249*** (-3.39) -0.1222*** (-3.39) -0.1233*** (-3.39) 
LOSS -0.0111 (-1.30) -0.0114 (-1.34) -0.0110 (-1.29) -0.0122 (-1.44) 
SPI -0.0018 (-0.53) -0.0016 (-0.47) -0.0021 (-0.60) -0.0015 (-0.45) 
MERGE -0.0026 (-1.32) -0.0026 (-1.40) -0.0026 (-1.38) -0.0029* (-1.72) 
ISSUE -0.0090 (-0.36) -0.0093 (-0.36) -0.0087 (-0.34) -0.0129 (-0.49) 
BIG 0.0011 (0.10) 0.0007 (0.07) 0.0018 (0.17) -0.0001 (-0.01) 
INDSPEC 0.0084 (1.43) 0.0085 (1.46) 0.0079 (1.38) 0.0084 (1.43) 
YE 0.0025 (0.44) 0.0023 (0.41) 0.0024 (0.42) 0.0028 (0.49) 
LOGNAS -0.0016 (-0.74) -0.0016 (-0.73) -0.0017 (-0.80) -0.0016 (-0.73) 
N 5100   5100   5111   5104   
Adjusted R2 0.0929   0.0927   0.0922   0.0914   
F 12.2181   12.3610   12.4797   12.2746   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  




7.3. Audit Report Lag 
 
I test the audit report lag/delays based on the number of days of financial year-end up 
to the audit report is signed as the dependent variable and its association with political 
ideologies. The analysis is conducted to provide evidence that auditor place more effort to 
conduct the audit for firms that leaning to a certain political ideology. The results in Table 23 
column (1) shows that variable LOGREP is positively correlated and significant with audit 
report lag and LOGDEM is negatively significant with audit report lag. These results indicate 
that firms that contribute to the Republican have lower audit report lag. On the contrary, the 
audit report lag is higher for firms that contributes to the Democrats. The results in column (3) 
and (4) show the similar findings to column (1) by exhibiting lower (higher) audit report lag 
for firms that contribute to the Republican (Democrats). In addition, the results imply that 
auditors relatively spend more time to conduct the audit for firms that contribute Democrats. 
Arguably, auditors perceive these firms as more risky and thus, auditors spend more time to 
provide reasonable assurance that the financial reports are free from material errors. 
The variable CPID in column (2) shows a significant negative relationship with audit 
report lag. This finding suggests that Republican-leaning firms have lower audit report lag 
compared to their Democrats leaning counterparts. The coefficient for the variable CPID is 
negative and significant at 1% level. The results also imply that auditors relative spend less 
time to conduct audits for Republican-leaning firms. One possible reason is that Republican is 
more conservative and provide information to satisfy the regulator's requirements which might 
affect the firm policies as stated by (Hutton et al., 2014, 2015). Thus, auditors might perceive 




Table 23. Political Ideologies and Audit Report Lag        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables REPORTLAG REPORTLAG REPORTLAG REPORTLAG 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 4.3562*** (49.47) 4.3543*** (49.44) 4.3533*** (50.03) 4.3520*** (49.25) 
LOGREP -0.0019* (-1.80)     -0.0031*** (-3.35)     
LOGDEM 0.0030*** (2.79)         0.0038*** (4.20) 
CPID     -0.0165*** (-4.61)         
LOG_AT -0.0511*** (-10.00) -0.0508*** (-9.58) -0.0496*** (-9.36) -0.0524*** (-10.15) 
MTB -0.0032*** (-3.83) -0.0031*** (-3.71) -0.0030*** (-3.52) -0.0033*** (-3.87) 
LOGSEG -0.0205*** (-3.10) -0.0205*** (-3.12) -0.0206*** (-3.12) -0.0209*** (-3.20) 
FOREIGN -0.0143 (-1.37) -0.0141 (-1.35) -0.0136 (-1.31) -0.0141 (-1.35) 
ROA -0.0624** (-2.24) -0.0632** (-2.27) -0.0653** (-2.33) -0.0624** (-2.24) 
LEV 0.0857*** (4.13) 0.0848*** (4.10) 0.0806*** (3.93) 0.0865*** (4.16) 
RECINV -0.0329 (-1.11) -0.0331 (-1.12) -0.0360 (-1.21) -0.0337 (-1.14) 
PPE -0.1015*** (-4.18) -0.1007*** (-4.15) -0.1042*** (-4.31) -0.1024*** (-4.23) 
LOSS 0.0582*** (6.31) 0.0581*** (6.30) 0.0583*** (6.33) 0.0591*** (6.36) 
SPI -0.0035 (-0.61) -0.0034 (-0.58) -0.0033 (-0.56) -0.0038 (-0.64) 
MERGE 0.0231*** (2.71) 0.0230*** (2.70) 0.0230*** (2.69) 0.0233*** (2.76) 
ISSUE 0.0315 (0.60) 0.0308 (0.59) 0.0287 (0.55) 0.0326 (0.62) 
BIG -0.0377** (-2.41) -0.0381** (-2.44) -0.0393** (-2.53) -0.0367** (-2.33) 
INDSPEC 0.0023 (0.34) 0.0024 (0.36) 0.0030 (0.45) 0.0023 (0.33) 
YE -0.0221** (-2.07) -0.0220** (-2.06) -0.0227** (-2.11) -0.0221** (-2.07) 
LOGFEES 0.0334*** (4.55) 0.0337*** (4.62) 0.0346*** (4.81) 0.0335*** (4.56) 
N 15252   15252   15279   15257   
Adjusted R2 0.1523   0.1523   0.1516   0.1520   
F 55.4684   56.7944   56.7489   56.5776   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    




7.4. Controlling for Lobbying Expenses 
Table 24 presents the results for political ideologies and audit fees, controlling for total 
lobbying expenses (SUMLOBBY). The relationship between political ideologies and audit fees 
could be influenced by unobservable factors, for instance, lobbying activities. Thus, the 
analysis in Table 20 attempts to isolate the effect of political ideologies to audit fees from the 
possible effect from other political activities such as lobbying activities. The coefficients of 
SUMLOBBY across all columns show positive and significant relationship with LOGFEES, 
signalling lobbying activities could raise agency conflict and increase business risks. 
Furthermore, the results also show that the coefficient for LOGREP (LOGDEM) is negative 
(positive) in column (1), (3) and (4). The evidence suggests that firms that contribute to the 
Republican (Democrats) are paying higher (lower) audit fees even after controlling for 
lobbying expenditures. The results are statistically more significant for column (2) which 
suggest that Republican-leaning firms are associated with higher audit fees compared to their 
Democrats leaning counterparts after controlling for lobbying. Overall, the results propose that 
the effect of political ideologies to audit fees are is not influenced by firms decision to involve 
in lobbying activities. The result still supports hypothesis 1 and qualitatively remain unchanged 







Table 24. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Controlling for Lobbying    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 7.5132*** (11.82) 7.5165*** (11.72) 7.2478*** (11.51) 7.5303*** (11.82) 
LOGREP -0.0051 (-1.31)     -0.0068* (-1.93)    
LOGDEM 0.0078** (2.30)         0.0089*** (2.87) 
CPID     -0.0385*** (-3.01)        
SUMLOBBY 0.0105*** (3.47) 0.0108*** (3.48) 0.0116*** (3.68) 0.0100*** (3.31) 
LOG_AT 0.3959*** (29.66) 0.3970*** (30.83) 0.4003*** (30.33) 0.3934*** (30.22) 
MTB 0.0055* (1.78) 0.0057* (1.83) 0.0062** (1.99) 0.0053* (1.70) 
LOGSEG 0.1154*** (5.78) 0.1151*** (5.78) 0.1144*** (5.76) 0.1131*** (5.64) 
FOREIGN 0.2790*** (7.69) 0.2795*** (7.70) 0.2815*** (7.73) 0.2788*** (7.71) 
ROA -0.1458 (-1.39) -0.1468 (-1.39) -0.1498 (-1.41) -0.1474 (-1.40) 
LEV 0.3862*** (3.79) 0.3799*** (3.78) 0.3616*** (3.61) 0.3900*** (3.84) 
RECINV 0.1285 (0.74) 0.1313 (0.75) 0.1219 (0.70) 0.1276 (0.74) 
PPE -0.5029*** (-6.04) -0.5004*** (-6.03) -0.5137*** (-6.19) -0.5074*** (-6.09) 
LOSS 0.0444 (1.09) 0.0458 (1.12) 0.0476 (1.16) 0.0468 (1.14) 
SPI -0.0119 (-0.61) -0.0119 (-0.62) -0.0097 (-0.49) -0.0120 (-0.61) 
MERGE 0.0175 (0.70) 0.0176 (0.70) 0.0169 (0.65) 0.0177 (0.71) 
ISSUE 0.2034*** (2.96) 0.2032*** (2.94) 0.2002*** (2.89) 0.2048*** (2.96) 
BIG 0.0341 (1.23) 0.0347 (1.26) 0.0377 (1.38) 0.0347 (1.25) 
INDSPEC 0.1476** (2.21) 0.1480** (2.21) 0.1479** (2.21) 0.1478** (2.22) 
YE 0.1360*** (8.55) 0.1363*** (8.54) 0.1374*** (8.57) 0.1363*** (8.56) 
LOGNAS 0.3559 (0.61) 0.3503 (0.60) 0.3395 (0.58) 0.3331 (0.57) 
N 4361   4361   4367   4364   
Adjusted R2 0.8406   0.8405   0.8399   0.8406   
F 597.4197   610.9453   609.2669   612.4814   






***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.  








7.5. Controlling for Discretionary Accruals 
I control for discretionary accruals to examine whether the relationship between 
political ideology and audit fees is influenced by discretionary accruals as the measure of 
earnings management. I use Jones (1991) and Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models as 
proxies for discretionary accruals.  
Table 25 shows the results on the association between political ideologies and audit 
fees, controlling for discretionary accruals as the measure for earnings management. Frankel 
et al., (2002) find that audit fee is negatively correlated with earnings management. Eshleman 
and Guo (2014) also suggest that management has the incentives to produce higher quality 
earnings under the scrutiny of higher quality auditor. In other words, higher fees paid induce 
management to put more effort to reduce earnings management. This evidence could imply 
that earnings management could also influence audit fees. Thus, Table 24 exhibits the results 
of the main tests, controlling for earnings management indicated by JONES_DA and 
MODJONES_DA. The results on Panel A and B show consistent findings with the main results 
of political ideologies and audit fees. Firms that contributes to the Republicans (Democrats) 
are associated with lower (higher) audit fees. The coefficients for variable CPID are negative 
and significant implying that firms that are leaning towards the Republican are paying lower 
audit fees in both models. The coefficient for JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA show a 
significant negative relationship with audit fees, consistent with Eshleman and Guo, 2014 and 







Table 25. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Controlling for Discretionary Accruals     
Panel A. JONES_DA           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 8.8373*** (55.73) 8.8417*** (55.56) 8.8549*** (55.47) 8.8319*** (55.44) 
LOGREP -0.0046* (-1.72)     -0.0077*** (-3.18)    
LOGDEM 0.0100*** (3.63)         0.0115*** (4.48) 
CPID     -0.0473*** (-4.55)        
JONES_DA -0.1428*** (-2.64) -0.1446*** (-2.67) -0.1444*** (-2.64) -0.1388** (-2.57) 
LOG_AT 0.4289*** (39.47) 0.4317*** (42.80) 0.4365*** (42.04) 0.4259*** (40.79) 
MTB -0.0014 (-0.57) -0.0012 (-0.46) -0.0007 (-0.29) -0.0015 (-0.59) 
LOGSEG 0.1009*** (7.06) 0.1010*** (7.05) 0.0996*** (6.97) 0.0995*** (6.89) 
FOREIGN 0.2866*** (10.17) 0.2872*** (10.20) 0.2873*** (10.24) 0.2879*** (10.23) 
ROA -0.2806*** (-4.65) -0.2850*** (-4.74) -0.2928*** (-4.86) -0.2816*** (-4.63) 
LEV 0.4202*** (6.24) 0.4161*** (6.21) 0.4049*** (6.08) 0.4197*** (6.21) 
RECINV 0.4108*** (4.74) 0.4079*** (4.68) 0.3941*** (4.51) 0.4076*** (4.70) 
PPE -0.5383*** (-7.96) -0.5392*** (-7.98) -0.5549*** (-8.26) -0.5392*** (-7.98) 
LOSS 0.0993*** (4.13) 0.0987*** (4.11) 0.0995*** (4.16) 0.1012*** (4.11) 
SPI 0.0296* (1.74) 0.0307* (1.84) 0.0325** (2.03) 0.0288* (1.69) 
MERGE 0.0122 (0.62) 0.0118 (0.60) 0.0123 (0.61) 0.0125 (0.64) 
ISSUE 0.0714 (0.56) 0.0674 (0.53) 0.0668 (0.53) 0.0735 (0.56) 
BIG 0.2595*** (7.21) 0.2576*** (7.15) 0.2536*** (7.01) 0.2627*** (7.19) 
INDSPEC 0.0568*** (2.76) 0.0582*** (2.82) 0.0603*** (2.89) 0.0566*** (2.74) 
YE 0.1424*** (2.60) 0.1433*** (2.61) 0.1422*** (2.59) 0.1421*** (2.60) 
LOGNAS 0.1071*** (10.25) 0.1073*** (10.24) 0.1081*** (10.28) 0.1072*** (10.22) 
N 8291   8291   8309   8295   
Adjusted R2 0.8555   0.8554   0.8551   0.8554   






p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    








Panel B. MODJONES_DA          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 8.8250*** (55.26) 8.8295*** (55.10) 8.8427*** (55.05) 8.8201*** (55.00) 
LOGREP -0.0045* (-1.68)     -0.0076*** (-3.14)    
LOGDEM 0.0100*** (3.64)         0.0115*** (4.47) 
CPID     -0.0469*** (-4.50)        
MODJONES_DA -0.0683** (-2.58) -0.0685** (-2.55) -0.0691** (-2.56) -0.0670** (-2.57) 
LOG_AT 0.4301*** (39.46) 0.4330*** (42.80) 0.4378*** (41.99) 0.4272*** (40.82) 
MTB -0.0015 (-0.60) -0.0012 (-0.49) -0.0008 (-0.31) -0.0015 (-0.62) 
LOGSEG 0.1007*** (7.06) 0.1008*** (7.06) 0.0994*** (6.98) 0.0993*** (6.90) 
FOREIGN 0.2886*** (10.28) 0.2892*** (10.30) 0.2893*** (10.36) 0.2898*** (10.33) 
ROA -0.2861*** (-4.72) -0.2907*** (-4.81) -0.2986*** (-4.93) -0.2870*** (-4.69) 
LEV 0.4102*** (6.12) 0.4058*** (6.09) 0.3947*** (5.95) 0.4100*** (6.09) 
RECINV 0.4224*** (4.84) 0.4195*** (4.79) 0.4055*** (4.61) 0.4190*** (4.81) 
PPE -0.5402*** (-8.03) -0.5412*** (-8.05) -0.5569*** (-8.33) -0.5408*** (-8.04) 
LOSS 0.0972*** (3.98) 0.0966*** (3.95) 0.0974*** (4.00) 0.0991*** (3.96) 
SPI 0.0288* (1.71) 0.0300* (1.81) 0.0318** (2.00) 0.0279* (1.66) 
MERGE 0.0097 (0.50) 0.0093 (0.47) 0.0098 (0.49) 0.0101 (0.53) 
ISSUE 0.0691 (0.54) 0.0651 (0.51) 0.0646 (0.51) 0.0713 (0.54) 
BIG 0.2613*** (7.23) 0.2593*** (7.17) 0.2552*** (7.02) 0.2644*** (7.20) 
INDSPEC 0.0565*** (2.73) 0.0580*** (2.79) 0.0601*** (2.87) 0.0563*** (2.72) 
YE 0.1432*** (2.62) 0.1440*** (2.63) 0.1429*** (2.61) 0.1429*** (2.62) 
LOGNAS 0.1067*** (10.25) 0.1070*** (10.25) 0.1078*** (10.29) 0.1069*** (10.24) 
N 8285   8285   8303   8289   
Adjusted R2 0.8555   0.8553   0.8551   0.8554   
F 1126.0589   1144.0580   1136.7464   1154.7880   






***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






7.6. Controlling for Accounting Conservatism 
Table 26 shows the results on political ideologies and audit fees relationship, 
controlling for accounting conservatism. This study controls for conservatism using 
conservatism score (C_SCORE) used in the previous analysis of the relationship between 
political ideologies and conservatism. Gul et al. (2002) find that accounting conservatism could 
have an impact on audit effort and consequently audit pricing. Thus, I control for accounting 
conservatism to the political ideologies and audit fees relationship. Column (1) the variable 
LOGDEM shows positive and marginally significant relationship with audit fees, consistent 
with the main analyses. Firms contributing to the Democrats are also paying higher audit fees 
and Republican-leaning firms are significantly paying lower audit fees. The variable CPID also 
shows negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that Republican-leaning firms are still 
associated with lower audit fees after controlling for conservatism attributes. The results 
indicate the results qualitatively unchanged with the main analysis which also means that the 
relationship between political ideologies and audit fees are not necessarily influenced by 
conservatism. However, the results show no significant correlation between accounting 







Table 26. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Controlling for Conservatism      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0255*** (61.78) 9.0344*** (61.89) 9.0458*** (61.68) 9.0227*** (61.69) 
LOGREP -0.0016 (-0.71)     -0.0061*** (-3.37)    
LOGDEM 0.0113*** (4.57)         0.0120*** (5.91) 
CPID     -0.0406*** (-6.18)        
C_SCORE -0.0000 (-0.17) -0.0000 (-0.14) -0.0000 (-0.17) -0.0000 (-0.17) 
LOG_AT 0.4039*** (37.62) 0.4085*** (40.92) 0.4118*** (40.19) 0.4030*** (39.55) 
MTB 0.0009 (0.45) 0.0013 (0.67) 0.0018 (0.89) 0.0009 (0.44) 
LOGSEG 0.1019*** (8.03) 0.1024*** (8.08) 0.1011*** (7.97) 0.1015*** (7.96) 
FOREIGN 0.2964*** (12.24) 0.2975*** (12.30) 0.2984*** (12.38) 0.2966*** (12.26) 
ROA -0.1907*** (-3.32) -0.1956*** (-3.43) -0.2012*** (-3.53) -0.1914*** (-3.32) 
LEV 0.2893*** (4.48) 0.2805*** (4.39) 0.2710*** (4.25) 0.2891*** (4.50) 
RECINV 0.1291* (1.86) 0.1265* (1.82) 0.1165* (1.68) 0.1290* (1.86) 
PPE -0.4379*** (-7.93) -0.4387*** (-7.95) -0.4498*** (-8.27) -0.4377*** (-7.94) 
LOSS 0.0999*** (5.09) 0.0991*** (5.05) 0.1008*** (5.16) 0.1003*** (5.03) 
SPI 0.0227* (1.65) 0.0236* (1.75) 0.0245* (1.82) 0.0225 (1.64) 
MERGE 0.0363** (1.99) 0.0356* (1.92) 0.0356* (1.88) 0.0364** (2.00) 
ISSUE 0.1325 (1.38) 0.1292 (1.35) 0.1282 (1.31) 0.1330 (1.38) 
BIG 0.2996*** (8.44) 0.2966*** (8.34) 0.2940*** (8.22) 0.3009*** (8.38) 
INDSPEC 0.0803*** (4.78) 0.0818*** (4.87) 0.0830*** (4.87) 0.0802*** (4.77) 
YE 0.1317*** (2.94) 0.1316*** (2.92) 0.1304*** (2.89) 0.1318*** (2.94) 
LOGNAS 0.1145*** (10.68) 0.1151*** (10.70) 0.1159*** (10.78) 0.1145*** (10.66) 
N 14096   14096   14121   14101   
Adjusted R2 0.8487   0.8484   0.8482   0.8487   
F 1955.9603   1981.6533   1977.4759   2000.6706   






***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.     






7.7. Controlling for Corporate Governance Variables 
Table 27 shows the results of the relationship between political ideologies and audit 
fees, including corporate governance variables as control variables. Prior research finds that 
board independence (Carcello et al., 2002; Knechel & Willekens, 2006) and female board 
members (Lai et al., 2017) demand differentially higher audit effort which thereupon increases 
audit fees. Audit fees are higher for firms with multiple stakeholders with their individual risks 
profiles because it increases monitoring costs (Knechel & Willekens, 2006). A more diverse 
board member is also used as a corporate governance mechanism and to promote greater 
monitoring function, and incite higher earnings quality (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et 
al., 2011). Gul et al. (2011) find that female board is associated with the improvements of 
information environment and oversight which could potentially reduce audit fees. Furthermore, 
Lai et al. (2017) complement Gul et al. (2011) and Srinidhi et al. (2011) by showing that female 
board members are associated with higher likelihood to employ specialist auditors and paying 
higher audit fees.  
Thus, board characteristics should affect the determination of audit fees. Thus, this 
paper control for corporate governance indicators such as FEMALEBOARD and INDBOARD. 
FEMALEBOARD is the female board member ratio in the board and INDBOARD is the ratio 
of independent board members over the total number of board members. Furthermore, 
Republican-leaning firms are negative and significantly associated with lower audit fees shown 
by the negative coefficient of the CPID variable in column (2). Firms that contributed to the 
Democrats are associated with higher audit fees which are consistent with the main results 
(column (1)). Corporate governance variables FEMALEBOARD and INDBOARD are 






that suggests more diverse board demand more audit efforts to promote greater monitoring and 








Table 27. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Controlling for Corporate Governance Variables    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0292*** (29.04) 9.0357*** (30.48) 9.0386*** (31.57) 9.0302*** (28.70) 
LOGREP -0.0023 (-0.93)     -0.0053** (-2.29)    
LOGDEM 0.0104*** (3.42)         0.0111*** (3.93) 
CPID     -0.0369*** (-3.82)        
INDBOARD 0.3708*** (3.91) 0.3678*** (3.86) 0.3606*** (3.75) 0.3735*** (3.90) 
FEMALEBOARD 0.4652*** (3.87) 0.4754*** (3.95) 0.4929*** (4.10) 0.4664*** (3.88) 
LOG_AT 0.4059*** (30.42) 0.4114*** (32.39) 0.4155*** (32.95) 0.4040*** (30.78) 
MTB -0.0029 (-0.88) -0.0024 (-0.74) -0.0020 (-0.61) -0.0030 (-0.90) 
LOGSEG 0.1278*** (7.65) 0.1282*** (7.67) 0.1269*** (7.60) 0.1270*** (7.57) 
FOREIGN 0.3225*** (9.75) 0.3233*** (9.74) 0.3244*** (9.77) 0.3228*** (9.74) 
ROA -0.2475** (-2.12) -0.2507** (-2.14) -0.2548** (-2.17) -0.2512** (-2.15) 
LEV 0.3250*** (3.61) 0.3125*** (3.46) 0.3008*** (3.35) 0.3272*** (3.64) 
RECINV 0.1832* (1.79) 0.1782* (1.74) 0.1622 (1.59) 0.1820* (1.77) 
PPE -0.5086*** (-6.50) -0.5082*** (-6.50) -0.5200*** (-6.73) -0.5124*** (-6.53) 
LOSS 0.0559* (1.82) 0.0570* (1.86) 0.0583* (1.89) 0.0558* (1.82) 
SPI -0.0033 (-0.24) -0.0023 (-0.17) -0.0013 (-0.10) -0.0036 (-0.26) 
MERGE 0.0082 (0.31) 0.0080 (0.29) 0.0078 (0.28) 0.0080 (0.30) 
ISSUE -0.1451 (-0.60) -0.1581 (-0.71) -0.1542 (-0.73) -0.1441 (-0.59) 
BIG 0.0631 (1.08) 0.0593 (1.01) 0.0545 (0.91) 0.0627 (1.07) 
INDSPEC 0.0510** (2.42) 0.0523** (2.46) 0.0545** (2.55) 0.0510** (2.42) 
YE 0.1460** (2.56) 0.1464** (2.56) 0.1455** (2.54) 0.1455** (2.56) 
LOGNAS 0.1163*** (7.98) 0.1168*** (8.04) 0.1176*** (8.05) 0.1163*** (7.98) 
N 7506   7506   7517   7509   
Adjusted R2 0.8290   0.8286   0.8281   0.8290   






p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






7.8. Controlling for Political Indicators 
 Cooper et al. (2010) simulate multiple political indexes to measure the strength of 
political ties using political contribution variable. In the paper, they employ four different 
measures of political indexes which include the strength, ability and power of the political 
connection. This paper utilises two similar approaches to Cooper et al. (2010) to measure the 
strength of political ties through political connections. First, instead of using the candidates 
that a company contributes to, this study uses PIPARTY variable to measure how a firm 
subscribes a particular party ideology in the past five years. By using this method, I can analyse 
how firms incorporate the political party’s ideology in the past years. Second, this study uses 
PIHOME which is the proxy of the ability of candidates provides favours to the donors in the 
same state. Cooper et al. (2010) use this method because they argue that a candidate is more 
likely to be able to support a firm in the same state as the candidate.   
The results show that Democrat-leaning party are associated with higher audit fees in 
Panel A and Panel B column (1) and (4) when controlling PIPARTY, PIHOME and both. The 
results do not show a significant association between the contribution to the Republicans and 
audit fees, except when controlling for PIHOME in Panel B column (2). Total contribution 
show positive and significant results in Panel A (p-value<0.05), Panel B (p-value<0.1) and 
Panel C (p-value<0.05). The main variable CPID remain qualitatively unchanged when 
controlling for PIPARTY, PIHOME and both with the main results which show a negative 
relationship with LOGFEES. The coefficient for PIPARTY and PIHOME show a negative 
relationship with audit fees, signalling that the stronger political ties between firms and political 
party, the audit fees are lower. This finding is consistent with Cooper et al. (2010) paper which 






firm value could indicate a better future performance which in turn could lower business risks 







Table 28. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Controlling for Political Indexes developed by Cooper et al. (2010)  
Panel A. PIPARTY           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0597*** (61.73) 9.0732*** (62.03) 9.0895*** (62.25) 9.0593*** (61.69) 
LOGREP -0.0000 (-0.01)     -0.0023 (-1.17)    
LOGDEM 0.0089*** (3.51)         0.0089*** (4.05) 
CPID     -0.0244*** (-3.37)        
PIPARTY -0.0500*** (-3.06) -0.0574*** (-3.30) -0.0748*** (-4.50) -0.0503*** (-3.00) 
LOG_AT 0.4031*** (37.59) 0.4070*** (40.88) 0.4080*** (39.60) 0.4031*** (39.73) 
MTB 0.0008 (0.41) 0.0012 (0.60) 0.0014 (0.69) 0.0009 (0.42) 
LOGSEG 0.1027*** (8.12) 0.1031*** (8.17) 0.1022*** (8.10) 0.1027*** (8.11) 
FOREIGN 0.2973*** (12.20) 0.2982*** (12.25) 0.2986*** (12.31) 0.2974*** (12.21) 
ROA -0.1899*** (-3.35) -0.1940*** (-3.44) -0.1964*** (-3.48) -0.1906*** (-3.35) 
LEV 0.2902*** (4.50) 0.2825*** (4.43) 0.2786*** (4.37) 0.2891*** (4.50) 
RECINV 0.1298* (1.89) 0.1274* (1.85) 0.1211* (1.77) 0.1304* (1.89) 
PPE -0.4388*** (-7.95) -0.4406*** (-8.00) -0.4468*** (-8.18) -0.4377*** (-7.94) 
LOSS 0.1005*** (5.17) 0.0998*** (5.15) 0.1012*** (5.25) 0.1001*** (5.08) 
SPI 0.0228* (1.65) 0.0238* (1.75) 0.0242* (1.79) 0.0228* (1.66) 
MERGE 0.0356* (1.93) 0.0349* (1.88) 0.0348* (1.85) 0.0356* (1.94) 
ISSUES 0.1295 (1.37) 0.1262 (1.34) 0.1251 (1.32) 0.1292 (1.37) 
BIG 0.2991*** (8.42) 0.2962*** (8.33) 0.2946*** (8.26) 0.2997*** (8.38) 
INDSPEC 0.0790*** (4.70) 0.0802*** (4.77) 0.0803*** (4.73) 0.0789*** (4.70) 
YE 0.1309*** (2.92) 0.1305*** (2.90) 0.1297*** (2.87) 0.1308*** (2.92) 
LOGNAS 0.1142*** (10.59) 0.1147*** (10.62) 0.1151*** (10.65) 0.1142*** (10.58) 
N 14112   14112   14137   14117   
Adjusted R2 0.8489   0.8487   0.8487   0.8489   






p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






Panel B. PIHOME           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0302*** (62.17) 9.0393*** (62.30) 9.0505*** (62.07) 9.0276*** (62.11) 
LOGREP -0.0015 (-0.67)     -0.0060*** (-3.32)    
LOGDEM 0.0114*** (4.58)         0.0120*** (5.90) 
CPID     -0.0405*** (-6.15)        
PIHOME -0.4221*** (-3.47) -0.4304*** (-3.45) -0.4545*** (-3.42) -0.4239*** (-3.47) 
LOG_AT 0.4039*** (37.64) 0.4085*** (41.01) 0.4118*** (40.30) 0.4030*** (39.61) 
MTB 0.0009 (0.45) 0.0013 (0.67) 0.0018 (0.89) 0.0009 (0.44) 
LOGSEG 0.1028*** (8.20) 0.1033*** (8.25) 0.1021*** (8.16) 0.1024*** (8.13) 
FOREIGN 0.2971*** (12.23) 0.2982*** (12.29) 0.2990*** (12.37) 0.2972*** (12.24) 
ROA -0.1906*** (-3.33) -0.1955*** (-3.45) -0.2013*** (-3.55) -0.1913*** (-3.34) 
LEV 0.2889*** (4.48) 0.2802*** (4.38) 0.2708*** (4.25) 0.2887*** (4.50) 
RECINV 0.1286* (1.86) 0.1260* (1.82) 0.1159* (1.68) 0.1285* (1.86) 
PPE -0.4385*** (-7.95) -0.4393*** (-7.97) -0.4504*** (-8.28) -0.4383*** (-7.96) 
LOSS 0.1001*** (5.10) 0.0992*** (5.05) 0.1009*** (5.16) 0.1004*** (5.04) 
SPI 0.0218 (1.59) 0.0228* (1.69) 0.0235* (1.75) 0.0216 (1.58) 
MERGE 0.0362** (1.97) 0.0355* (1.91) 0.0355* (1.87) 0.0363** (1.99) 
ISSUES 0.1328 (1.38) 0.1294 (1.36) 0.1285 (1.32) 0.1332 (1.38) 
BIG 0.3006*** (8.33) 0.2975*** (8.24) 0.2950*** (8.11) 0.3018*** (8.28) 
INDSPEC 0.0793*** (4.76) 0.0809*** (4.85) 0.0821*** (4.88) 0.0792*** (4.75) 
YE 0.1315*** (2.95) 0.1313*** (2.94) 0.1302*** (2.91) 0.1315*** (2.96) 
LOGNAS 0.1141*** (10.67) 0.1146*** (10.70) 0.1155*** (10.77) 0.1141*** (10.65) 
N 14104   14104   14129   14109   
Adjusted R2 0.8488   0.8486   0.8484   0.8489   
F 1956.5213   1982.0828   1977.5666   2001.2907   






***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






Panel C. PIPARTY & PIHOME         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0609*** (62.27) 9.0744*** (62.57) 9.0908*** (62.78) 9.0605*** (62.24) 
LOGREP 0.0001 (0.04)     -0.0022 (-1.11)    
LOGDEM 0.0090*** (3.54)         0.0090*** (4.06) 
CPID     -0.0246*** (-3.39)        
PIPARTY -0.0490*** (-2.99) -0.0562*** (-3.23) -0.0739*** (-4.46) -0.0490*** (-2.92) 
PIHOME -0.4197*** (-3.40) -0.4246*** (-3.36) -0.4473*** (-3.37) -0.4196*** (-3.39) 
LOG_AT 0.4031*** (37.66) 0.4072*** (40.99) 0.4080*** (39.72) 0.4032*** (39.80) 
MTB 0.0008 (0.40) 0.0012 (0.60) 0.0013 (0.68) 0.0008 (0.41) 
LOGSEG 0.1031*** (8.25) 0.1036*** (8.30) 0.1028*** (8.24) 0.1032*** (8.24) 
FOREIGN 0.2970*** (12.21) 0.2979*** (12.26) 0.2982*** (12.31) 0.2970*** (12.22) 
ROA -0.1895*** (-3.33) -0.1937*** (-3.43) -0.1962*** (-3.48) -0.1903*** (-3.34) 
LEV 0.2903*** (4.51) 0.2825*** (4.44) 0.2787*** (4.39) 0.2892*** (4.52) 
RECINV 0.1302* (1.89) 0.1279* (1.86) 0.1216* (1.78) 0.1309* (1.90) 
PPE -0.4387*** (-7.94) -0.4404*** (-7.98) -0.4467*** (-8.16) -0.4375*** (-7.92) 
LOSS 0.1002*** (5.14) 0.0994*** (5.12) 0.1008*** (5.21) 0.0998*** (5.05) 
SPI 0.0222 (1.61) 0.0232* (1.71) 0.0235* (1.74) 0.0222 (1.62) 
MERGE 0.0355* (1.93) 0.0349* (1.87) 0.0347* (1.85) 0.0355* (1.94) 
ISSUES 0.1296 (1.37) 0.1263 (1.34) 0.1252 (1.32) 0.1293 (1.36) 
BIG 0.2995*** (8.36) 0.2965*** (8.27) 0.2949*** (8.20) 0.3000*** (8.31) 
INDSPEC 0.0788*** (4.71) 0.0801*** (4.79) 0.0803*** (4.76) 0.0787*** (4.71) 
YE 0.1310*** (2.94) 0.1305*** (2.92) 0.1299*** (2.89) 0.1309*** (2.93) 
LOGNAS 0.1140*** (10.63) 0.1145*** (10.66) 0.1150*** (10.70) 0.1140*** (10.62) 
N 14104   14104   14129   14109   
Adjusted R2 0.8490   0.8488   0.8489   0.8491   






p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






7.9. Interactions between Political Ideology and Political Indicators 
Table 29 exhibits the results on the relationship between political ideologies-political 
indexes and audit fees. This study uses the interaction between political indicators variables 
and political ideologies measures to identify the possibility of firms induce more strongly the 
political ideology of a certain party.  The results in Panel A show that firms contributing to the 
Republican negatively correlated with audit fees (p-value<0.1) in column (1) and (3).   The 
coefficient for variable CPID shows a negative and significant relationship with audit fee (p-
value<0.05), implying that political orientation and the strength of political ties does influence 
the relationship between political ideology and audit fees. However, the results show that when 
interacting contributions to the Democrats and political indicators, there is no significant 
relationship with audit fee in Panel A and B. This could be implying that the strength of political 
ties could weaken the relationship between a firm that contributes to the Democrats and audit 
fees.  Overall,  the strength of political ties should improve firm financial performance as 
suggested by  (Cooper et al., 2010). Furthermore, there is no association between the interaction 
between political ideologies measures, and political indexes could affect audit fee in Panel B. 
This show that political ties based on the local state candidate that firm support weakens the 
effect of political ideologies to audit fee. The evidence also indicates that PIPARTY is more 






Table 29. Political Indicators Interactions with Political Ideologies      
Panel A. PIPARTY           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0608*** (60.95) 9.0861*** (61.59) 9.0839*** (62.36) 9.0687*** (60.89) 
PIPARTYXLOGREP -0.0105* (-1.70)     -0.0099* (-1.71)    
PIPARTYXLOGDEM 0.0026 (0.62)         0.0035 (0.87) 
PIPARTYXCPID     -0.0523** (-2.27)        
LOGREP 0.0011 (0.47)     -0.0011 (-0.55)    
LOGDEM 0.0080*** (2.75)         0.0077*** (3.14) 
CPID     -0.0157** (-2.31)        
PIPARTY 0.0122 (0.28) -0.0277 (-1.24) -0.0084 (-0.23) -0.0618*** (-2.90) 
LOG_AT 0.4028*** (37.91) 0.4056*** (40.99) 0.4079*** (39.72) 0.4028*** (39.96) 
MTB 0.0008 (0.41) 0.0011 (0.56) 0.0014 (0.69) 0.0008 (0.42) 
LOGSEG 0.1024*** (8.08) 0.1028*** (8.12) 0.1020*** (8.06) 0.1027*** (8.10) 
FOREIGN 0.2968*** (12.16) 0.2974*** (12.17) 0.2982*** (12.31) 0.2971*** (12.17) 
ROA -0.1902*** (-3.34) -0.1927*** (-3.40) -0.1968*** (-3.48) -0.1905*** (-3.34) 
LEV 0.2896*** (4.52) 0.2847*** (4.49) 0.2779*** (4.38) 0.2895*** (4.53) 
RECINV 0.1323* (1.93) 0.1302* (1.89) 0.1230* (1.80) 0.1309* (1.90) 
PPE -0.4375*** (-7.92) -0.4380*** (-7.95) -0.4458*** (-8.16) -0.4374*** (-7.94) 
LOSS 0.1000*** (5.14) 0.0997*** (5.11) 0.1009*** (5.22) 0.1000*** (5.08) 
SPI 0.0223 (1.61) 0.0231* (1.70) 0.0238* (1.76) 0.0226* (1.65) 
MERGE 0.0352* (1.92) 0.0352* (1.90) 0.0343* (1.82) 0.0359* (1.96) 
ISSUES 0.1273 (1.33) 0.1229 (1.31) 0.1241 (1.30) 0.1274 (1.35) 
BIG 0.2997*** (8.45) 0.2971*** (8.35) 0.2951*** (8.27) 0.2995*** (8.39) 
INDSPEC 0.0786*** (4.68) 0.0793*** (4.73) 0.0800*** (4.71) 0.0789*** (4.70) 
YE 0.1315*** (2.94) 0.1319*** (2.95) 0.1300*** (2.88) 0.1312*** (2.93) 






N 14112   14112   14137   14117   
Adjusted R2 0.8489   0.8488   0.8487   0.8489   
F 1875.1783   1941.8860   1944.9867   1958.8726   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






Panel B. PIHOME           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 9.0308*** (62.24) 9.0394*** (62.33) 9.0504*** (62.06) 9.0281*** (62.18) 
PIHOMEXLOGREP 0.0169 (0.79)     -0.0180 (-0.79)    
PIHOMEXLOGDEM 0.0363 (1.14)         0.0291 (1.05) 
PIHOMEXCPID     -0.0473 (-0.45)        
LOGREP -0.0016 (-0.68)     -0.0060*** (-3.31)    
LOGDEM 0.0113*** (4.56)         0.0120*** (5.88) 
CPID     -0.0405*** (-6.18)        
PIHOME -0.6490** (-2.45) -0.4075*** (-4.69) -0.3183** (-2.22) -0.5045*** (-2.99) 
LOG_AT 0.4040*** (37.64) 0.4085*** (41.01) 0.4118*** (40.29) 0.4031*** (39.60) 
MTB 0.0009 (0.45) 0.0013 (0.67) 0.0018 (0.88) 0.0009 (0.44) 
LOGSEG 0.1027*** (8.19) 0.1033*** (8.25) 0.1021*** (8.16) 0.1024*** (8.13) 
FOREIGN 0.2971*** (12.23) 0.2982*** (12.29) 0.2990*** (12.36) 0.2972*** (12.24) 
ROA -0.1907*** (-3.33) -0.1956*** (-3.44) -0.2014*** (-3.55) -0.1915*** (-3.33) 
LEV 0.2887*** (4.47) 0.2801*** (4.38) 0.2708*** (4.24) 0.2886*** (4.50) 
RECINV 0.1287* (1.86) 0.1259* (1.82) 0.1157* (1.67) 0.1285* (1.86) 
PPE -0.4386*** (-7.97) -0.4393*** (-7.97) -0.4505*** (-8.28) -0.4384*** (-7.97) 
LOSS 0.1001*** (5.09) 0.0992*** (5.05) 0.1008*** (5.16) 0.1004*** (5.04) 
SPI 0.0219 (1.60) 0.0228* (1.69) 0.0234* (1.75) 0.0216 (1.58) 
MERGE 0.0360* (1.95) 0.0355* (1.91) 0.0355* (1.87) 0.0361** (1.98) 
ISSUES 0.1328 (1.38) 0.1294 (1.35) 0.1285 (1.32) 0.1332 (1.38) 
BIG 0.3005*** (8.32) 0.2974*** (8.24) 0.2949*** (8.11) 0.3017*** (8.27) 
INDSPEC 0.0794*** (4.76) 0.0808*** (4.85) 0.0821*** (4.87) 0.0792*** (4.75) 
YE 0.1315*** (2.96) 0.1314*** (2.94) 0.1303*** (2.91) 0.1316*** (2.96) 
LOGNAS 0.1141*** (10.67) 0.1146*** (10.70) 0.1155*** (10.77) 0.1141*** (10.65) 






Adjusted R2 0.8488   0.8486   0.8484   0.8489   
F 1869.9162   1935.9779   1931.7786   1954.8943   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
***, ** and *, respectively, refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two tails.    






7.10. Excluding Extreme Republican and Extreme Democrat Observations 
I also examine the possibility of firms consist of employees that contribute to both 
Republican and Democrat in the same year (i.e. firms not only contribute to either one of the 
two parties). There is a concern that a firm could contribute to both parties because employees 
have different political agendas or merely to build political connections with the politicians and 
support whoever that might sit in the government. Furthermore, according to Goldman et al. 
(2009), “the majority of the sample companies donate to both parties, implying that hedging 
considerations are one important determinant of their donations” (p. 2345). Firms could 
contribute to both parties as a hedging strategy. Therefore, I test whether or not the results are 
driven by extreme Republican firms (CPID = +1) or extreme Democrat firms (CPID= -1) to 
examine the effect of political orientation to audit fee. I exclude those extreme Republican and 
extreme Democrat observations. I find that the results remain unchanged with LOGDEM is 
positively associated with LOGFEES after controlling for LOGREP in column (1). The results 






Table 30. Political Ideologies and Audit Fees Excluding Extreme Democrat and Extreme Republican Observations  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES LOGFEES 
  Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
_cons 8.4237*** (45.97) 8.5417*** (48.16) 8.5132*** (51.05) 8.4394*** (46.51) 
LOGREP 0.0057 (0.85)    0.0074 (1.15)    
LOGDEM 0.0148** (2.24)       0.0166** (2.42) 
CPID    -0.0142 (-0.83)       
LOG_AT 0.4000*** (29.62) 0.4056*** (30.48) 0.4042*** (29.79) 0.4013*** (30.19) 
MTB -0.0006 (-0.17) 0.0000 (0.01) -0.0000 (-0.01) -0.0005 (-0.13) 
LOGSEG 0.1343*** (7.33) 0.1352*** (7.41) 0.1327*** (7.30) 0.1350*** (7.39) 
FOREIGN 0.3032*** (8.43) 0.3008*** (8.30) 0.3017*** (8.41) 0.3027*** (8.44) 
ROA -0.1423 (-1.32) -0.1421 (-1.30) -0.1388 (-1.28) -0.1486 (-1.35) 
LEV 0.3428*** (4.11) 0.3269*** (3.86) 0.3318*** (3.98) 0.3360*** (3.97) 
RECINV 0.1238 (1.06) 0.1252 (1.07) 0.1078 (0.94) 0.1291 (1.10) 
PPE -0.5276*** (-6.19) -0.5277*** (-6.15) -0.5366*** (-6.40) -0.5177*** (-6.07) 
LOSS 0.0899*** (4.11) 0.0887*** (3.98) 0.0935*** (4.31) 0.0866*** (3.81) 
SPI -0.0225 (-1.08) -0.0196 (-0.94) -0.0204 (-0.98) -0.0220 (-1.05) 
MERGE 0.0149 (0.58) 0.0151 (0.58) 0.0147 (0.56) 0.0151 (0.59) 
ISSUES 0.5467*** (4.71) 0.5215*** (4.46) 0.5203*** (4.75) 0.5413*** (4.55) 
BIG 0.1836*** (3.05) 0.1757*** (2.91) 0.1765*** (2.91) 0.1868*** (3.06) 
INDSPEC 0.0558** (2.15) 0.0571** (2.20) 0.0552** (2.12) 0.0560** (2.17) 
YE 0.1533*** (2.90) 0.1542*** (2.92) 0.1534*** (2.89) 0.1539*** (2.92) 
LOGNAS 0.1254*** (8.68) 0.1260*** (8.72) 0.1266*** (8.78) 0.1253*** (8.64) 
N 4561   4561   4586   4566   
Adjusted R2 0.8434   0.8430   0.8442   0.8434   
F 588.3682   593.1394   613.3160   599.0256   
p 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   














This study considers additional analyses using other variables that could influence audit 
fees including political contributions, audit report lag and controlling for lobbying expenses, 
political indicators, conservatism, discretionary accruals and corporate governance variables. 
In addition, I also remove extreme Republican and Democrat-leaning observations. The results 
for political contribution – audit fee analysis show that the variable TCONT is positively 
associated with LOGFEES, supporting the agency problems and political connections theory. 
The additional analyses reveal that Republican-leaning firms are associated with a higher 
propensity of income-decreasing earnings management (higher negative value of discretionary 
accruals) and lower audit report lag. The results of the main analyses also remain to hold after 
controlling for several factors that could affect audit fees such as discretionary accruals, 
conservatism, lobbying expenses, political indicators and corporate governance variables. 
Overall, the additional analyses support the results exhibited in the main analyses section. In 
addition, I also exclude extreme political ideologies, When the extreme Republican and 
extreme Democrat firms (CPID = +1 and -1, respectively) are excluded, the results qualitatively 
remain unchanged with firms with the Democrats orientations are associated with higher audit 










Firm involvement in the political sphere is still an ongoing debate in the U.S. and 
around the world. Researchers in accounting and finance have found mixed evidence on the 
effects of corporate political activities on financial outcomes. Thus, the study on political 
activities is still important and relevant. Corporations and individuals spend millions of dollars 
on political activities, which shows the significance of such activities for the economy. Given 
the mixed evidence and the high amount of money spent on political activities, political 
ideology could provide the rationale for why individuals and corporations might engage in 
political activities in the first place. Therefore, political ideology could be an important factor 
that might affect financial outcomes and the firm’s decision-making.  
Political ideology is an important attribute that a firm might embrace to form a 
company’s decisions and policies. Ultimately, the political ideology that a firm adopts could 
affect financial decisions. Because political ideologies can be more directly measured using 
political contributions to a political party, it is interesting to examine the impact of political 
ideologies on firms’ financial outcomes. Thus, this paper examines whether political ideology 
could also influence auditors’ assessments of audit risks and audit fees.  
There are four motivations for investigating the relationship between political ideology 
and audit fees. First, despite the vast literature on political activities, prior studies offer mixed 
results on whether political activities provide benefits to businesses. Thus, political ideology 
could provide insights into how political activities could influence financial outcomes. Second, 
the recently emerging accounting and finance literature on political ideology provide evidence 
that political ideology could, in fact, influence a firm’s financial outcomes and decision-






perceptions of risk, which is proxied by audit fees, has not been examined before. Therefore, 
it is important to analyse how political ideology could also play a role in influencing auditors’ 
perceptions and audit fees. Third, firms’ and investors’ political ideologies could also influence 
investment decisions. Because of this, political ideology could also have a significant impact 
on the capital market. Finally, the U.S. provides an interesting setting for hypothesis testing 
because it has two distinct, dominant political parties with divergent political ideologies. With 
the currently increasing gap between the two ideologies, it is important to examine how the 
two disparate political ideologies influence financial outcomes and play a role in the economy. 
This study makes two main contributions. First, to my knowledge, no prior study 
examined the relationship between political ideologies and audit fees extensively. Thus, this 
study is the first study that investigates the relationship between political ideology and audit 
fees. In addition, this thesis also proposes the channels through which political ideologies could 
affect audit fees. I propose conservatism and discretionary accruals as the possible explanations 
for how political ideologies could affect audit fees. Second, this study amplifies the importance 
of political ideology as one of the important attributes of a firm that could affect financial 
outcomes. Political ideology, as one of the important cultural attributes of firms, extends the 
currently emerging accounting and finance literature, which iterates that cultural aspects of a 
firm, such as risk-taking behaviours and religiosity, could affect financial outcomes and, 
ultimately, auditor perception.   
The results of this study show that there are differences in audit fees for firms that 
subscribe to different political ideologies. The results show that firms that contribute to the 
Republican (Democrat) ideology pay lower (higher) audit fees. I obtain similar results when 






presidential regimes. I also perform additional analyses of audit report lag. To provide a further 
explanation of how political ideologies can affect audit fees, I test financial report quality as a 
possible channel through which political ideologies could affect auditors' assessments of risks. 
The proxies I use for financial report quality are conservatism and discretionary accruals. This 
study utilises the firms’ reactions to bad news as the definition of conservatism. I find that 
Republican-leaning firms are associated with conservatism. I also use four other measures of 
conservative financial outcomes, including investment on tangible assets, ROA, R&D 
expenses and stock return volatility (standard deviation of daily stock returns - SDRET). I find 
that Republican-leaning firms are associated with higher ROA and lower R&D expenses, 
investment in tangible assets and stock return volatility, which is consistent with the argument 
that the Republican ideology is more conservative. Regarding discretionary accruals, I use 
JONES_DA and MODJONES_DA as the proxies for discretionary accruals, and I find that 
Republican-leaning firms are associated with lower discretionary accruals, implying lower 
earnings management and higher quality earnings. The higher quality earnings provided by 
Republican-leaning firms could explain the relationship between political ideologies and audit 
fees. I conduct endogeneity tests to mitigate the possibility of unobservable or omitted variable 
biases. The results are consistent with Heckman selection bias procedures. Propensity score 
matching tests reveal that the results remain unchanged with audit fees and discretionary 
accruals analyses. The results for the political ideologies-audit fees relationship is also 
consistent when using the difference-in-differences method, although I find no evidence that 
political ideology could affect conservatism and discretionary accruals using the difference-in-
differences method. 
For additional analyses, I conduct several tests to provide more explanation of the 






associated with higher audit fees, signalling that firms with individuals who make political 
contributions are associated with higher risks that are translated into higher audit fees. This 
finding is consistent with the prior literature leaning toward political activity as a form of 
corruption or bribery, as well as agency problem arguments. I also test the relationship between 
political ideologies and the negative value of discretionary accruals, and I find that Republican-
leaning firms are associated with higher negative values of discretionary accruals. This 
evidence suggests that Republican firms are associated with income-decreasing earnings 
management and more conservative financial reporting. I test the audit report lag as a proxy 
for audit risks, and I find that Republican-leaning firms are associated with lower audit report 
lag. This finding shows that Republican-leaning firms take fewer risks and are more 
conservative, which also attracts lower risk assessments. I also control for several factors that 
could have an impact on political ideologies and audit fees, such as lobbying activity, 
discretionary accruals, political indicators and conservatism. I find that the results remain 
qualitatively unchanged after controlling for lobbying expenses and discretionary accruals. In 
addition, I also control for corporate governance variables, such as the proportion of females 
and independent directors on the board. I find that the results remain qualitatively unchanged 
after controlling for the two control variables. 
This study is not without caveats. First, I use donations to proxy for firm ideology, and 
this assumes that the donation reflects political ideology when, in fact, the firm could donate 
to a political party in office to obtain contracts from the government regardless of political 
affiliations. On top of that, there is a possibility that Republican firms engage in substantial 
risk taking, thus the results in this study is an “on average” estimates. To that extent, the results 
should be interpreted with caution. Second, apart from the limited period (2000-2016), the 






outside the U.S. setting. However, this study could be applicable to countries that have 
dominant political parties with distinct political ideologies. It would be interesting for future 
studies to examine political ideology and its impact on corporate decisions beyond the U.S. 
context. Thus, researchers and practitioners could have a better understanding of how political 
ideology could affect firm policies. Last but not least, auditors might not always consider 
political affiliation in the risk assessment. However, as argued by Notbohm et al. (2018), 
auditors might review subjective matters including political ideology to strengthen their risk 
assessment of a client. Therefore, the audit fees are based on the assessment of clients’ business 
risk which is indirect and implicit. 
Future studies should consider a better measure of political ideologies. As highlighted 
in the methodology section, the measure CPID disregards the magnitude and the importance 
of political contributions. The variable does not consider the amount of the contribution to each 
party. Furthermore, future research should also use a more sophisticated measure to capture 
donation importance. In terms of the events that occurred within the sample period, future 
works should consider major events such as the implementation of SOX, S404 and the global 
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Appendix 1. Variable Definitions 
 
1. Dependent Variables 
 
Main Analysis 
LOGFEES: Natural logarithm of audit fees obtained from AuditAnalytics database. 
Discretionary Accruals Tests 
JONES_DA: Discretionary accruals model based on Jones (1991). 
MODJONES_DA: Modified Jones discretionary accruals model based on Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995). 
Conservatism Tests 
INV: Capital expenditures divided by net property plant and equipment. 
R&D: Research and development expenditures divided by total assets. 
SDRET: Stock return volatility, measured by the standard deviation of daily stock return. 
C_SCORE: Firm-year measure of accounting conservatism developed by Khan and Watts 
(2009) which is measure by using three variables; Size (natural log of equity value), MTB 
(market to book ratio) and Leverage (long term and short term debt of market value of equity). 
Audit Report Lag Test 
REPORTLAG: Natural logarithm of number days from financial year-end until audit report is 
signed. 
 
2. Test Variables 
 
LOGDEM: Natural logarithm of aggregate individual political contributions to the Democrats 
Party. 
LOGREP: Natural logarithm of aggregate individual political contributions to the Republican 
Party. 
CPID: Corporate political ideology which is measured by contributions to Republican Party 
minus contributions to Democrats Party over total contributions in a given year. 
TCONT: Total political contributions measure which is measured by firm-year aggregate 
individual political contributions divided by total assets (total assets is in millions). 
 








LOG_AT: Firm’s size measure which is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
MTB: Market to book ratio which is measured by share price multiplied by common share 
outstanding over total common/ordinary equity. 
LOGSEG: Natural logarithm of a number of business segments that a firm involved in. 
FOREIGN: A dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm has a foreign operation and 0 
otherwise. 
ROA: Return on assets which are measured by net income over total assets. 
LEV: Leverage is total liabilities over total assets. 
RECINV: Sum of total inventories over total receivables. 
PPE: Property, plant and equipment is net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. 
LOSS: The loss dummy that takes the value of 1 of the firm incurred a loss in the current period 
and 0 otherwise. 
SPI: A dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm has special items and 0 otherwise. 
ISSUE: A dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm issue capital in the period, and 0 
otherwise.  
BIG: Auditor size dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big N 
auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
INDSPEC: Auditor industry specialist dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor 
is an industry specialist (obtain more than 30% market share in a specific industry), 0 otherwise. 
YE: A fiscal year-end dummy which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s fiscal year-end is 31 
December.  
LOGNAS: The natural logarithm of non-audit services fees. 
The difference in Differences Test 
SHIFT: A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is moving from an extreme 
Republican (CPID=+1) to a less extreme, neutral or to lean towards the Democrat (CPID<1). 
YEAR_2008: A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the financial year end is 2008 and 
afterwards. 
Conservatism Tests 
LAGLEV: Lagged total liabilities over total assets. 
INVESTCYCLE: Depreciation and amortisation over total assets. 
BIDASK: Bid–Ask is the bid–ask spread, scaled by the midpoint of the spread. 







SUMLOBBY: Natural logarithm of total firm’s lobbying expenses.  
Corporate Governance Variables 
INDBOARD: The total number of independent board members over total board size. 
FEMALEBOARD: The total number of female board members over total board size. 
Political Indexes 
PIPARTY: The dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm contributes to the same party in the 
last five years, 0 otherwise. 
PIHOME: The dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm contributes to the candidate in the 
same state as the company’s headquarter in the last five years, 0 otherwise. 
Heckman Selection Bias Tests 
CPIDREP: The dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CPID>0 and 0 otherwise. 
LAMBDA: The inverse mills ratio obtained from the first stage of the Heckman selection bias 
process. 
Other Variables 
SI: The absolute value of special items divided by total assets. 
RESTRUCTURE: Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company undergoes 
restructuring, 0 otherwise. 
MERGER: A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm engages in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activities, and 0 otherwise.  
 
4. Fixed Effects 
 
INDUS: Industry dummy variable, included in all regressions. 









Appendix 2. Contributions Limits for 2017-2018 Federal Election 
 
   
   



















































































More detailed information is provided on https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-






 The FEC defines nonconnected committee as any committee that conducts activities in 
connection with an election, but that is not a party committee, an authorised committee 
of any candidate for federal election, or a separate segregated fund. 11CFR 106.6(a). 
 Multicandidate committee: A political action committee or party committee that has 
been registered at least 6 months, has more than 50 contributors and, with the exception 
of state party committees, has made contributions to at least 5 candidates for federal 
office. 11 CFR 100.5(e)(3).  
 Party Committee: a political committee that represents a political party and is part of 












Supreme Court Strikes Down Overall 
Political Donation Cap 
Protesters at the Supreme Court, which has been hostile recently to campaign finance 







Protesters at the Supreme Court, which has been hostile recently to campaign finance 
limits.CreditCreditDoug Mills/The New York Times 
By Adam Liptak 
April 2, 2014 
WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court on Wednesday continued its abolition of 
limits on election spending, striking down a decades-old cap on the total amount any 
individual can contribute to federal candidates in a two-year election cycle. 
The ruling, issued near the start of a campaign season, will very likely increase the 
role money plays in American politics. 
The 5-to-4 decision, with the court’s more conservative members in the majority, 
echoed Citizens United, the 2010 decision that struck down limits on independent 
campaign spending by corporations and unions. 
Wednesday’s decision seemed to alter campaign finance law in subtle but important 
ways, notably by limiting how the government can justify laws said to restrict the 
exercise of First Amendment rights in the form of campaign contributions. 
The court’s 88-page decision reflected sharply different visions of the meaning of the 
First Amendment and the role of government in regulating elections, with the 
majority deeply skeptical of government efforts to control participation in politics, 
and the minority saying that such oversight was needed to ensure a functioning 
democracy. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for four justices in the controlling opinion, 
said the overall limits could not survive First Amendment scrutiny. “There is no right 
in our democracy more basic,” he wrote, “than the right to participate in electing our 
political leaders.”  
In a dissent from the bench, Justice Stephen G. Breyer called the majority opinion a 
disturbing development that raised the overall contribution ceiling to “the number 
infinity.” 
“If the court in Citizens United opened a door,” he said, “today’s decision may well 
open a floodgate.” 
Such oral dissents are rare, and they signal deep disagreements. But Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Breyer noted from the bench that the other side’s arguments 
were well presented. 
Wednesday’s decision did not affect familiar base limits on contributions from 
individuals to candidates, currently $2,600 per candidate in primary and general 
elections. But it said that overall limits of $48,600 by individuals every two years for 
contributions to all federal candidates violated the First Amendment, as did separate 






In his written opinion, Justice Breyer said Wednesday’s decision would allow “a 
single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a 
candidate’s campaign.” He was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. 
The ruling, which goes in effect in a matter of weeks, concerned only contributions 
from individuals. Federal law continues to ban direct contributions by corporations 
and unions, though they remain free to spend unlimited sums through “super PACs” 
and similar vehicles. 
The case, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, No. 12-536, was brought by 
Shaun McCutcheon, an Alabama businessman, and the Republican National 
Committee. Mr. McCutcheon, who had contributed a total of about $33,000 to 16 
candidates for federal office in the 2012 election cycle, said he had wanted to give 
$1,776 each to 12 more but was stopped by the overall cap for individuals. The party 
committee said it wanted to receive contributions above the legal limit for political 
committees. 
In an interview last fall, Mr. McCutcheon said his goal was to encourage the adoption 
of conservative principles. “To me,” he said, “being a conservative means smaller 
government and more freedom.” 
Chief Justice Roberts said the core purpose of the First Amendment was to protect 
political speech from government interference, even if many people might welcome 
it. 
“They would be delighted to see fewer television commercials touting a candidate’s 
accomplishments or disparaging an opponent’s character,” he wrote. “Money in 
politics may at times seem repugnant to some, but so, too, does much of what the 
First Amendment vigorously protects. If the First Amendment protects flag burning, 
funeral protests and Nazi parades — despite the profound offense such spectacles 
cause — it surely protects political campaign speech despite popular opposition.” 
The decision chipped away at the central distinction drawn in Buckley v. Valeo, the 
court’s seminal 1976 campaign finance decision. Independent spending, the court 
said in Buckley, is political speech protected by the First Amendment. But 
contributions may be capped, the court said then, in the name of preventing 
corruption. The court added in passing that aggregate contribution limits were a 
“quite modest restraint upon protected political activity” that “serves to prevent 
evasion” of the base limits. 
Chief Justice Roberts said that brief passage on overall limits had to be reconsidered 
in light of regulatory developments and other factors. But he added that the Buckley 
decision’s general structure remained intact. “We see no need,” he said, “to revisit 






The chief justice said that while the $2,600 base limits were also intact, the overall 
caps placed an unacceptable burden on “an individual’s right to participate in the 
public debate through political expression and political association.” 
 
 
Before and After the Supreme Court’s Ruling 
How Wednesday’s decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission changes 
the total amount individual donors can contribute to federal candidates, national 
parties and political committees. 
April 2, 2014 
“The government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support 
than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse,” he wrote. 
Leveling the playing field is not an acceptable interest for the government, Chief 
Justice Roberts said. Nor is “the possibility that an individual who spends large sums 
may garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties,” he 
added, quoting Citizens United. 
The only acceptable justification, he said, was rooting out “quid pro quo corruption” 
or the appearance of it. 
Justice Breyer said that analysis was too narrow. “The anticorruption interest that 
drives Congress to regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more important 
interest than the plurality acknowledges,” he wrote. “It is an interest in maintaining 






“Where enough money calls the tune,” he wrote, “the general public will not be 
heard.” 
The Roberts court has been consistently hostile to campaign finance limits. In a half-
dozen earlier cases, the five more conservative justices have voted together, though 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. have sometimes taken a more 
incremental approach than the bolder one called for by Justices Anthony M. 
Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. 
Wednesday’s decision is likely to increase overall campaign spending, but it may also 
rechannel some of it away from super PACs and toward candidates and parties. 
“The existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the movement of money away 
from entities subject to disclosure,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote. “Because 
individuals’ direct contributions are limited, would-be donors may turn to other 
avenues for political speech.” He was joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy and Scalia. 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. 
The main opinions spent many pages arguing over the possibility that the basic limits 
could be circumvented without the overall caps. Justice Breyer gave detailed 
examples, which Chief Justice Roberts dismissed as speculative and highly 
implausible. The chief justice added that Congress could address some perceived 
loopholes through earmark requirements, transfer restrictions, segregated accounts 
and mandated disclosure, though he did not say that those efforts would pass 
constitutional muster. 
Justice Breyer said there was little hope that regulators would vigorously enforce 
even the existing limits. 
More broadly, he said the decision was one “that substitutes judges’ understandings 
of how the political process works for the understanding of Congress; that fails to 
recognize the difference between influence resting upon public opinion and influence 
bought by money alone; that overturns key precedent; that creates huge loopholes in 
the law; and that undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of campaign finance 
reform.” 
A version of this article appears in print on April 3, 2014, on Page A1 of the New York edition with 
the headline: Justices, 5-4, Void Key Spending Cap in Political Races. Order Reprints | Today’s 













Companies to Explain 
Their Politics 
 By Communications 
 July 10, 2006 
 
Shareholder initiatives requiring greater disclosure of corporate campaign 
contributions and lobbying have fared better in 2006 but still mostly fail. 
By Neil Tambe 
July 10, 2006 | Shareholders who are concerned that corporations’ political activities 
could devalue their stocks are increasingly prodding public companies to make their 
political contributions and lobbying activities more transparent. So far, most 
companies are pushing back. 
Two initiatives put forth by shareholders at this year’s annual meeting for JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. would have required the financial giant to disclose how and why it uses 
company money to play politics. JPMorgan’s board of directors, which would have 
been charged with greater oversight of all corporate political activity, opposed the 
initiatives, and the resolutions failed to win a majority of shareholders’ votes at the 
company’s May meeting. 
On average, shareholder support for such transparency resolutions is double what it 
was just two years ago; for the 2006 proxy season, it was 21% per company, 
according to the Center for Political Accountability (CPA), which has been advocating 
for greater transparency of corporate political activity since 2003. So far, 12 






CPA has been working with investment groups that advocate positions on corporate 
practices—socially responsible investors, they call themselves—and labor groups to 
get transparency initiatives on corporate ballots. CPA contends that unchecked 
political activity can pose risks to a company’s stock price. The center’s Green Canary 
Report argues that “the failure of companies to conduct due diligence on their 
political giving and ultimate recipients” could negatively affect shareholder value by 
tarnishing the company’s reputation if the company’s politics contradict its policies. 
The report cites such companies as SBC Communications, BellSouth, Altria Group and 
Union Pacific, whose corporate policies support gay and lesbian employees but 
whose political contributions may have funded anti-gay groups. The companies that 
CPA singles out all contributed to a conservative political action committee formed 
by former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, called Americans for a Republican 
Majority PAC (ARMPAC), which then funded three groups that actively oppose gay 
rights. 
The transparency advocates’ report also attempts to show that a company whose 
business strategy relies too heavily on political giving may have underlying financial 
problems—examples include Enron, Worldcom and Qwest. 
This year, CPA worked with the Green Century Balanced Fund, a socially responsible 
institutional investment firm, to bring resolutions to four companies: Coca-Cola, 
Pepsi Co., the California-based biotechnology firm Amgen and Home Depot. The two 
beverage companies agreed to greater transparency without even bringing the issue 
to a shareholder vote. 
“It’s very unusual to get such an immediate positive result,” said Andrew Shalit, Green 
Century’s director of shareholder advocacy. 
Amgen’s board recommended that shareholders approve the measure that CPA 
helped Green Century propose to the biotech company, and 75% of them did. At 
Home Depot, where the board opposed the resolution, only 34% of shareholders 
voted for it, which killed the proposal. Sometimes companies implement policies 
without majority shareholder approval, but without board endorsement, shareholder 
initiatives of any sort typically fail. 
Companies say laws require enough disclosure 
Federal campaign finance laws prohibit contributions to candidates and national 
party committees from corporate treasuries, but a company can form a political 






PAC’s political contributions. State and local laws vary, but in some areas 
corporations can contribute directly to candidates and parties. 
Corporations may also contribute, in unlimited amounts, to tax-exempt groups that 
engage in political activity but escape campaign finance rules because the groups are 
not intended to directly affect the outcome of elections. Corporate donations to such 
trade groups, social welfare organizations and political issue advocacy groups known 
as 527 committees are not always disclosed. 
Aside from donations to political candidates, parties and tax-exempt groups, large 
public companies typically try to influence legislation and government policy through 
lobbying. That’s another area where shareholders deserve to know more, said Tom 
Borelli, portfolio manager at the Free Enterprise Action Fund, a socially responsible 
mutual fund advocating for free-market principles. 
Borelli, who presented one of the two shareholder resolutions considered at this 
year’s annual meeting of JPMorgan, is skeptical of the rationale behind the 
company’s public policy positions and political activity. His resolution, which failed 
with a 24% approval rate, called for disclosure of the company’s lobbying priorities. 
“Just come to us with some rationale as to why this is more important than that,” 
Borelli said in regard to JPMorgan, which has agreed to further dialogue on the issue. 
The labor union AFL-CIO put forth the other JPMorgan resolution. Borelli said he 
opposed the measure because he found that there was not direct evidence that the 
company’s political contributions endangered shareholder value. He questioned the 
intentions of the labor groups involved in presenting shareholder resolutions for 
more transparency, speculating that unions have more of a political interest in 
corporate issues—such as Social Security privatization—than they do in shareholder 
value. Labor groups have given more than $34.6 million in federal political 
contributions so far in the 2006 election cycle, according to the non-partisan Center 
for Responsive Politics. 
Companies opposed to shareholder resolutions like the AFL-CIO’s make arguments 
based on cost, redundancy and strategic issues. 
“Public disclosure of the specific business rationale for each political donation could 
place Citigroup at a competitive disadvantage by revealing its strategies and 
priorities,” the financial company stated in its response (PDF) to a transparency 
resolution backed by some shareholders this year. 
A spokesman for Amgen, which is now implementing stockholders’ proposal for 






disadvantage nor that the costs of implementation were significant. Companies 
opposed to saying any more about their political activities also argue that they 
already disclose their contributions as required by law. JPMorgan Chase told its 
shareholders, “The Board believes that the information required to be disclosed 
under the proposal is duplicative of information already available to the Firm’s 
stockholders and the public, and would cause the Firm to incur additional and 
unnecessary expense,” according to the company’s 2006 proxy statement (PDF). 
Companies are not required by law to provide aggregate lists of all their company’s 
political contributions. Rather, they report contributions to various jurisdictions. The 
Center for Responsive Politics provides information on corporate contributions to 
federal campaigns, parties and committees at its website OpenSecrets.org. To find 
disclosure for state-level contributions, shareholders must turn to various online 
databases run by states or to the central database of the National Institute on Money 
in State Politics. 
Disclosure of contributions to committees and organizations not regulated by the 
FEC is not as rigorous. 
Finding information about contributions to so-called 527 organizations requires 
navigating through forms filed with Internal Revenue Service (whose tax-code 
designation for the groups lends them their common name). The Center for 
Responsive Politics also maintains a publicly available online database. 
Much is secret about involvement in trade associations 
Corporations are not required to disclose their contributions to trade and social 
welfare organizations, which are also under the IRS’s jurisdiction. Trade associations 
may elect to withhold the identities of their members by paying a penalty called a 
“proxy tax.” Even if they name their members, the amount that individual companies 
contribute for political purposes remains largely undisclosed. 
Critics say this wrinkle can benefit corporations that may want to downplay the 
extent of their affiliation with trade groups that participate in political activities 
contrary to company values or that would lead to public scrutiny. 
Trade organizations can participate in unlimited lobbying to influence legislation 
relevant to their purposes and can make political expenditures to influence elections 
so long as that is not their primary purpose. 
Bruce Freed, co-founder of the Center for Political Accountability, said that trade 






source to recipient and that he finds trade groups’ definition of political spending to 
be too narrow. 
Next year, the Green Century Balanced Fund plans to push the companies in which it 
invests to say more about their contributions to trade associations. Shalit, the firm’s 
shareholder advocate, says he’s not expecting immediate success. 








Supreme Court Ends Overall 
Limit on Political Donations 
Justices, in 5-4 Vote, Rule $123,200 Cap on Individuals' Giving in Election 
Cycle Violates Free Speech 
 
By Jess Bravin And Colleen McCain Nelson 






WASHINGTON—The Supreme Court struck down some caps on political 
contributions Wednesday, the latest in a string of decisions rolling back campaign-
finance regulations that have fundamentally altered how elections are fought. 
By a 5-4 vote, the court threw out the limit, currently $123,200, on what any 
individual can give to all federal candidates and political committees over a two-year 
election cycle. The plurality opinion, by Chief Justice John Roberts, said those caps 
infringe on First Amendment free-speech rights and aren't justified by the public 
interest in fighting political corruption. 
The court left intact limits on how much an individual can give to specific candidates 
and political committees, including $2,600 per candidate for each primary or general 
election. But the court's liberal dissenters, led by Justice Stephen Breyer, accused the 
majority of setting the stage to dismantle "the whole of campaign-finance regulation" 
in future cases. 
 
High Court Strikes Down Limits on Campaign Funds 
The Supreme Court struck down aggregate limits on political contributions, saying such rules violate the 






Political parties, which have seen their influence wane as outside groups that can 
collect unlimited sums have played an increasingly larger role in campaigns, could be 
one of the prime beneficiaries of Wednesday's ruling. 
Previously, aggregate limits forced donors to choose among party committees and 
candidates, donating to a select few before bumping up against the $123,200 cap. 
Meantime, super PACs and some other outside groups have been playing by a 
different set of rules that allow unlimited donations, sometimes without public 
disclosure of donors' names. 
Reince Priebus, chairman of the Republican National Committee and a plaintiff in the 
case, predicted more money will now flow to candidates and committees that are 
required to disclose their donors, bolstering transparency. "What the campaign finance 
laws have done is put party committees in a place where we have the most restrictions, 
the most disclosure, and we can raise the least," he said. "What's happened is that the 
groups that can raise the most disclose the least." 
 
Jerry Seib: High Court Lifts Campaign Spending Limits 
The Supreme Court lifted a ban, Tuesday, on how much an individual can spend during an election season. 
WSJ's Jerry Seib explains why some are so upset over the ruling. 
Democrats said the ruling would open the floodgates to more corrosive money in 
politics. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) said striking down the aggregate limits would 






In the 2012 election, an estimated 644 individuals donated the maximum amount 
allowed by law to candidates and political parties, with about 60% of the money going 
to Republican causes, according to the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics. 
Their $93.4 million in contributions were a tiny fraction of the overall amount of 
money spent on elections. 
Roughly 1.2 million Americans made donations of $200 or more in the 2012 election. 
In all, those donations accounted for $2.8 billion, or 64% of the amount of money 
spent on the 2012 election, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. 
 
The case was brought by Alabama businessman Shaun McCutcheon, pictured here leaving the Supreme 
Court in October 2013 after the justices heard oral arguments in the case. REUTERS 
Wednesday's ruling follows the court's landmark 2010 Citizens United case, where a 
similar 5-4 majority overruled two precedents to throw out limits on political spending 
by corporations and unions. 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that while "Congress may regulate campaign 
contributions to protect against corruption" or its appearance, it "may not regulate 
contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics" or to level the playing 






The chief justice didn't question precedents holding that giving unlimited amounts to a 
specific candidate could create an appearance of corruption. But he said that was a 
"prophylactic measure" to prevent crimes like bribery, apparently leaving open for 
another day whether that interest could justify the restriction on political speech it 
entailed. 
The case was brought by businessman Shaun McCutcheon, a 46-year-old electrical 
engineer from Hoover, Ala., who describes himself as a late bloomer to politics. He 
said he found himself quickly frustrated by restrictions on the number of candidates he 
could back. 
The Republican National Committee backed him, while Democratic groups and 
activists argued that the campaign regulation, which traces to the post-Watergate 
overhauls of the 1970s, was valid. 
 
In an interview Wednesday, Mr. McCutcheon hailed the decision, saying more money 
"creates more competition and puts more ideas out there. I don't see how it could hurt 
anything. We're talking about free speech in a free country." 
Justice Breyer, who took the unusual step of reading his dissent from the bench, said 
an individual's interest in giving to an unlimited number of candidates and committees 
should be balanced against maintaining public confidence in the political system. 
"Giving, say, $3,000 or more to each of 435 candidates, a total of $1.3 million, 






Citizens United opened a door, today's decision may well open a floodgate," so that "a 
few large donations…drown out the voices of the many," he said, joined in his dissent 
by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. 
Josh Earnest, a White House spokesman, said the administration was disappointed and 
concurs with Justice Breyer's opinion that when combined with Citizens United the 
ruling "eviscerates our nation's campaign finance laws." 
The Obama administration argued the aggregate limit helps prevent donors from 
circumventing contribution caps to specific candidates by restricting money in the 
system. But Chief Justice Roberts dismissed as implausible the scenarios of corruption 
the government suggested could follow if the aggregate cap was lifted. 
Political spending is a form of free speech, he said, and therefore any restriction must 
pass the highest constitutional scrutiny to survive. "If the First Amendment protects 
flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades—despite the profound offense such 
spectacles cause—it surely protects political campaign speech despite popular 
opposition," he wrote, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and 
Samuel Alito. 
Justice Clarence Thomas voted with the majority, but wrote separately to say he 
favors striking down all restrictions on political contributions. 
Wednesday's decision marks another turn from the court's 1976 opinion in Buckley v. 
Valeo, which established the legal framework for campaign finance law after 
Watergate. That ruling struck down limits on campaign expenditures as infringing 
"core First Amendment rights," but upheld regulation of contributions, finding them a 
limit on "symbolic expression" rather than pure speech. 
Many fundraisers praised the Supreme Court's decision, though some said privately 
that it would lead to even pressure on them to donate more money. 
"This will mean my phone lines will light up," said Rick Hohlt, a longtime Republican 
donor and Washington lobbyist. Mr. Hohlt and his wife regularly donate the 






Ray Washburne, the chief of fundraising for the Republican National Committee, said 
the court decision had an immediate impact. He was meeting in Chicago Wednesday 
morning with two wealthy donors who had already hit the donation cap. When the 
court's decision came out during his meeting with one donor, the individual agreed to 
contribute the maximum $32,400 to the RNC. "It's already helped, he maxed out, now 
he maxed out to me too," Mr. Washburne said in a telephone interview. 
—Brody Mullins contributed to this article. 











Investors Push for Fuller Picture 
of Corporate Political 
Contributions 
Donations to trade groups, candidates and political-action committees 
attract more scrutiny 
 
ILLUSTRATION: ERIC PALMA 
By Mara Lemos Stein and Maxwell Murphy 
April 4, 2016 9:38 p.m. ET 
With an especially contentious campaign season in full swing, corporate political 
spending is a hot topic this proxy season. 
Though regulators don’t require it, more than half the S&P 500 companies make some 






study by the Center for Political Accountability and the Wharton School’s Zicklin 
Center for Business Ethics Research. 
Investors, however, are demanding a fuller picture of companies’ political giving and 
lobbying efforts. 
More than 100 resolutions on the subject have been, or could be, presented to the 
largest U.S. companies, according to ISS Voting Analytics. That figure is based on 
proposals filed as of Monday, plus a tally of proponents who say they plan to propose 
similar ones. 
“Disclosure, board oversight and robust compliance are intertwined and an integral 
part of enterprise risk management of political spending,” said Bruce Freed, president 
and founder of the CPA, which advocates greater disclosure of such spending. 
Investors aren’t necessarily looking to end corporate involvement in politics, but some 
of them want to make sure it is aligned with a company’s stated goals, and say 
disclosure will bolster accountability. 
“What we are asking for in disclosure is that a company be upfront and explain why 
such spending is important” for the company’s strategy, said Timothy Smith, director 
of environmental, social and governance shareowner engagement at Walden Asset 
Management, which manages about $2.7 billion of assets. 
Cash donated to trade groups, political candidates and political-action committees has 
come under greater scrutiny, especially if they involve hot-button issues. 
“CFOs pay attention to material financial results; they also pay attention to risk and 
compliance,” Mr. Smith said. 
The amounts companies spend and disclose vary widely. Last year, Verizon 
Communications Inc. contributed $199,450 to individual candidates and just over $1 
million to party organizations, ballot initiatives, political-action committees and other 
groups, according to a report on its website. The figures don’t include contributions by 






General Electric Co. , meanwhile, contributed $695,850 to U.S. campaigns and 
organizations last year, down from $891,094 a year earlier, but doesn’t disclose 
contributions by its employee-funded PACs. 
Verizon declined to comment, as did a GE spokeswoman. 
Corning Inc. will begin in July to post semiannual reports on its contributions and 
lobbying, responding to shareholder request for more information. The voluntary 
disclosure “supports our good-governance practice,” said Corning finance chief Tony 
Tripeny. 
One thing that frustrates investors is the lack of a central repository for data on 
corporate giving. Finding out how much a company gave to politicians, causes and 
trade groups would require searches of dozens of databases, and even that might not 
yield a complete record. 
Despite the increased attention, shareholder resolutions on political spending received 
an average of 27% support last year, according to ISS. 
In many cases, such proposals don’t come to a vote at all, but they often open a 
discussion between a company’s management and investors. 
New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer, who manages the city’s pension funds, is 
pressing the issue at several companies. 
“We want to ensure that any corporate political spending advances the long-term 
interests of the company and its shareowners, not the personal political preferences of 
a particular executive with access to the corporate purse strings,” he said. 
One way of measuring progress on openness about corporate political contributions is 
the CPA-Zicklin index, which shows that 25% of the companies in the S&P 500 index 
placed some type of restriction on their political spending in 2015. The CPA-Zicklin 
Index has registered a steady improvement in transparency and accountability in that 
area. 
“Companies need to think strategically about these issues,” said Zachary Parks, 






ignore disclosure initiatives have been the target of shareholder resolutions, bad press 
and lawsuits. But kitchen-sink disclosure isn’t risk free,” he said. 
Mandatory reporting may be on the horizon. 
In 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed requiring companies to 
disclose their political activities, but it hasn’t acted despite support for the idea in most 
of the 1.2 million comment letters it received. 
A rider to the federal budget passed in December barred the agency from spending its 
resources pursuing a political-spending measure through the end of the fiscal year. 
The SEC declined to comment. 
With or without a prompt from Congress, the SEC is likely to adopt a rule requiring 
some kind of disclosure on corporate political giving by public companies, said 
William Lawlor, a partner in Dechert LLP. 
“It’s really a question of when, not if,” he added. 











Article 5.  
Money in politics: Our view 
The Editorial Board, USA TODAYPublished 5:03 p.m. ET July 26, 2016 | Updated 5:23 p.m. ET July 26, 2016 
Democrats say one thing, do another. 
 
(Photo: Justin Lane, epa) 
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Democrats want you to know that they are really, really against big money in politics. 
The party platform, adopted this week at the Philadelphia convention, calls for “a 
government that represents the American people, not just a handful of powerful and 
wealthy special interests.” It demands an end to super PACs. And it calls for a 
constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens 
United decision, which opened the door to unlimited corporate and union contributions. 
“This election is about overturning Citizens United, (which) allows the wealthiest people 
in America, like the billionaire Koch brothers, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars 
buying elections and, in the process, undermine American democracy,” Bernie Sanders 
declared in his speech Monday night. 
Perhaps sometime in a faraway world, the blessed day will arrive when Citizens 
United is reversed. For the time being, however, there’s a big difference between what 






Committee emails, in addition to showing DNC favoritism toward Hillary Clinton in her 
race against Sanders, provide an unseemly inside look at the care and feeding of major 
donors. 
One of the emails refers to a “$200,000 Tribe Package” that comes with five premier 
hotel rooms for the convention, credentials and tickets for various events, and “five 
reserved places for an exclusive roundtable and campaign briefing with high-level 
Democratic officials.” 
 
Money, influence are here to stay: Opposing view 
 
The DNC’s selling of access extends all the way to the White House. The emails reflect 
much back and forth about which Democratic fat cat deserved to sit next to President 
Obama at a roundtable discussion in May with 28 major party financiers at the 
Jefferson Hotel in Washington. 
The Republicans are only slightly less hypocritical about all this. The party’s 
presidential nominee, billionaire businessman Donald Trump, routinely criticizes big 
donors and lobbyists. He vows to upend Washington’s rigged system and portrays 
himself as too rich to be bought. But, after Trump largely self-funded his primary bid, 
his campaign is actively fundraising and has endorsed a super PAC committed to 
helping him win the White House this fall. 
Despite all the bipartisan talk about rigged systems, both Cleveland and Philadelphia 
have been awash in corporate cash and special interest money. The conventions 
outside the convention halls — the parts you don’t see on TV — feature the usual whirl 
of partying, networking, lobbying, fundraising, marketing, influence-buying and 
influence-peddling. Some of these events occur simultaneously with the prime-time 
convention schedule. 
Big money is a threat to democracy, even more so at the congressional level than the 
presidential one. In Congress, issues ranging from tax policy to climate change get 
tilted toward moneyed interests. Congressional candidates spend obscene amounts of 
time dialing for dollars like telemarketers, instead of doing the jobs they are elected to 
do. 
Potential reforms range from prompt disclosure of “dark money” contributions all the 






touch the millions of dollars in questionable and often tax-deductible corporate 
contributions to the Clintons’ family charity, which raise many of the same questions. 
Until the campaign-financing system changes, you can’t expect the Democrats to 
unilaterally disarm. But as long as they are slurping at the trough, they shouldn’t be so 
sanctimonious about it. 
USA TODAY's editorial opinions are decided by its Editorial Board, separate from the 










Article 6.  
State politicians accepted illegal donations 
from corporations 
By Anna Sanders 
July 28, 2018 | 9:06pm 
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Letitia James (left to right), Marc Molinaro, and Andrew CuomoGetty Images/Hans 
Pennink/James Messerschmidt 
Gov. Cuomo and other candidates for state office are hauling in thousands of illegal 
campaign contributions from corporations, The Post found. 
Cuomo’s re-election campaign has kept at least $27,000 in illegal funds from 
corporate donors, state filings show. 
Public Advocate Letitia James accepted at least $5,000 in illegal corporate 
contributions to her state attorney general campaign, filings show. And Marc 






took thousands from three corporate donors using the same address – a possible 
violation of campaign law. 
Corporations can give no more than $5,000 total a year to state candidates and 
committees under New York election law. 
“This law has been routinely violated,” said veteran Albany watcher Blair Horner, of 
the good government group NYPIRG. “I don’t know of anyone punished for doing 
this.” 
Cuomo accepted $15,000 from Saratoga Gaming and Raceway, now called 
Saratoga Casino and Raceway, in April 2016. In January 2017, his campaign got 
$10,000 from the Coalition for Ticket Fairness Inc. 
The guv also received $7,000 from Sea Crest Construction Corp. this year. 
Additionally, his campaign took two donations of $5,000 each this month from the 
Northeastern Line Constructors Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors 
Association. 
If a corporation gives $5,000 to a candidate, it can’t give to any other state 
campaigns that year. But many violations fly under the radar. Candidates also can’t 
see other recipients of corporations’ contributions until filings are released. 
For instance, Cuomo illegally received $5,000 from 110 Sand Company on July 11 – 
after it gave thousands to other state committees this year. 
Cuomo’s campaign said it receives funds “from thousands of contributors and has 
rigorous controls in place to prevent non-compliance,” including refunding any 
donations over legal limits. 
“Any overages will be returned and reflected in our next filing,” Cuomo campaign 
spokeswoman Abbey Collins added. 
For her AG campaign, James took $10,000 from Slate Property Group on May 18, 
her corporate filings show. She also took $7,500 each from Climatech HVAC Corp. 






The James campaign claimed Slate’s campaign contribution reflected sloppy 
bookkeeping, with the money actually coming came from a limited-liability company 
of the same name. LLCs have much higher contribution limits, though government 
watchdogs decry the loophole for allowing the fat contributions. 
James spokeswoman Delaney Kempner said the campaign will return $2,500 to both 
Climatech and Ipex and will conduct a “full review of donations to make sure there 
aren’t others over the limit.” 
Corporations that are affiliated with each other but registered as separate legal 
entities each get their own $5,000 donation limit. 
Molinaro may have run afoul of this workaround, filings show. His campaign took 
$4,000 each from Baright Associates, TGS Associates and Foam & Wash Express, 
all listed at the same Dutchess County address. 
While Baright and TGS are incorporated as separate businesses, Foam & Wash 
Express is not. Molinaro’s campaign insisted all donations were legal because 
another company called Baright Enterprises actually gave the $4,000 while doing 
business as Foam & Wash. 
Councilman Jumaane Williams (D-Brooklyn) took $50,000 for his campaign for 
lieutenant governor from three affiliated firms that gave above the limit, The Post 
reported earlier this month. The campaign said it will return the money and Williams 
won’t take any corporation money going forward. 
Violations are supposed to be policed by Cuomo appointee Risa Sugarman, the 
chief enforcement counsel at the Board of Elections. She is viewed as an ally of the 
governor. Sugarman refused to answer questions about enforcement on Friday. 
Retrieved from: https://nypost.com/2018/07/28/state-politicians-accepted-illegal-donations-
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